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# SOCIAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY  
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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# TO CHECK INFLATION

BY ALVIN JOHNSON

**I**NFLATION is upon us. Week by week the average citizen notes that the cost of living is going up. It now stands at an all-time high; and there is an almost universal conviction that it is going higher. Therefore people are buying whatever they foresee that they may need in the coming months. They are also buying a lot of things they won't really need. Macy's, distinguished for level-headed competence in the field of retail trade, has found it worth-while to take expensive full pages in the metropolitan press to ask us why we are buying so much. Since Christmas, according to the advertisement, the public has been buying about 25 percent more in all the department stores of New York than it bought in the corresponding period of last year.

Why are we buying so much? We have dollars, and we doubt that they will buy so much six months from now as they buy now. Get rid of the dollars and lay your hands on something tangible. That is the maxim now circulating in ever wider circles. As Europeans put it, we are "fleeing from the dollar."

It is not that any person of sound sense fears that the dollar will go the way of the European currencies in the inflationary nightmares of recent years. After the first world war Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and Italy had only token reserves of gold and gold exchange in their treasuries. Our Government possesses two-thirds of the gold available in the whole world. The European governments were staggering under debts so huge that it was utterly impossible for them to pay interest. They were bankrupt, and their money, paper based solely on government credit, struck the toboggan slide, a slide equipped with no lower end. Our Government is carrying a debt of 250 billions. But interest on the debt is under 3 percent of our national income. Double the debt: we could still pay interest without overtaxing our resources.

It is no time to sell the United States short. But the dollar—that is another matter. The dollar is shrinking in purchasing power. Why?

Economists of every school have accepted, with more or less good grace, the principle that when there is no question in the public mind of the soundness of the currency as such the movements of the price level are dominated by the relation between the volume of free purchasing power and the volume of purchasable goods. This is just another case of the ancient law of supply and demand, which has undergone two centuries of refinement but still stands. Turn loose a new fund of purchasing power—whether cash or credit, public or private—without provisions for a corresponding increase in salable commodities, and the price level is bound to rise. Flood the market with an increase in commodities, with no corresponding expansion of purchasing power, and the price level is bound to drop.

Any tyro in economics, to be sure, can bring forward exceptions to the rule: the influence of panic in speeding up the application of purchasing power; the fixing of prices by government action or by co-operative action of producers; consumer resistance, and so on. Such disturbing factors render exact quantitative calculations impossible. The forces of adjustment between purchasing power and purchasable goods encounter friction; but the forces operate just the same. Argue away the present upward movement of the price level, if you can.

Since the outbreak of the Korean war and the inauguration of the rearmament program very considerable additions have been made to the volume of purchasing power without corresponding additions to our volume of commodities. This disturbance of the normal relation of general supply and demand promises to be much more serious in the future, as we put into operation our gigantic armament plans. How many billions will be spent in the next twelve months? At least 20 billions. We shall probably have our spending mechanism geared for 40 billions next year.

But let us look at this year's 20 billions. How will it be spent?

For ships and airplanes, guns and ammunition, maintenance of our army in Korea, the building of barracks for our increasing military establishment, and similar items. Practically all of it will be spent in this country, for there are no available supplies of commodities in the Far East. Much of the 20 billions will be set free in our markets as additional purchasing power—how much we may consider later. Will there be any corresponding increase in commodities on the market? We are living in an era of virtually full employment. There are no considerable reserves of labor, nor stockpiles of material to be drawn upon. Men for the army and for the armament industries will have to be drawn away from civil production. Materials for war industry—copper, aluminum, the nonferrous metals needed for alloys, even wool and leather—will be taken in whole or in part by the Government.

Purchasing power on the market will be increased; purchasable commodities will be reduced in volume; a situation that must lead to a rising level of prices, if let alone.

To meet this impending, and actual, problem of inflation three main expedients have been widely discussed. One is the Baruch program of price regulation, freezing at once all prices and costs. The second, imputed I do not know how justly to Eric Johnston, envisages such an increase in commodity production as to take up the excess purchasing power released by rearmament. The third attacks the excess surplus by taxation, or by plans for bond issues that may carry off the surplus purchasing power and render it innocuous. I invite the reader to consider these expedients, in turn.

The Government has now undertaken a general program of price and wage freezing. We have had much relevant experience under OPA. The scheme involved rationing, with many administrative difficulties; it involved widespread, though not universal, dispositions to comply under the grave national emergency. Today there is a sense of national emergency, but it lacks the vividness of the time when Rommel was at large in North Africa, or the time of our desperate landing in Italy. We do not have equiva-

lent forces operating on us today to enforce compliance. And in default of general compliance we must count on the resurgence, on a larger scale, of the black-market operations that afflicted us even in the depths of our concern over the course of the war.

Yet controls of prices and costs can be of immense importance, in the present emergency. They can eliminate panic buying, to a large extent, and curb in some measure the more or less panicky upward movement of wages, the chief element in cost. But they would operate with difficulty against the force of a huge unbalance of free purchasing power. To give the forces of control a real chance we must in some way correct the unbalance between free purchasing power and the volume of purchasable commodities.

Is it not possible to increase that volume by stepping up production? We succeeded in this, in a measure, during the second world war. But that was a period beginning with vast numbers of men unemployed, factories closed down or operating on part-time schedules, stocks of materials piled up. We were able to carry the immense burdens of the war and yet increase our production for civil uses. Today conditions are wholly different. We have what is virtually full employment. Less than 2 million workers are unemployed, much less than the number normally shopping around for jobs. Except for military uses we have no stock piles of materials. We have no inventories crowding our warehouses. As we draw men and materials into war industry we are at our wits' ends to replace them, let alone finding workers for expansion of production for civil use.

Yet all things are possible in an economy so versatile and resourceful as that of America. Full employment or not, we still have labor resources not exploited: the modest possible million of the available unemployed; a million or more of time-expired workers who would come back if assured that their pension rights would not be impaired; an indefinite number of potential women workers not now employed. As for materials, though the Government may cut us down on steel and wood, leather and



wool, copper and aluminum and nonferrous metals for alloys, we have an industry ingenious enough to dispense with almost any material. It can make expensive shoes without leather, a fiber that outclasses wool in most respects out of coal and water and thin air. Nor does it need to confine itself to the German art of substitution. It can make thousands of goods the consumer never thought of, but which he falls for the moment he sees them.

Give industry time for the development of new commodities, new processes; for enlisting and training young workers and old; for putting its wares before the public through effective publicity: it could no doubt fill the gap between purchasing power and commodities. Industry would need time; but, alas, in the present emergency we have no time to give.

And so we are forced to approach the problem from the third angle. How can we mop up the 20 billions, more or less, of purchasing power that will be released by the armament program? First, by taxation. Of the 20 billions, 12 billions will go to labor; and it is the money received by labor that is especially inflationary. Can we devise and enforce a scheme of taxation that will take an additional 12 billions out of incomes under 5,000 dollars? To ask the question is to answer it. We can't; not with a presidential election in the offing. Nor can we take the other 8 billions out of the corporations and large private incomes without crippling the industry we depend on for the existing flow of taxes.

Then must we cut our armament garment to the cloth, "paying as we go"? That is unthinkable. We will build armaments up to our conception of safety, wherever the money is to be found. If we haven't the cash we shall build on credit. We can always call on the banks to extend our credits on their books and let us check on them for our expenses. But that is inflation.

As anyone can see, the way out is a popular loan, subscribed by rich and poor alike, absorbing the floating surplus of purchasing power and if possible enough more to permit a modest rollback in prices. In the past the Treasury has accomplished miracles in

such loans, as attested by the 35 billions in E bonds now outstanding and prepared to fall due in the next four or five years.

The Treasury is trying to persuade the holders of E bonds to keep them for another ten years. The Treasury is tremendous in its bond salesmanship. It is destined to be successful at least in part. Much of this volume of E bonds will be renewed. But we cannot expect to see a new volume floated. For the public attitude has turned sour on E bonds.

Again and again you hear E bondholders declaring that they have been gypped. They put into E bonds the money they would have liked to spend on an automobile. Now they are getting their money back; they can hardly buy a bicycle with it.

Of course like all soreheads they exaggerate. The bondholders have not been gypped out of half their purchasing power nor anything like it. Professor Sumner Slichter, the most cautious and competent of American economists, published in the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* of October 19, 1950, a detailed study of the position of the E bondholder. Some have lost more, some less, but the average gyp is only a little over 12 percent. The E bondholders in their 35 billion aggregate have been fleeced out of something under 4 billions. Are 4 billions anything for small bondholders to cry about? Yet they cry, and the outlook for maintaining and extending the volume of E bonds is dim.

Professor Slichter offers, as a way out, the flotation of a new kind of bond, with interest and principal adjustable to the level of prices. You pay a hundred dollars for a bond: if, at the end of the year, prices have gone up 10 percent, 10 percent is added to your interest; if, at the maturity of the bond, prices have advanced 100 percent you will get two hundred dollars for the one you put in. You may cheerfully put off the consumption of your money, knowing that at any later day it will buy as much as it buys today.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Julius Hirsch has pointed out that a similar procedure was used in 1923 to stabilize the value of money in Germany. The Weimar Republic issued bonds with interest and principal guaranteed in purchasing power in dollars, the dollar then being as stable as index numbers.



The idea, which Professor Slichter credits to Irving Fisher, the ablest and most indefatigable authority on money and the price level America ever produced, is older than the work of Fisher. I heard it expounded in 1895, in discussions of the gold standard. At that time money was appreciating, and the bondholder was gypping the public. But the "sound" economists felt that any concession to a purchasing power theory of money was laying profane hands on the Ark of the Covenant, the gold standard.

Today we have no "sound" economists, nor any gold standard, nor other standard except the will of the Government. There is nothing tangible behind our money except its purchasing power. Therefore it is no longer impious to lay our hands on purchasing power.

Let the Treasury undertake to float an issue of bonds, interest and principal adjustable to the price level. Would they sell? Certainly; the danger is, they might sell too well, disturbing the value of other bonds outstanding. Our Treasury, however, is very ingenious. By limitations on the interest rate, on maturity, negotiability, on the volume for which any person can subscribe, the Treasury could protect the value of the existing volume of bonds against dangerous invasion. It could still sell enough of the bonds to mop up the embarrassing excess of purchasing power and cut off inflation at its source.

Will someone say that the index numbers used to determine the price level are too imperfect to carry the load of justice to the bondholder? An immense amount of research has been applied through the last half century to perfecting the various index numbers now in use. They are not perfect, nor ever will be; but in this workaday world there is no such thing as absolute perfection. The price level, as determined by index numbers, is drawn into every negotiation between labor and management, from Maine to Los Angeles. At least 20 million workers have had their wages fixed with some reference to the price level. An instrument which is good enough for labor ought to be good enough for the bondholder.

It may be objected that an "escalator" loan might impose a serious indefinable burden on the Government. If the E bonds had been subject to the escalator principle, would not the Government instead of the E bondholders have lost 4 billions? If we had issued bonds offering purchasing power security, many more would have been sold, mopping up the surplus purchasing power that made for such inflation as we have had. Neither Government nor bondholder would have lost 4 billions, nor anything like the sum. Nor would the average household have been distressed by the constant rise in the cost of living.

But would this not impose a new responsibility on the Government—responsibility for the price level? It is not new; the Government undertook a moral responsibility for the price level when it abandoned the gold standard. It uses today such instruments as it has on hand for the exercise of this responsibility: credit control, stock market control, taxation, popular loans. It is prepared to undertake price control, and rationing if necessary.

The escalator loan would be just another instrument of price control placed in the hands of the Government. Worked with bold discretion it could exert great influence in neutralizing for the individual the effects of inflation, and in abating the force of inflation itself.

# THE SPECIALIST AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM

BY ULRICH SONNEMANN

## I

BY WAY of introducing the specialist as a psychological problem, I should like to refer to an accident that occurred several years ago in a system of caves in one of our southern states. A professional geologist, who had set out to explore the formation of rocks and their enclosures, was found dead near the entrance to which he had been unable to make his way back. Traces of his footsteps told of endless, circular, and repetitive wanderings in the subterranean maze, wanderings which at many points had come close to the sunlight, never to reach it. The circle this particular specialist described proved fatal to himself, which was strange in view of the fact that he had been a cave explorer for years and was not unfamiliar with the area where death overtook him. He had concentrated on the composition, the texture, and the stratification of rocks as keys to their genesis; he had paid little attention, it appeared, to their topology, even though it was this topology which lent him access to his subject, and even though this very topology of caves is known to depend intrinsically on the geological structure of the formations that shape them.

Intrinsic relationships are not concatenations of independent factors but features of wholes. The geologist who did not understand the topological structure of the maze that caught him, did he understand the rocks that formed that maze? Did he understand the subject matter of his specialization? Or should we not rather ask, did the subject matter of his specialization exist in the particular way in which he conceived of it, that is, cut off from its own topological characteristics, even though his entire research depended on the opportunities for exploration granted him by

these characteristics? His understanding, in any case, was not sufficient to make him master of the situation. It did not embrace the whole to which he should have applied himself, and in applying his intellect not as a central faculty of orientation but as a segregated function for research, he did not apply himself as a whole person. When he encountered a situation that tested his understanding, the understanding was revealed to be inadequate on either side, that of "subject" and that of "object." The panicky man floundering through the caves was no longer a geologist, and the rocks themselves were no longer an object of his understanding.

How does this case apply to the specialist in general? Situations of the kind described above are rare, because the same trend of social history as that which produced the assembly line and other forms of human machinery as well as the specialist, has also produced conditions of human coexistence which not only permit but even foster such segregations between a person's existence and his professional functions. It is only when the safeguards of mechanized civilization which operate on the social plane are suspended, as they were suspended in the geologist's case, that the defect becomes visible, and that is what makes the incident so instructive. The most important point it brings into focus is a peculiar lack of mastery over both the self and the object, a defect which there is reason to believe tends to be strictly correlative. But this defect becomes a problem to the person himself only in the case of those in whom a specialistic attitude, induced by society, is defied by an unconquerable demand for whole-someness.

A number of clinical cases in my own experience were extremely brilliant specialists, characterized by both a particularly great capacity for work-and-thought concentration, and at the same time a resistance to their field of specialization, which took the form of an indomitable urge to understand, master, and make wholes. It was this urge which led them originally to their orbits of interest, where they were only to find that they were not allowed by their vocation to proceed according to their subjects' own given dimensions, contours, and intrinsic nature, but were supposed to

tackle these subjects according to an arbitrarily preimposed division of professional viewpoints and an equally arbitrary determination of aims of knowledge. Without their resistance to this situation, these specialists would not have become clinical cases; what led to the conflict was not a more pathological, but a healthier trend than the one that ruled the social environment, for the urge to deal in wholes, understandingly or creatively or both, is a perennial characteristic of human nature.

Since the beginnings of the industrial revolution this urge, which used to have free play in the academic professions as well as in the work of the craftsman, has, through the division of research and the division of labor, been increasingly frustrated in both realms. The development has been justified sometimes by its own irreversibility and sometimes by its striking successfulness. The irreversibility is evident, but does not prove that the development is bound to go on forever in the same direction; the striking successfulness I will reserve for later discussion. It would seem, in any case, that this unique change in man's psychological, as well as social, situation should constitute a major topic for a science of man; but the same irreversible trend which has produced the topic has also, apparently, provided safeguards against the danger of inquiry, for there is at present no science of man. The trend operates not only against the unity of human existence; it also operates against that unity of man's knowledge about himself which would give him a conceptual scheme for an overall context of his life. Without such a conceptual scheme into which can be fitted the partial aspects of human existence, the segregated areas of facts with which the individual social and anthropological sciences deal, it is impossible to recognize in their true nature changes in man's situation which lie in more than one such area and which pervade all scientific aspects of human existence at once. Such a conceptual scheme is, in turn, not conceivable without a primary orientation on the scientist's part to needs and values *perennially human*. The perennially human, while showing up in the time-medium of history and requiring the now neglected

study of history to be seen and understood, is itself not the historical, not the "traditional," not the past, but on the contrary all that which resists historical and social changes and persists timelessly throughout them. It is evident that this element of the perennially human easily and dangerously drops out of sight in a time of accelerated social and historical change such as ours, and that reorientation to it is all the more necessary if contemporary man is to be enabled to master the stream of changing conditions around him rather than drift with its currents.

In the clinical cases mentioned above it was the perennially human which defied and withstood the temptation to drift along, inherent in certain currents of contemporary social change. The case of Mr. A may be cited as the simplest example. Mr. A, a thirty-two-year-old married man, working as an industrial architect and designer for a big firm, came to the attention of the clinic psychologists because of his nightmares and his frequent failure to reach his place of employment. Sometimes he would not leave the subway at the right station, and would ride for hours; other mornings, leaving early for work, he would persuade himself that he still had time for a walk, so would leave the subway at a stop short of his destination, take the walk, and after many hours return home. His training and work record were otherwise excellent; he seemed strongly motivated toward his tasks, and his superiors had high praise for what he accomplished once he surmounted the initial difficulty of getting to work. He was, on the whole, not absent-minded, though during the disturbed period slight instances of absent-mindedness during work hours had been observed. What then was the reason for the trouble?

From the outset of the treatment, the fear of the work setting or any misgivings in respect to the employment itself were excluded from consideration because of the patient's excellent record and his expressed satisfaction with working conditions and salary. The subway was for a time the center of diagnostic speculation, which focused on the possibility that this means of transportation was a substitution for something else; the fact that it moves under-



ground seemed to lend itself to many possible symbolizations. But the patient appeared wholly uninterested in the subway, showing neither a phobia nor any particular attachment in its respect, and behaved in the same manner when the subway was replaced by a bus. At this point, attention returned to his working situation. It was found that the man who did the excellent special work whenever he got to it was, strictly speaking, not the same person who left home to go to work.

Mr. A had been a student of architecture but also of mathematics, of art history, of sociology, of whatever he found himself in need of to comprehend more fully his particular subject matter—architecture. His ideas for the building of houses and public places were geared to his understanding of the needs of the people who were to live in the houses as individuals and to pursue their common interests in the public buildings. But he had never gotten a chance to carry out these ideas. Once employed, he found that the central interest which had provided the mainstream of spontaneous motivation toward his work was cut off and that his faculties of design, segregated from the topic of his life, were being used for purposes which neither were set by himself nor did they represent the voluntary choice of most of those who were to work in the factories and laboratories he designed. The opportunity for spontaneous consensus between man the maker and a public to be served by his learning and skill no longer applied to his situation. It did not apply in that form of society in which he lived; it might have applied even less in a society where anonymous private enterprise is replaced by the enterprise of an even more anonymous state. And yet, his learning and skill were still at his disposal; he still was able to satisfy his employers. Once he reached his place of work the segregated function took over and, so to speak, was able not only successfully to operate on its own but to compel the patient to identify himself with it to some extent. But it did so without his ultimate approval, and the conflict, quite properly, showed up during his daily transition from one version of his life to the other.

Mr. A had not been unconscious of this conflict; but he had been unaware of its meaning and thus also of its power over him in those moments when the two versions of his life were bound to clash. He had known all along where the trouble lay; but since the conflict of values underlying it had, as such, not become articulate in his mind, neither had the nature of the conflict. There was no struggle, in other words, between the "conscious" person in him and an unintegrated, unconscious complex interfering with its self-set tasks; there was struggle between two sets of the patient's motivation, one spontaneous and self-determining, the other deliberate and induced. Once the processes of articulation were encouraged and assisted by the therapist, once Mr. A knew what he had known all along but had not been ready to admit to himself, that it was right for him not to go to work, he went to work regularly for the next two months, then switched to another, far more satisfactory, though less well-paid, employment. The nightmares, symbolisms of striking literalness in which the patient had most often found himself sucked toward a hole in the ground, vanished.

The danger which the outward manifestations of the conflict and its ultimate solution warded off was one implicit in most specialization. Mr. A had been on the road to becoming a technician. A technician—a nothing-but technician, to avert misunderstandings—is not a man who successfully masters self-chosen tasks, but who sells a skill. It is evident that what is best in a skill cannot ever be sold; what can is the command of certain methods and techniques of operation. Once the skill, in this sense, is sold, the skilled function, being exploited like the egg-laying function of a chicken, loses the support of the personality; it is segregated; the personality is frustrated because its goal-strivings are no longer disposing of what has been sold, their self-developed power, their main arm of functional articulation.

This points to the inseparability between the psychological situation of the specialist and the peculiar present trends of the civilization in which he is caught. The great question that



remains is what can the segregated function possibly accomplish if the support of the personality is wanting. According to widespread belief, it should be able to accomplish more and more, to penetrate its subject matters and master its objectives better and better. But what are the criteria here for the "more" and the "better"? They are themselves technical; they are set by the particular use to which the specialist's skill is put. Unlike the criteria of the person who pursues an interest for its own sake, unlike those of the academician (in the traditional meaning of the word), these criteria do not derive from the intrinsic nature of the object; thus the truth about the object is no longer central to the operation with respect to their goals. On the part of the person, the specialist himself, we find a correlative lack of participation of the motivational mainsprings. One central characteristic of the specialist's psychological situation, then, is that he is drawn, against more or less resistance on his part, from the freedom of the academician to the technician's comfortableness and safety.

The thesis that specialization is not a way to the mastery of the subject matters of science was expressed in its most radical form by Bergson in an early discourse. The specialty, he said, which renders the scientist *maussade*—boring, sour—renders the science sterile. This sounds too sweeping, not only because some specialists have fascinating personalities but because everyone now knows for sure that since the world began nothing has equaled the triumph of specialized science. Yet if we look at the distribution throughout the sciences of those triumphs of which we can actually be sure, we find clusters of them, progressively more dense, in the direction of those fields with subject matters further and further away from human existence—mainly in physics. Closest to human existence, in those fields of psychology which explicitly deal with it, we find the least amount of certitude, though not necessarily of its assertion. This is as odd as it is perturbing, because the distribution of *responsibilities*, which in our present society lie on the shoulders of science, shows a gradient reciprocal to that of certitude; they wax in density away from

physics and in the direction of psychology. They do so not only because psychology has become a fad and a social power, but because its subject matter, man, has lost in self-certitude at the rate at which he has found certitude in physics; believing he has gained in power over the forces of nature, he is rapidly yielding his power over himself to these forces, is replacing by television what in vision he has lost, and is seeking the lost self-certitude in the self-assured vagaries which popular psychology offers.

## II

It is in these vagaries of popular psychology that specialism comes into its fullest bloom and into sharpest focus as a social phenomenon. The attitude of the psychologizing specialist can be characterized by a striking lack of humility before his own subject matter, a blindness to its given dimensions, and a mechanistic inclination to divide it arbitrarily and to force it to yield data which are the product of the method of investigation rather than intrinsic to that which is investigated. The resulting errors in psychological science itself will be characterized in more detail later. On the part of the psychologizing specialist's attitude, viewing it from a wider perspective, we find an equally perturbing inclination toward a dogmaticalness, all too often charged with high emotion, that, indifferent to the inarticulateness of its own premises, absolutizes the point of view of a certain school and more and more often the point of view of a certain technique.

This observation forces us to compare the situation of the psychologizing specialist with that of the specialist in physics. When we do so we find, first of all, that the subject matter of physics, being so remote from human existence, admits of an increasing and comparatively easy separation, conceptual as well as experimental, between phenomenal observations and theoretical laws behind the phenomena, without the danger of a constant mix-up between the two. The way toward specialization was not paved by an arbitrarily preimposed subdivision of the science, as has happened in the existing subdivisions of the nonexistent science

of man, but by whatever problems the intrinsic nature of the subject matter posed; whatever helped the solution of these problems was investigated. The subject matter of physics, then, could be defined in terms of problems which led the physicist on; in some fields closer to human existence, even the definition of problems, the aims of knowledge, may vary with the schools. But correlative to this fortunate situation on the *object* side of physics, we seem to find, certainly, not any less interest in his own science on the part of the physicist, not even, necessarily, any less emotionalism in regard to his theoretical positions, but a greater basic detachment from aprioristic premises and from the danger of confounding his own school of thought with the science. The corpuscular theory of light was superseded by the wave theory but returned in a reunion—happy according to some, precarious according to others—with the wave theory after Planck had expounded his theory of quanta. There was at any rate no schism of schools, the reason being that the scientist's own existence was nowhere involved. As we move nearer to fields which do concern human existence, the typical specialist's attitude in defense of his theoretical position can be seen to grow increasingly more emotional and more inclined to disparage rather than answer his opponent's points. Carlyle tells of a philologist who was sincerely convinced that eternal damnation awaited another philologist because of the latter's theory of irregular verbs. We encounter similar attitudes throughout the realm of philosophy and the contemporary social sciences.

Specialistic attitudes, then, do not lead to an organic unification of the field of a science unless the nature of its subject matter explicitly calls for such attitudes. The often-heard claim, however, that they are necessary for a successful penetration of all the subject matters of science, in brief, for *concentration* per se, not only is at odds with the given nature of certain subject matters but at least as much with that of concentration itself. The lives of many of the most successful scholars in all sciences, of those whom, for some reason or other, no one ever conceives of calling specialists,

are full of amazingly successful concentrations on subjects completely remote from their main fields of interest, yet linked with them by an attitude of continuous readiness for experience on the part of those scholars. This raises the whole problem of successful concentration as a psychological one and suggests that concentration is a cyclic phenomenon which, like any other cyclic phenomenon, cannot be understood without its own opposite, its rhythmical counterpart in the temporal succession of the phases of life. The structure of biographies most pertinent to our problem shows clearly that the less concentrated, the more relaxed, and the wider in scope a person's orbit of phenomenal experience in the intervals *between* the phases of concentration, the stronger and more penetrating concentration is likely to be, since it is in the intermittent phases that those resources of experience are gathered from which the processes of concentration will themselves have to draw.

It would seem, then, that theoretical strength does not, as it should according to a lay prejudice, grow at the rate at which phenomenal experience is reduced but that the two are correlative and complementary; the richer the phenomenal experience, the richer the *observation* in a state of receptive detachment, the sharper and purer the theories that draw from it. The attitude that favors a full articulation of such cycles does not, as a mechanistic misunderstanding has it, favor any such thing as spreading over field after field. It is not concerned with everything but with the whole. A whole, whether encountered by the physicist or the social scientist, is a lawful context which gives significance to each particular part-phenomenon that articulates itself within it; what makes its inner lawfulness understandable, however, is its own overall significance which it derives from the broader contexts in which it is embedded and to which it refers. The true academician's subject matter, *in principle*, thus becomes the universe: whatever he encounters—and it may lie in exceedingly small sectors of fields—occurs to him in such a way as to represent a universal order. Such a universal order, since it already deter-

mines the phenomenal structure under the scientist's observation, is inseparable from that structure; to the extent, then, to which it drops out of his sight, to the extent to which his preconceived procedure interferes with the self-articulation of any objects under his attack, phenomenal structure will escape, first his eye, ultimately his theories.

This allows for a closer differentiation, already overdue, between legitimate and illegitimate "specialism," and for a definition of "specialistic attitude" as characterized in this paper. It is evident from the foregoing that no wrong attaches to any specialization, any concentration on a particular subject matter, or realm of subject matters, which, in setting its method of analytic attack, closely follows the given structure of the object. If the object happens to be a whole, such as the whole subject matter of entomology, or any of its self-articulated subdivisions, the wholeness of that object implies at once the *universality* of good order constituent to nature throughout, and a distinct *separateness* from other subject matters of nature: a separateness which, in favoring the concentration of the scientist's focus upon it, legitimatizes, at the same time, its specialistic restriction. It is different for such subject matters of one science as are inseparable from other subject matters lying within a different science and in actuality form one with them. Specialistic narrowing of focus here cannot but fail to perceive the order of the whole and cannot help to replace what it misses by a mechanical order which it imposes on the subject by means of procedure.

Specialistic attitudes in the present sense, then, are characterized by a scientist's preoccupation with his own method, his unsuspecting readiness to accept as object properties what may be the result of his inquiry itself, and, as an inevitable corollary of such an attitude as well as its safeguard against perturbing perceptions, a growing loss of the capacity for phenomenal observation—for observation as *primary* experience—on his part. This dominance of the technical over the intrinsic becomes the more a danger the closer the subject matter happens to lie to the

scientist's own sphere of existence. Within the realm of the social sciences, "specialism" in this sense not only is helped by their existing and in many ways arbitrary subdivisions but by the scientist's natural lack of focal distance from his subject (man), which prevents him from perceiving its total order.

From Max Wertheimer came a statement that neatly points up the fork of the road in psychology where one branch leads to specialistic artifacts, the other to universes. A thing which is black and uncanny, Wertheimer said, is just as uncanny as it is black, yea, if it is both at the same time, it is uncanny in the first place. This approach is incomprehensible to those psychologists who, in the present sense, are specialists, because it respects and enjoys the phenomenal as given *before* setting out to theorize about it, and only in this way does it manage to keep its logical power as sharp as it does its phenomenal observations clean; the specialist, living in a phenomenally impoverished world, may still experience the uncanny vaguely, but cannot recognize it as being of the same cognitive dignity as the black. Thus he interferes with the self-articulation of the object: the theorizing corrects the phenomenon and in doing so distorts rather than understands it; in the end, the object is still uncanny, the resulting theory not even that. The uncanny, I was told by a scientist with a dephenomenalized world outlook, is what the subject *projects* into the thing because it is black. Now, nothing in the experience of the thing with its two intrinsic qualities justifies the assumption that only one of the two is its own whereas the other is made up by the observer, consciously or unconsciously. Thus the investigation of cognitive processes becomes impossible because the results of such investigation are dogmatically dictated in advance. But why did the critic reject the uncanny as object property? Because "uncanny" is not a scientific concept.

Neither, in a way, is black; but why go into detail? We have here a striking example of a typically specialistic and highly unscientific confusion, brought about by the fact that the psychologist, unlike the physicist, investigates processes which belong



to the same general order of processes as those whereby, being a human being himself, he conducts his investigation. As a result, he confounds the two and forbids the processes on the object side to lead to conceptual forms to which he would not allow the process of investigation to lead. The uncanny may not be a scientific concept, but then it does not occur on the side of the scientist's thought process in the first place but on that of his phenomenal subject. The uncanny, of course, is never eliminated even for our critic. An ununderstood statement has not the same object properties as one understood. Eventually the critic with whom I was discussing Wertheimer's statement referred to the statement itself in words which implied that he found it to be uncanny.

Examples of both the phenomenal impoverishment of the psychologizing specialist's world and the resulting theoretical confusion of perspectives and their data could be presented ad infinitum. No boy who ever shot at a target with ten as the ideal and the maximal goal ever tried for anything but this ten, yet at the very beginning of the Lewinian group's treatise on the level of aspiration we find the hypothetical assumption that, after having scored six, the boy then tries for eight, attains five, is disappointed and decides to try for six once more. Since the assumption is senseless, a relevant characteristic of the whole situation—the differential structure of the goal—is overlooked at the start, with disturbing effects on the subsequent development of the theory. The defenders of the theory here reply that "aspiration," in the sense of the theory, is a factor different from aspiration as the central feature of *goal-directedness* which, in organizing the boy's visual and motor co-ordination, inheres in the whole process of his observed task behavior. But a glance at their method shows that all data pointing to the existence, in this and comparable instances, of such a "different" aspirational factor (which could be understood independently of the differential structure of the task), are themselves the result of a special procedure employed by the investigators, by which their human subjects are asked more

or less suggestive questions about that factor as a presumably existent one. The circularity of the method, a closed system of operations inaccessible to any such observations as would interfere with its own premises, thus explains its very "successes."

Such methodological circles, which permit a theory to isolate itself from the phenomenality of its own subject, are nothing new. The dispute between Bergson, after he had questioned the metaphysical relevancy of certain mathematicisms in the traditional conception of time, and the mathematician Le Dantec offers a telling example of the naive indulgence in such circles inherent in some types of specialistic attitude. Le Dantec, attacking Bergson's position in a long paper, argued that *from the viewpoint of the mathematician* Bergson's reasoning was incomprehensible; yet his own reasoning, in defense of a mathematical time concept, was based throughout on the very presupposition of its metaphysical relevancy which Bergson, himself a good mathematician but unidentified with the "viewpoint" of one, had questioned. Le Dantec's paper also inadvertently revealed what he himself had used as an argument, his lack of comprehension of those fundamental time perceptions of Bergson which had given rise to the latter's whole theory on the subject. Dominance of method over subject matter, of the mechanical over the intrinsic, and phenomenal impoverishment of primary experience thus go hand in hand. Without a full realization of their interdependence the specialist in our present sense remains ununderstood. His preoccupation with his own procedure has been characterized. As far as phenomenal impoverishment viewed in its wider aspects is concerned, it is obvious that whole orbits of human experience may be cut off from the specialist; not without resentment he will, in such cases, evaluate references to the wider experience as intuitive, with the implication of disorderliness. This is only natural since any phenomenal realm, for human comprehension, stands and falls with the access to it which primary experience lends or does not lend. Musicology is an exact science, but how comprehensible is it to the completely unmusical, even to the



half-musical to whom music is an opportunity for vague emoting? In the same way, physiognomic and other complex qualities do not yield their order unless experienced first: the expressive movements, for example, do not express any less because some people do not have eyes for them. Or consider the question of humor in teen-age girls as investigated by Sister Agnes R. of Nazarene College, who, dissatisfied with speculative theories about humor, attacked the subject psychometrically. Her results show convincingly that girls below the age of fifteen like different cartoons from those favored by girls of sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen, but who in the world, except Sister Agnes, had still to be convinced of that? We may still not understand any better from her study *why* they do, but psychological gains are not entirely wanting since we are left with a hunch why it should just have been humor that puzzled Sister Agnes. Thus, exactly those subject matters which of their own nature are radical counterforces to any mechanization will always challenge some to set mechanical procedures in motion for their "mastery." Many theoretical inquiries into *jokes* which have been presented as their motivational analyses fall into the same category. In all cases of this kind, the alienating character of phenomenal impoverishment can be said to affect, correlatively, the investigator's primary understanding of his subject matter and his manner of setting his method of approach.

In the case of Mr. A, whose story I presented earlier, the therapist—not the one who first tackled the case but the one who solved it—was a psychologist, but he was a specialist in one sense only: he was ready to follow his subject matter wherever it took him. He could not be a specialist in the ordinary sense of violating the given dimensions of his subject matter by arbitrarily segregating a psychological aspect of it as lying within his professional domain and functionalizing, in the meaning of Jaspers' term, all other aspects upon the psychological, for it was precisely in those other aspects that the psychological one, as it mostly does, found its implementation. He could not be a specialist in the

ordinary sense because he had to understand the patient's situation, which was bound to remain ununderstood so long as the patient's position in the social process which gave birth to the trouble, so long as the intrinsic nature of the social process itself, remained outside the scope of clinical consideration. Nor could the psychologist help being a social philosopher, for he had to take sides in a clash of values: he had to evaluate, not in the sense of applying conventional standards to unconventional phenomena, but of having to face a situation where an elementary clash of values was the relevant feature of his object, where it determined the nature of the phenomena themselves, and where the conventional happened to hamper the truthful.

It is within the orbit of personality and clinical psychology that the question of the desirability of specialization as now understood becomes most burning, because the contention of such desirability here seems to clash directly with the nature of the subject matter itself, the latter implying a constant necessity for the investigator to understand the phenomenal world of an individual in order to be able to understand the individual. To the extent that this individual's experience processes go beyond the bounds of the psychologist's experience processes, which are limited by his specialization, they will escape his understanding; consequently, specialization here works against its own purposes. This situation has another aspect, at least as critical, which has already been hinted at: the psychologist will be tempted to devaluate, to relativize, the ununderstood phenomenal in the experience processes of his subjects, removing it from his own field of attack not in a manner of parenthetical exclusion, which is legitimate for purely theoretical purposes, but of reductionism. If he follows any—in Andras Angyal's term—"immanentistic" doctrine which, in determining the nature of personality processes, one-sidedly focuses on subjective needs and drives, phenomenal structure will have less and less significance for him; more and more, in his view, is unified man, man one with his impulses, steered by his reason and facing his world, replaced by split man,

putting up with his world, facing his own impulses as well as their repressions and claiming to be rational on no better grounds but that he has become wholly deliberate.

What takes place here is a taciturn and inarticulate transference of the psychologist's own theoretical perspective for experience processes to the vantage point of the subject engaged in them. This transference has a hundred different forms as well as degrees of crudeness. Shown by Prinzhorn in the case of psychoanalysis more than twenty years ago, restated by Köhler in *The Place of Values in a World of Facts* (New York 1938), this is the central error which pervades most of our popular theories and from which careless applications of the Gestalt principle to personality dynamics (without first a complete grasp of the phenomenal and then its complete translation into theoretical language) are by no means exempt. This error is specifically specialistic because of its naiveté. Bergson had already stated the specialist's inclination to conceive of his subject matter in terms of his method rather than the other way round. He had not pointed out in any detail, had not shown the various sleights of hand which turn abstractions from processes into factorial entities assumed to partake in the processes as such, and so forth; nor had he considered the possibility that the method of inquiry itself may alter the phenomena under its attack.

This happens not only in physics where it is fully understood and succeeds in putting a completely different accent on the temporary dilemma of operationalism; it happens demonstrably and constantly, though on the whole undetectedly, in many areas of the social sciences. Dominance of the technical over the intrinsic, as has been seen, may take the form of reducing a certain subject matter to a mere opportunity for displaying a preconceived method of inquiry. In other instances, where the statistical method is used, not for its legitimate end of clarifying the structure of large bodies of relevant data but of predicting the structure of human events to come, specialistic attitudes are characterized by an inclination to reduce *events* to mere *occurrences*,

focusing on their comparative numbers without questioning the basis of comparison used, remaining blind to the specific event-nature of each, and never inquiring into those elemental processes behind them—revelation of which would invalidate a cherished technique from the start. Yet it is evident, and has been confirmed by notable experiences of the more recent past, that public opinion, polled for purposes not in themselves compelling, and public opinion compelled to determine the course of historic events are two different entities, and that the structure of human motivation allowed to operate where opinion is polled does not permit the prediction of that motivational structure which comes into play where opinion, eventually, is called upon to decide the issues.

Nevertheless, happenings which visibly explode the dominance of method over subject matter are on the whole rare; most of the typical specialistic errors in the scientific orbit of human events—confounding of perspectives, misrepresentations and alterations of an object of inquiry by the inquiry itself, and so on—go as unnoticed as they run wild, wherever the goal of all theory, intrinsic truth, is replaced by operational definitions, operational goals—in brief, where the techniques of operation replace the subject matter. The technician in social and psychological work, the industrial psychologist, for instance, who is hired to improve the output of workers—that is, to use human beings as means to ends—is pursuing the task of manipulating his subject matter, man, according to criteria not derived from the intrinsic nature of his subject matter but from a current and probably mistaken concept of the intrinsic nature of the production process, with the result that he will more or less violate the former and may ultimately violate the latter as well. To expound this possibility would presuppose an analysis of the intrinsic nature of productivity. In any case, the situation is not recognized, especially by many industrial psychologists, because the difference in criteria has never occurred to them, and cannot occur to them so long as there is no primary orientation to intrinsic truth. Where, on

the other hand, the criteria of validity can only be intrinsic, as in the application of techniques to personality diagnosis, the dilemma shows up at once; the ability of our clinical tests to discern what is wrong with people depends precariously on the test administrator's ability to discern what is wrong with the tests. Even in an area of this kind, however, the visibility of the dilemma does not guarantee that it will actually be seen by all or most of those who work in that area: mechanization, as an overall characteristic of the civilization of our times, does not necessarily stop short of the individually relevant even in inquiries which may have cognition of the individually relevant as their express objective.

In view of the operationalist direction of this whole development, it becomes all the more revealing to trace it to its relatively more recent origins and to find these origins marked by dogmatic, if inarticulate, claims to absolute truth on the part of those who swore that metaphysical premises were far from their hearts. Operationalism, while being applied in science, is itself not a scientific but an extrascientific decision that may be philosophical and is, in most instances, purely arbitrary. The same point can be made for the original dogmaticisms from which the development has sprung—for instance, Thorndike's statement that everything that exists exists in a certain quantity; a whole generation of specialists in this country has been brought up on the assumption that this is a true and relevant statement. Today, in every school of thought, to the extent to which it has ceased to be just that and has become a technique, disturbing questions and criticisms concerning methods, concepts, primary determinations of subject matter and so on, matters which belong at the very center of scientific theory rather than at its periphery, are referred to the periphery by being termed philosophical. This implies a sensational redefinition of philosophy: philosophy is the locus of all points which the technician leaves unanswered. It does not disturb him that these same points turn up later in his work as gross errors in scientific logic for they do so unrecognized; they cannot

be recognized where even the inarticulate premises of one's school of thought are, as such, no longer of interest because the criteria of validity have become purely operational.

### III

In what direction is this process pointing if not in that of Orwell's 1984, the end of both society and the individual, the world of the technological collective? In moving toward it, specialized science, in becoming more popular, may already be falling slightly into disrepute. It may be applied to healing people, but it may also be applied to inventing a toothpaste that can make the user's teeth shine in the dark. In taking the lead and assigning his objectives to the specialist, the technological collective, however, can still not claim the example set by physics. The atomic secret has been lifted by scientists interested only in lifting it; it was afterward that the discovery was put to technological use. It is anyone's guess what is going to happen to the natural sciences once they begin to accept research assignments dictated to them by the power interests of the technological collective rather than by problems articulated in the development of these sciences themselves.

A situation of this kind, however, already exists in those "applied" sections of the social sciences in which field workers manipulate human beings according to principles of "environmental adjustment" as superficial as they are untrue to the nature of adjustment processes *spontaneously occurring*. As is readily seen, the loss of the criterion of intrinsic truth is inextricably linked with the sectional character of the sciences themselves in which these field workers are trained. Dealing in wholes of human existence, they can still only dabble in them if their approach is guided by any specialistic reductionism, or if their conception of their subject matter is guided by anything but its full self-articulation as a phenomenon pervading as many sectional sciences as it may choose to pervade. Implicit in all sectional science, the arbitrariness of primary determination of subject



matters which of their own nature are universes does not, apparently, make a science any more analytical; the typical specialistic approach, which only reaches the height of absurdity in the attitude of the nothing-but technician, is characterized at least as much by its blindness for relevant detail as for wholes.

That specialization, of the type characterized in this paper, has already reached its climax as a process phenomenon of social history is, unfortunately, improbable; the interests which foster it are powerful, the forces of resistance which its destructiveness stirs into action are still weak. It is at present assisted by the fact that the sometimes enormous growth of specialistic groups as professional groups may delude the specialists as well as society into assuming a corresponding magnitude of the simultaneous accumulation of certitude on their part. Moreover, it is assisted by the unwarranted specialistic inclination of all scientists to regard the adjoining science as beyond understanding. As this segregation tendency spreads in all directions, the universality of science is lost in more than one respect, with provincialism as the only possible outcome. When truth is sacrificed to operationalism by the technician, universality to arbitrary subdivisions of whole subjects, the training ground of the seekers of either ideal is no longer firm: for the first time in its history, academic freedom, in nontotalitarian countries, is threatened not exclusively by the traditional, in the end always superable, dangers from without, but by a conspicuous weakening of its own impulses, which takes the form of a slow and inarticulate renunciation of the only two ideals on which it can be founded.

The technician does not often oppose academic freedom squarely and consciously; it belongs to the many matters from the periphery of his existence which he terms cultural factors and does not wish to miss. But what happens is that he creates a situation to which academic freedom quite simply no longer applies, because no ideas are left to which to apply it. No longer aware of what is going on beyond his specialty nor of what he himself is doing to his specialty, the specialist on his way to

becoming a technician is likely to be in for most staggering surprises, for the technological collective will always prove stronger than its individual functional devices, which it isolates as social beings and exploits as skills. The often observable blinker-wearing passivity of the typical specialist outside his frame of work is not accidental; it is the inevitable private side of a public existence without self-created purpose, without spirituality. The technician who once was a specialist can often be seen to observe what he may comprehend as his animal nature, his own unattached and undirected impulses, frustrating their self-transcendence, their spontaneous attachment to objects, and he can be found replacing by deliberation what he has lost in inner liberty. The perfect technician is no longer a problem to himself; with complete adaptation to the demands of the technological collective, there no longer develop the tensions which the conflict between a truthless social role and a truth-seeking psyche generates in the half-technicalized specialist. Carrying over to himself the pattern of compartmented, mutually unrelated functional sections characteristic of the technicalized world around him, the perfect technician develops a segregated personality throughout. The segments no longer follow any unifying principle of action because no direction is set by the cognitive functions of the psyche which have been "sold" to purposes extraneous to the psyche's own. The observable consequence is that the conative ones assert themselves in all directions, striving in none. To define, as otherwise we may, the nothing-but technician as a device for the measurement of the behavior of ununderstood rats would therefore be incomplete, unless we add that this whole contraption, in turn, appears to be mounted upon an equally ununderstood animal, which may or may not be of that same species.

The specialist has been presented as a psychological problem; and yet, unless we concur with his own predilection for arbitrary divisions of, in itself, indivisible subject matter, we readily see that he is a problem to more than psychology only and that he will not be understood from the viewpoint of a single science

unless he is simultaneously understood from all others that apply. That he can be presented as a psychological problem does not mean that the answer to it must be psychotherapeutic; the solution must clearly be a pedagogic one in this case; the key to it is in the hands of teachers. That specialized science, in setting out to find certitude, has apparently ended up with destroying what certitude there was is disturbing only so long as we fail to recognize that all philosophical reductionisms which claim the support of such sciences as the psychology of personality can be shattered, one by one, by advancing these sciences and clarifying the typically specialistic errors within these sciences themselves which have seemingly made such claims possible. A science of man, as true to philosophy as to large bodies of as yet uncomprehended facts, which it may be hoped will emerge from the vicissitudes of a specialistic age, will have to be true, first of all, to the teachings of these very vicissitudes. The obstacle to its growth, the obstacle even to a more general visibility of the need for it which exists in our society, is at present the technician. The alternative which his existence poses does not admit of a patchwork of compromises. Sooner or later, but inescapably, it must force a decision.

# AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

BY JACOB OSER

MANY social scientists have sought cause-and-effect relations between agriculture, nonagricultural enterprise, and the business cycle. Some argue that a prosperous industrial sector brings good times to the farmers. Labor spokesmen declare that high wages result in a high level of demand for farm products, and thus they claim a high correlation between labor income and agricultural income. Others say that prosperous farmers cause an upsurge of prosperity throughout the economy, and that depression in agriculture drags down the rest of the economy. A theory has been advanced that agricultural income determines national income, the ratio being 1 to 7, but Table 1 indicates that this magic ratio obtained only during the magic years 1910-14 and 1915-19. We should expect farm income to show a decline in relation to total national income because a declining proportion of our population is engaged in agriculture. But the extent of the decline since 1921 illustrates the deteriorating position of agriculture. The ratio of farm income to national income was lower in 1921 than in any previous year since 1910, and in 1932 the ratio was lower than in any of the last thirty-eight years. This illustrates only that farmers are more vulnerable to depressions than the rest of the population taken as a whole. A causal relationship between farm income and national income has never been proved.

The spokesmen of special interest groups who claim that the prosperity of the nation depends on the prosperity of their own group are partly, but not equally, right. It is entirely possible for one group to be prosperous while another is depressed. So it was in the United States in the 1920's, when business boomed while agriculture dragged behind in the upturn. But the fortunes of all sectors of our economy are intertwined, and they tend to rise and

Table 1. NATIONAL INCOME, NET FARM INCOME, AND THE RATIO OF NATIONAL INCOME TO NET FARM INCOME, UNITED STATES, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1910/14-1945/48<sup>1</sup>

	National Income <sup>a</sup> (in billion dollars)	Net Income to Persons on Farms from Farming <sup>b</sup>	Ratio of National Income to Farm Income
1910-14	32.5	4.3	7.6 : 1
1915-19	52.4	7.5	7.0 : 1
1920-24	63.9	5.6	11.4 : 1
1925-29	78.5	6.6	11.9 : 1
1930-34	52.8	3.5	15.1 : 1
1935-39	67.0	5.4	12.4 : 1
1940-44	135.1	10.4	13.0 : 1
1945-48	197.5	17.2	11.5 : 1

<sup>a</sup> The national income series since 1929 has been revised, and is not strictly comparable with the earlier figures. <sup>b</sup> Including government payments.

<sup>1</sup> Computed from United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1949*, p. 640; United States Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics, 1949*, p. 633; United States Department of Commerce, *1949 Statistical Supplement to the Survey of Current Business*, p. 6; United States Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945* (Washington 1949) p. 12; Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, *Basic Facts on Employment and Production, 79th Congress, 1st Session* (Washington 1945) p. 12.

fall together. Disturbances in one area ripple out in all directions, sometimes returning to reinforce the original disturbance. Agricultural prosperity increases the demand for many kinds of goods and services, and high urban incomes increase the consumption of agricultural products. A depression appearing first in one sphere of economic activity will often be felt in the other soon afterward. This may be the result of the influence of economic conditions in one sector on conditions in the other. Or both sectors may be the victims of the same exogenous disturbances.

Nevertheless, it appears that because agricultural production is so remarkably stable, it is not a basic cause of cyclical fluctuations. During the decade 1929-38, total agricultural output in any one year never deviated more than 8.4 percent from the average for the decade.<sup>1</sup> With a rising population in the United States, and

<sup>1</sup> Computed from United States Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics, 1949*, p. 596.

with increasing farm productivity, complete stability of farm output would not be the ideal situation, and, in fact, the trend indicates an increasing volume of farm production. But fluctuations of physical output from year to year are small, exceeding 10 percent only once between 1929 and 1948. In fifteen of the nineteen year-to-year output changes during this period, the variation in output from one year to the next was less than 5 percent. And this during a time including the worst depression and the greatest boom in our history.

Not even changes in the weather have a great influence on total agricultural output. Weather conditions can greatly affect the output in any one region of the United States, or the output of a particular product. But bad weather in one area is usually counterbalanced by good weather elsewhere. Moreover, what is bad weather for one crop can be good weather for another. Heavy rains at harvest time will hurt tomato and cotton crops, but the same rains can be beneficial to corn and wheat, since their harvests fall at different times.

Booms and depressions seem to arise in the industrial part of the economy, and are transmitted with increasing violence to agriculture. Since the supply of and demand for farm products are both fairly inelastic with respect to price, small changes in demand will result in large changes in agricultural income. In a boom, the demand for food and agricultural raw materials rises, causing a rise in farm income that is typically larger than the rise in income of nonfarm groups. In a depression, farm prices have been known to drop 60 percent and more.

Agriculture, however, is not entirely passive under the blows of the industrial cycle; it is not merely a cork buffeted about on a turbulent sea. "The relations of agriculture and the trade cycle, even if more or less spontaneous fluctuations in agriculture itself can be excluded as causes, are at least mutual or circular."<sup>2</sup> We are here interested primarily in the impact of agricultural conditions on the business cycle, and in the role of government policy

<sup>2</sup> John H. Kirk, *Agriculture and the Trade Cycle* (London 1933) p. 4.



in influencing these conditions. We will take up first the effects of changes in the physical flow of farm products, and will then consider various patterns of income redistribution between farmers and others, and their effects on the business cycle.

*Physical Volume of Farm Output and the Business Cycle*

A stable physical volume of farm output has a stabilizing effect on the business cycle. If the supply of farm produce is inelastic and cyclically stable, it forces its way into consumption channels, unless government price support prevents it. A continuing large volume of output in a depression tends to sustain employment and income among farm laborers, trucking firms, railroads, packing and processing plants, wholesalers, retailers, manufacturers of containers, and so on.

The price elasticity of demand for farm products seems to be relatively small. A recent estimate places it at  $-0.2$  to  $-0.4$ .<sup>3</sup> This means that a rise in the physical output of farm products, together with a fall in the whole demand schedule for farm products, would reduce gross farm income. This is in effect a redistribution of income between farmers and nonfarmers, and its implications will be discussed below. The important point here is that, in spite of the relatively inelastic demand for farm produce, large quantities can be sold if the government does not restrict marketings by supporting prices. Assuming that the above estimate of price elasticity of demand is correct, a 10 percent drop in farm prices will result in a 2 to 4 percent rise in the quantity demanded.

Consider the effect of low prices for cotton on the demand for cotton products. There is a positive correlation between the price of cotton and the amount consumed domestically. The reason is that both are influenced in the same direction by general busi-

<sup>3</sup> See manuscript by O. H. Brownlee and D. G. Johnson, *Reducing Price Variability Confronting Primary Producers*, presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, December 29, 1949. They omitted the minus signs. The estimate apparently applies to the elasticity of demand at the farm.

ness conditions. Prosperity produces both higher cotton prices and the higher incomes which cause increases in the demand for cotton goods. The whole demand curve for cotton shifts. In depression, the price of cotton falls, but the ability of people to buy goods even at lower prices falls even further. But suppose incomes were high and cotton prices low? Mr. Tolley, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, estimated in 1941 that for every cent increase in the price of cotton, the consumption of cotton in the United States would go down about 100,000 bales, other things being equal.<sup>4</sup> Total mill consumption of both domestic and foreign cotton in the United States in the year beginning August 1940 was 9,721,703 bales; during the same period, the market price per pound at New Orleans averaged 11.06 cents. The arc elasticity of demand with respect to prices between 11.06 and 12.06 cents was  $-.12$ .<sup>5</sup> This result is not inconsistent with the finding of Brownlee and Johnson that the price elasticity of demand for farm products is between  $-0.2$  and  $-0.4$ , for the demand for most foods is more elastic than the demand for cotton. Also, the demand for cotton is probably more elastic today than it was in 1941, since raw cotton prices have risen more than finished cotton-goods prices, and the cost of cotton is therefore a more important element in the cost of the finished goods.

The first point to be stressed here, then, is that raising the prices of farm products during a depression restricts farm marketings and aggravates the depression. Maintaining the volume of sales by allowing farm product prices to fall has a stabilizing effect, increasing both employment and income in those businesses which handle and process farm products.

<sup>4</sup> *Formula For Determining Parity Prices*, Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, 77th Congress, 1st Session (Washington 1941) p. 80. Nothing was said about the time necessary to realize the change in demand in response to changes in price.

<sup>5</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics, 1948*, pp. 79, 85. Computed from the equation in G. J. Stigler, *The Theory of Price* (New York 1947) p. 54.

*Income Redistribution and the Business Cycle*

Farmers' incomes tend to fluctuate widely over the business cycle. As their incomes fluctuate, their demand for the products of industry changes in the same direction. Were total value of crops fairly stable,<sup>6</sup> large crops would result in lower prices for farm products without changing farmers' incomes.<sup>7</sup> A large crop during a depression would help to stimulate recovery. But other factors affect prices besides the size of crop. The demand curve for farm products shifts as we go from one stage of the business cycle to another. During prosperity, large crops can bring high prices per unit; in depression, even small crops can often sell at low prices. This is demonstrated by the fact that while the volume of agricultural production fell from 102 in 1931 to 96 in 1932 (taking 1935-39 as 100), prices of all farm products fell from 90 in 1931 to 68 in 1932 (taking August 1909-July 1914 as the base period).<sup>8</sup>

When farm incomes fluctuate, what is the effect on the cycle? We shall assume a closed system, in which a loss of income to the farm sector as a result of price changes is balanced by a corresponding gain to the nonfarm sector, and vice versa. Thus, if prices for farm products fall, purchasers of farm products gain at the expense of farmers.

Let us assume that the government does not intervene in supporting farm prices or incomes. As a depression develops, what will happen to farm prices? A study was made of wholesale prices of 64 commodities over a period of 14 to 80 years.<sup>9</sup> The total value of the commodities included constituted in 1937 about one-third of the aggregate value of all agricultural commodities, raw

<sup>6</sup> This would be the case if the demand curve for farm products did not shift, and the elasticity of demand were equal to  $-1$ .

<sup>7</sup> Except to the extent that harvesting a large crop is more costly than harvesting a small one. There are added costs of containers, labor, and trucking, and more plant food is removed from the soil if the crop is large.

<sup>8</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics, 1947*, pp. 525, 532.

<sup>9</sup> F. C. Mills, *Price-Quantity Interactions in Business Cycles*, National Bureau of Economic Research (New York 1946) *passim*.

materials, and manufactured goods produced in the United States. Cyclical fluctuations in prices and quantities were studied; their joint cyclical variability was derived through a method of averaging in the reference cycle framework that tends to offset fluctuations not consistently associated with business cycles.

It was found that at one end of the scale of 64 commodities, for Appalachian petroleum and potatoes cyclical fluctuations in the price factor accounted for 98 percent of the joint variability of prices and quantities, quantity fluctuations for 2 percent. Passenger automobiles and iron ore were at the other extreme; price fluctuations contributed only 1 percent, while quantity fluctuations accounted for 99 percent of the combined variability.

Agricultural products dominated the group for which the price contribution was 75 to 98 percent of the joint variability. Of the 15 commodities in this group, 13 were of agricultural origin.

The 64 commodities were combined into 16 major groups. The groups were not mutually exclusive in every case, and one commodity could appear in several groups. It was found that cyclical price fluctuations of domestic crop products and foods accounted for 96 percent of their joint cyclical variability of prices and quantities. The corresponding figure for all United States farm products was 93 percent, and for domestic animal products 90 percent.

We have seen that quantities of farm products vary only slightly from stage to stage of business cycles. Fluctuations in output of farm products can vary more widely than indicated above, but they do not agree regularly in timing with cycles in the whole economy. Wholesale prices of farm products, however, vary widely over the business cycle. As a depression develops, farm prices and incomes fall; there is a redistribution of income in favor of nonfarm groups. Here we must ask, first, how and to whom is the income redistributed? Second, what is the effect on the business cycle?

Lower prices for agricultural raw materials can result in either lower prices for finished products at retail, or larger profit margins

for manufacturers and distributors, or in a combination of both. If prices for finished products are inflexible, savings in costs of production will not be passed along to consumers. To what extent might this occur? Industries with the most inflexible prices are metal and metal products, chemicals and allied products, building materials, and housefurnishings.<sup>10</sup> These are the smallest users of agricultural products. The most flexible prices are found in industries producing foods, hides and leather, and textiles, and among these, agricultural raw materials are an important part of total costs. Their price flexibility is probably due in great part to the price flexibility of the farm products from which they are made. Low prices for farm products will be reflected in lower prices for finished goods; consumption of these goods will increase. But since the demand for agricultural products is inelastic with respect to price, farmers will receive less for the larger quantities of goods consumers buy.

Since agricultural products flow along lines of trade which are relatively competitive, most of the saving in farm product prices will be passed along to the consumer in the form of lower prices for finished goods. If the volume of farm output is maintained, and it presses itself on the market without price supports, prices at retail must fall. This is especially true when business is depressed and competition sharpens. Some, though not all, farm products are too bulky to store, or deteriorate in storage. For them, increased output will cause an increased production of finished goods using agricultural raw materials. Since the rise in production results from a greater supply of raw materials rather than a shift in the demand curve for the final products, a downward pressure will be exerted on prices of finished goods at retail. Our first conclusion is that as farm prices fall during a business downturn, farm income is reduced, and the incomes of consumers are increased by a corresponding amount.

At this juncture we must look at the propensities of farmers

<sup>10</sup> See J. Backman, "Price Inflexibility—War and Postwar," in *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 56, no. 5 (October 1948) pp. 428-37.

and others to spend. If, through falling prices of farm products, income is shifted from farm producers to consumers (both rural and urban), the effect on the business cycle will be determined in great part by the spending patterns of the two groups; if a government farm program shifts income from consumers to farmers, the opposite effect will develop. We shall also be concerned with the spending patterns of different income groups within farm and nonfarm categories, as these have important policy implications.

A study of consumer purchases was made in a Works Progress Administration project conducted by the United States Bureau of Home Economics and the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, in co-operation with the National Resources Committee and the Central Statistical Board. Detailed information on expenditures and savings during a twelve-month period in 1935 and 1936 was secured from a sample of more than 60,000 families living in cities of different sizes, in villages, and on farms in thirty different states. Table 2 gives the relevant data from the 1936 study.

We see that among both farm and nonfarm groups, the higher the family income, the greater the proportion saved. But for most income groups, farmers seem to save more or dissave less than either rural nonfarm or urban families in the same income group.

Table 3 is based on income and expenditure patterns for farm and nonfarm families and single consumers in 1941. Once again we see that (except for the lowest income group) farmers save more than others in the same income groups; for both farm and nonfarm people, the average propensity to save rises with a rise on the income scale.

We have, from the two studies cited above, conclusive evidence for 1935-36 and 1941 concerning the average propensity to save for different income levels among farm and nonfarm people. But what about the marginal propensity to save? What would be the disposition of an extra dollar of income received by a typical family in each of the income groups? We have no adequate statistical evidence to answer this question, and must fall back on



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Table 2. AVERAGE FAMILY <sup>a</sup> INCOME AND SAVINGS, UNITED STATES, 12-MONTH PERIOD, 1935-36, BY INCOME CLASS <sup>1</sup>

Income Class	Average Income <sup>b</sup>			Average Savings			Savings in Percent of Income		
	Farm	Rural Nonfarm	Urban	Farm <sup>c</sup>	Rural Nonfarm	Urban	Farm	Rural	Urban
Under \$500	\$339	\$344	\$329	—\$208	—\$84	—\$273	—61.4	—24.4	—83.0
500-1,000	751	765	789	—79	—53	—81	—10.5	—6.9	—10.3
1,000-1,500	1,233	1,246	1,245	28	1	—28	2.3	0.1	—2.2
1,500-2,000	1,719	1,723	1,742	226	64	32	13.1	3.7	1.8
2,000-3,000	2,388	2,390	2,412	569	230	155	23.8	9.6	6.4
3,000-4,000	3,390	3,408	3,454	1,167	494	424	34.4	14.5	12.3
4,000-5,000	4,396	4,483	4,438	1,905	990	693	43.3	22.1	15.6
5,000-10,000	6,587	6,878	6,912	3,463	2,591	1,420	52.6	37.7	20.5

<sup>a</sup> Families of two or more persons.

<sup>b</sup> Both income and consumption expenditures include imputed money values as follows: for farm families, rental value of both owned and rented houses, and value of home-produced food and farm-furnished fuel and ice; for rural nonfarm and urban families, net rental value of owned houses (rental value minus money expenses) and value of housing received as gift or pay. For rural nonfarm families, value of home-produced food is included in imputed income and consumption expenditures.

<sup>c</sup> For farm families, the value of net increase or decrease in the quantity of live-stock owned or of crops stored for sale between the beginning and the end of the year is included as positive or negative income and hence as positive or negative savings. Only differences due to quantity changes in inventory are included, however; differences in value due to price changes were excluded in the original study.

<sup>1</sup> National Resources Planning Board, *Family Expenditures in the United States* (Washington 1941) pp. 8-9.

deductive reasoning. It is possible that even a very-low-income family might have a low marginal propensity to consume. Suppose, for example, that a family is experiencing negative savings. This could be the result of purchases of durable consumer goods on credit; it could follow from the family's living beyond its income and drawing on past savings; or the family could be accumulating debts. Such a family, with its average propensity to consume being larger than 100 percent, could conceivably have a low marginal propensity to consume; an extra dollar of income received might be used to pay off old debts or to replenish depleted savings rather than to consume more goods and services.

Table 3. AVERAGE NET SAVINGS OR DISSAVINGS IN PERCENT OF NET MONEY INCOME, UNITED STATES, 1941, BY INCOME CLASS <sup>1</sup>

Net Money Income Class	Average Net Savings or Dissavings	
	Nonfarm Families and Single Consumers	Farm Families and Single Consumers
\$0-\$500	-26.75%	-36.7%
500-1,000	-5.1	5.6
1,000-1,500	1.5	20.9
1,500-2,000	2.9	30.9
2,000-3,000	4.8	32.7
3,000 and over		62.0
3,000-5,000	10.4	
5,000 and over	28.4	

<sup>1</sup> United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Spending and Saving of the Nation's Families in Wartime*, Bulletin No. 723 (Washington 1942) p. 16.

It seems reasonable to believe, however, that as people change their position on the income scale, they will change their spending and saving pattern to conform with the group into which they enter. That is, people entering a different income group will react in the same way as would consumers who were already at that level, though undoubtedly with a time lag. If this is so, we reach the conclusion that the marginal propensity to save rises as we go up the income scale, and that farmers have a much higher marginal propensity to save than others.

Proceeding from the above assumption as to people's reactions to income changes, the National Resources Committee estimated the marginal propensity to save in 1935-36. Further assumptions were that national income went up from \$60 billion to \$70 billion, and that the \$10 billion were distributed in the same proportion as the \$60 billion. The lowest third of the income groups in the nation would then save 11.8 percent of its increased income, the middle third 14.2 percent, and the upper third 36.0 percent.<sup>11</sup>

Assuming that people adopt the spending habits of the group

<sup>11</sup> National Resources Committee, *Consumer Expenditures in the United States* (Washington 1939) p. 170.

they enter, we can calculate the marginal propensity to consume for the various groups in 1935-36, using the data in Table 2. For example, the average farm family in the \$1,000-1,500 group had an average income of \$1,233, of which \$28 was saved. If the family moved into the next higher group, its income would rise by \$486, from \$1,233 to \$1,719. The amount saved would rise from \$28 to \$226. Therefore consumption would increase \$288, changing from \$1,205 to \$1,493. The marginal propensity to consume for the typical farm family in the \$1,000-1,500 group is calculated as  $288/486 \times 100$ , or 59.3 percent. Table 4 shows the computed marginal propensities to consume.

Given a falling marginal propensity to consume as we go up the income scale, and a lower marginal propensity to consume for farmers than for others, should we avoid transferring income to farmers from the rest of the community? Should our dictum to agriculture be, "You who are reluctant to consume shall suffer for your sin"? This is hardly necessary. It makes no difference, from the point of view of counteracting a depression, whether a farmer buys a durable consumer good like a refrigerator, or a durable producer good like a tractor or a new barn. We are concerned with people's propensity to spend, rather than with their propensity to consume. But we shall not settle for any kind of spending. We are seeking out that kind of spending which has

Table 4. MARGINAL PROPENSITIES TO CONSUME, IN FARM, RURAL NONFARM, AND URBAN FAMILIES, UNITED STATES, 12-MONTH PERIOD, 1935-36, BY INCOME CLASS <sup>1</sup>

<i>Income Class</i>	<i>Farm</i>	<i>Rural Nonfarm</i>	<i>Urban</i>
Under \$500	68.7%	92.6%	58.3%
500-1,000	77.8	88.8	88.4
1,000-1,500	59.3	86.8	87.9
1,500-2,000	48.7	75.1	81.6
2,000-3,000	40.3	74.1	74.2
3,000-4,000	26.6	53.9	72.7
4,000-5,000	28.9	33.2	70.6

<sup>1</sup> Computed from Table 2.

the most direct and immediate effect on the volume of production and employment. (Spending may result in the working down of inventories, which may itself be a prerequisite to increasing production and employment.) We are concerned with a farmer's expenditures on buildings, machinery, and equipment; we are not concerned with his expenditures on such things as farm real estate, stocks, and bonds.

To work out the farmer's propensity to spend on consumption and investment, we shall draw on another part of the study covering 1941, which was the basis for Table 3 above.<sup>12</sup> In Table 5 below, we have what is euphemistically called "average money income" per farm family (col. 2). All money income from non-farming sources is included, and also net money earnings from farming. Net money earnings are the difference between gross farm income and farm operating expenditures, adjusted for the value of the change in livestock owned and crops stored; farm expenses include livestock purchased, feed, hay, straw, automobile expense chargeable to the farm business, depreciation of farm buildings exclusive of dwelling, depreciation of farm machinery, and repairs on machinery and equipment.

Here we must revise the category called money income. We have no quarrel with the concept developed in the 1941 study in so far as accounting procedures are concerned, or in so far as determining the income of farm families goes. But we are concerned here with actual cash receipts and how they are spent. If buildings and machinery depreciate, the farmer's total assets are of course reduced, and his income is reduced by the amount of the depreciation. But none of the cash is reduced or sequestered because of depreciation. True, he might make repairs; but that is considered a cost of doing business, and it counteracts depreciation. Or a new machine or building might be acquired; but that will be listed separately as an expenditure. Therefore, since a deduction from money income has been made for depreciation, we shall have

<sup>12</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, *Rural Family Spending and Saving in Wartime*, Miscellaneous Publication No. 520 (Washington 1943).

Table 5. AVERAGE FARM INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF FAMILIES AND SINGLE CONSUMERS, UNITED STATES, 1941, BY INCOME CLASS<sup>1</sup>

Money Income Class (1)	Money Income <sup>a</sup> (2)	Deprec. of Mach., Equip., Farm Bldgs. (3)	Incr. in Livestock & Crops (4)	Actual Cash Income (2 + 3 - 4) (5)	Expenditures		Excess of Cash Inc. over Expend. (5-8) (9)	Excess of Inc. over Expend. in % of Cash Inc. ( $\frac{9}{5} \times 100$ ) (10)
					Cash <sup>b</sup> (6)	Invest. <sup>c</sup> (7)		
					Total (8)			
\$0-250	\$137	\$55	\$1	\$191	\$311	\$67	\$378	-97.9%
250-500	377	54	10	421	457	61	518	-23.0
500-750	628	97	35	690	633	91	724	-4.9
750-1,000	868	150	61	957	838	190	1,028	-7.4
1,000-1,500	1,226	145	101	1,270	977	240	1,217	4.2
1,500-2,000	1,701	252	194	1,759	1,259	324	1,583	10.0
2,000-3,000	2,439	332	372	2,399	1,663	497	2,160	10.0
3,000-5,000	3,776	411	692	3,495	1,974	778	2,752	21.3

<sup>a</sup> Includes adjustment for the value of the change in livestock owned and crops stored, and depreciation of farm machinery and farm buildings exclusive of dwellings.

<sup>b</sup> For family living, gifts, and personal taxes.

<sup>c</sup> Includes expenditures on farm buildings, new family dwellings, improvements on owned home and other real estate, and purchases of machinery and equipment; sales of machinery and equipment are deducted; repairs on homes are included in family living expenditures.

<sup>1</sup> Computed from United States Department of Agriculture, *Rural Family Spending and Saving in Wartime*, Miscellaneous Publication No. 520 (Washington 1943) pp. 9, 26-27, 142-43, 154-55.

to add these sums (Table 5, col. 3) in order to find cash income for each income group.

"Average money income" includes an adjustment for the value of the change in livestock owned and crops stored. While part of this change in inventory is due to purchases of livestock, feed, fertilizers, hired labor, and so on, most of it probably represents an investment built up through the farm family's labor. Moreover, it is labor which has not been converted into cash, and therefore it represents potential but not actual cash income available for spending. Since the inventory change was positive for every income group in 1941 (Table 5, col. 4), and since it reflects in part rising prices for farm produce, we shall deduct it from "money income." Adding the depreciation charges, and subtracting the increases in inventory, we get a series which we shall call "actual cash income" (col. 5).

To derive the spending pattern (on both consumption and investment goods) of farm families, we add the following expenditures: new construction and improvements on farm buildings; expenditures on purchases of machinery and equipment less sale of machinery and equipment; and money expenditures for gifts and welfare, personal taxes and family living. From these we calculate total family expenditures for each of the income groups (col. 8).

We now have farmers' average propensity to spend. To compare it with nonfarmers' average propensity to consume, we combine in Table 6 the results of Tables 3 and 5. They derive from the same study. We can now reach the following conclusions: At incomes below \$500, farm families and single consumers have a higher average propensity to spend than nonfarmers have to consume; between incomes of \$500 and \$1,000, they are about the same; above incomes of \$1,000, farmers have a lower propensity to spend than nonfarmers have to consume, but the discrepancy is far less than the observed differences when investment expenditures are ignored.



Table 6. TOTAL "NONSPENDING" OF FARM FAMILIES AND SAVINGS OF NONFARM FAMILIES, IN PERCENT OF CASH INCOME, UNITED STATES, 1941, BY INCOME CLASS <sup>1</sup>

<i>Income Class</i>	<i>Nonspending<sup>a</sup> of Farmers<sup>b</sup></i> (in percent of cash income)	<i>Savings of Nonfarmers<sup>b</sup></i>
\$0-250	-97.9% }	-26.7%
250-500	-23.0 }	
500-750	-4.9 }	-5.1
750-1,000	-7.4 }	
1,000-1,500	4.2	1.5
1,500-2,000	10.0	2.9
2,000-3,000	10.0	4.8
3,000-5,000	21.3	10.4

<sup>a</sup> Money not spent on consumption or investment.

<sup>b</sup> Families and single consumers.

<sup>1</sup> See Tables 3 and 5.

To calculate the marginal propensities to spend, we again assume that as families rise on the income scale, their pattern of expenditures changes to conform to the group which they enter. Table 7 presents the results. We find that farmers' marginal propensity to spend on consumption and investment is lower than the nonfarm families' marginal propensity to consume; but the

Table 7. MARGINAL PROPENSITIES TO SPEND, FARM AND NONFARM FAMILIES AND SINGLE CONSUMERS, UNITED STATES, 1941, BY INCOME CLASS <sup>1</sup>

<i>Income Class</i>	<i>Farm<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Nonfarm</i>
\$0-250	58.3% }	90.5%
250-500	82.1 }	
500-750	126.7 }	88.6
750-1,000	52.8 }	
1,000-1,500	77.1	93.7
1,500-2,000	78.2	90.4
2,000-3,000	44.3	78.9
3,000-5,000		63.2

<sup>a</sup> Includes investment expenditures.

<sup>1</sup> Computed from Table 5, cols. 2 and 8, and Table 3; average money income for nonfarm families taken from United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Spending and Saving of the Nation's Families in Wartime*, Bulletin No. 723 (Washington 1942) p. 16.

discrepancy is not so large as when we consider farmers' consumption expenditures only. There is also a declining marginal propensity to spend as we go up the income scale, with the decline greater for farmers than for others.

Several serious weaknesses are apparent in the above argument. In the first place, we have ignored investment expenditures by nonfarm groups; they too can build houses, business buildings, and buy machinery. In a depression year, however, savings of nonfarm groups are less likely to find their way into investment than in prosperous times. But low-income farm families suffer from shortages of capital. Even in a depression the small farmer typically needs better machinery, more fertilizer, better animal breeding stock, better buildings, and so on. In the second place, we do not know that farmers' pattern of expenditures of 1941 would obtain in a depression. And in the third, we do not know the time lag involved in changing a family's pattern of expenditure as it moves from one income group toward another. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence presented above, we reach these fundamental conclusions: As families go from low to high incomes their marginal and average propensities to consume tend to fall; low-income farm families have higher average propensities to spend than do correspondingly low-income nonfarm families to consume, and their marginal propensities are somewhat lower; medium- and high-income farm families have much lower average propensities to consume than do their counterparts off the farm, but their average propensities to spend are only moderately lower than that of nonfarm families to consume. The marginal propensity to spend is considerably lower for high-income farm groups than for the corresponding nonfarm families.

It has been argued by others<sup>13</sup> that the marginal propensity of farmers to spend (on consumption and investment goods) apparently does not differ from that of nonfarmers; but if the latter were higher, a redistribution of income against agriculture would raise the equilibrium level of expenditure upon goods and

<sup>13</sup> Brownlee and Johnson, *op. cit.*

services. This does not necessarily follow, because we must concern ourselves with how the burdens and benefits of an income shift are distributed among different income groups.

If income is shifted to agriculture and distributed among the various income groups in the same pattern as the burden is borne by nonagricultural groups, we can expect no countercyclical results. This follows from the fact that group for group above the \$1,000-income class, farmers have a tendency to spend less than others. The burden of a price support and crop restriction program can be divided into two parts: First, there is the tax burden to finance government expenditures in implementing its scheme. This burden falls most heavily on the high-income groups, both in absolute amounts and as a percentage of income. Second, there is the burden of high prices for farm products. In absolute amounts per family, the burden is heavier on people high on the income scale, but the low-income consumers bear the largest burden if we consider it in relation to size of income. The price burden will typically be heavier than the tax burden, first because price supports are inevitably associated with output restriction to minimize the cost of the program to the government; second, with an inelastic demand for farm products, buying up a small part of the marketable supply will cause a greater than proportionate increase in price. Because the price burden is greater than the tax burden, a price support program will reduce incomes of low-income consumers by a greater percentage than those of high-income groups; because low-income groups are so much more numerous than high-income groups, they probably pay out more dollarwise also as farm prices rise.

The benefits to farmers of a price support scheme accrue mainly to the largest farmers. Small farmers get most of their income in nonmoney form, and are therefore insulated to a considerable degree from market forces. In 1941, the average farmer earning a money income of \$500 or less had a nonmoney income that was larger than his money income. The average farmer in the \$3,000-5,000 class had only a 78 percent larger nonmoney income

than the farmer in the \$0-250 class, but he had a money income 28 times larger.<sup>14</sup> A price support program therefore largely by-passes the farmer with a small volume of output. The large farmers are the ones who will not increase their consumption by much as a result of increased incomes. Nor, as shown above, will their increased incomes necessarily result in an increased effective demand for investment goods. It is the small farmer who not only needs and wants to consume more, but needs more investment in the farm. Yet the small farmer benefits least from a price support and crop restriction program.

It would seem that a hands-off-agriculture policy by government would be a better countercyclical measure than a price support and crop restriction program, especially when we consider our earlier argument that a steady physical volume of farm output and sales is a stabilizing factor. Such a policy would offer lower food prices, with nonfarm low-income groups benefiting the most. But there is an additional problem to take into account: the disturbing effect of instability in farm income. Farm incomes are notoriously unstable. With every depression, the rate of forced farm sales rises sharply. As land values decline, debtor-farmers lose much of their equity in their farms.<sup>15</sup> A farm depression affects small-town and rural business men adversely. Threatened with bankruptcy, they may begin a scramble for liquidity which has adverse effects on production and employment.

We are now caught between Scylla and Charybdis. A price support and crop restriction policy aggravates fluctuations by (1) reducing the flow of farm products to market, and (2) shifting income from consumers, most of whom have high propensities to

<sup>14</sup> United States Department of Agriculture, *Rural Family Spending* . . . , pp. 26-27.

<sup>15</sup> Land values tend to fluctuate with the business cycle. If a farmer has a mortgage, his equity in his farm fluctuates even more widely than land values, worsening his position during a downturn. If the reciprocal of the fraction of the farm value which represents the owner's equity is multiplied by the percentage change in land value, the result is the percentage change of owner's equity. Thus, if a farmer owns two-thirds of the value of his farm, and has a mortgage for one-third, and if the farm value declines 25 percent, the farmer loses  $\frac{3}{2} \times 25$  percent, or 37.5 percent of his investment in the farm.

consume, to primarily the wealthier farmers, who have low propensities to spend. A laissez-faire policy is countercyclical to the extent that (1) it permits stability in the flow of farm products to market; (2) it shifts income from well-to-do farmers to consumers. A major disadvantage is that a laissez-faire policy means fluctuating farm incomes, with attendant unfavorable repercussions; it also neglects the welfare needs of impoverished farmers. Although the small farmer loses less than the large farmer, both percentage-wise and in absolute amounts, as prices fall, he may be hurt more by his small losses than would his more affluent neighbor by large losses in income.

To have the best of all possible worlds, a third alternative should be worked out: Prices should be permitted to reach the level that would clear the market without restricting the physical production and flow of farm products; income payments should be made to farmers in times of depression and low farm prices. The pattern of income redistribution should be planned so as to maximize the countercyclical effect. If this is not an ideal program, it is at least preferable to price supports. Farmers will insist on getting an adequate slice of the national pie. It may as well be worked out in such a way that it will achieve the maximum welfare and countercyclical effects.

#### *Countercyclical Income Payments to Farmers*

A good countercyclical income support program should operate only when the economy as a whole is depressed. A depression might be deemed to exist when average unemployment for a year exceeds 10 percent of the labor force. Income payments should be limited to perhaps a maximum of \$1,000 per farmer, in order to keep down the cost of the program and to concentrate payments among those farmers who are most likely to spend them. Payments should depend on the farmer's scale of production, and on the extent to which the market price falls below a guaranteed price.

Huge payments to farmers are hard to justify on grounds of farm

poverty.<sup>16</sup> Placing a ceiling on the size of government payments will test whether we want to help people, or whether the farm program is to continue to provide a bonanza for large growers of certain favored commodities. Too often the poverty of agriculture is proved by using average per capita or per family statistics, and then government payments are distributed in inverse relationship to need.

In boom times, general payments to farmers should be discontinued. This would not prevent the government from offering special assistance to depressed groups or areas. Small welfare payments might be offered to the lowest-income farmers. Or aid might be given in areas which suffer crop shortages, or to low-income areas in the form of funds for education, health, housing, and so on.

It is possible that farm prices will rise sharply on some commodities in years of short harvests either at home or abroad.<sup>17</sup> At such times, prices of nonperishables could be kept in line by drawing on stocks stored during years of abundance. A moderate government storage program when crops are abnormally large would tend to reduce price fluctuations.

If prices of farm products were stabilized, farmers' incomes would fluctuate with the size of the crop. Storing surpluses when yields are bountiful, and throwing them on the market when nature is niggardly, would tend to stabilize prices and destabilize incomes. In such a situation, some price rise during crop shortages would seem unobjectionable, since income stability for farmers is even more important than price stability. The argument here is not that the government should prevent moderate price rises when market conditions result in an upward pressure on prices, but rather that it should avoid supporting prices when the pressure

<sup>16</sup> A recent example of large payments was reported by the House Committee on Banking and Currency: under the price support program some potato producers had been paid up to \$500,000 on a single crop (*New York Times*, March 24, 1950, p. 2).

<sup>17</sup> While the total domestic output of farm products remains quite stable from year to year, the output of individual crops can fluctuate widely.



is downward. But the government should not intensify inflationary pressures by price and income supports in boom times, as it did during the war and has done ever since. In fact, the government would be justified in preventing steep price rises by releasing crops from storage. Farmers would not lose unduly thereby, but they would be prevented from reaping windfall gains. With a crop shortage, a moderate rise in price could compensate for the deficiency in output. But since the demand for farm products is relatively inelastic, a small reduction in harvests could lead to a large increase in price per unit of output, and to an increased total revenue for the smaller crops. With crops in storage, the government could release stocks, thereby moderating the price rise. If farmers demand protection against sharp drops in income, they should be willing to accept policies which will tend to moderate sharp increases in income.

#### *Summary and Conclusions*

Instead of causing or intensifying business cycles, agriculture acts as a stabilizing influence to the extent that the physical flow of farm products to market is quite stable. The result is a stabilizing effect on employment and income for those individuals and firms engaged in handling or processing farm products as they flow toward the consumers. Once fluctuations in the rest of the economy are controlled, the need for special agricultural policies will be reduced or eliminated; until this is done, special policies are necessary to prevent cyclical fluctuations from disorganizing and penalizing the most stable sector of the economy. Special agricultural policies can be planned for maximum countercyclical effect.

Since both the supply of and demand for farm produce are relatively inelastic with respect to price, fluctuations in agricultural income have greater amplitude than fluctuations in business activity. Widely fluctuating farm income works a hardship not only on farmers, but also on those who do business with farmers; the effect is disturbing to the economy.

If farm income is to be supported, this can be accomplished through price supports or through income payments. Price supports necessitate the restriction of output, and the diversion, destruction, or storage of farm products whenever physical output bursts the bounds set by acreage limitation. Reductions in the quantity marketed during a business downturn intensify the depression. As far as the effects of income redistribution go, the burden of higher prices is borne mainly by consumers, the majority of whom have incomes low enough to give them a high marginal propensity to consume. The benefits of price supports accrue mainly to the big farmers, who produce a large part of the marketed supply of farm products; their marginal propensity to spend is probably low. The price support program is therefore not good countercyclical policy.

An income support program could be developed which would have a tendency to stabilize farm income, as does the price support program. The income support program, however, would not restrict the flow of farm products to market and would thereby permit this important stabilizing force to operate to the fullest extent. The scheme should operate only when average annual unemployment exceeds 10 percent of the labor force, and the size of the payment to each farmer should be limited drastically in order to concentrate payments among low-income farmers, and also to prevent federal disbursements to farmers from reaching fantastically large amounts.

# INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA

BY NWANKWO CHUKWUEMEKA

## I

UNLESS it is recognized now and acted on, the rapidly mounting tension born of European imperialism in Africa will sooner or later (and probably sooner) explode in violent revolution as it has in Asia. This development—the emergence of colonial peoples—is a persistently recurring phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century and perhaps the most striking expression of the struggle for national self-determination. And there is little doubt that the survival of Western civilization, especially that of Western Europe, depends on the extent and rapidity of the adjustment made by the Western community of nations to this turn of events.

The struggle for freedom in Africa has its roots deep in the past. Though the Europeans first came to African shores as peaceful traders, they soon discovered that by pushing further inland they could make greater profits. It was then that with the aid of superior weapons Europe took over Africa, and proceeded systematically to destroy the social, religious, and cultural organization and expression of the African people. Outwardly, the African resigned himself with dignity to the role of servant and to a meager existence, until such time as he would be able to assert his independence, and this long suppression of national pride is reflected in the current tension. That the dissatisfaction is now making itself heard and felt is due partly to the weakening of European rulers as a result of two devastating wars and partly to the increase, especially in the last ten years, of Africans—businessmen, farmers, industrial workers, and students, including those educated abroad—who have become aware of the irreconcilable conflict between African national aspirations and the

colonial economies. In fact, all these groups associate their poverty and other difficulties with alien political control.

How will the West with its traditional conviction of its own racial superiority and its reluctance to meet squarely the problems arising out of a diversity of races, creeds, and cultures, meet this new challenge? Can any solution be found within the framework of existing Western institutions? Or will the struggle for freedom in Africa (and Asia) reverse the pattern of the past and impose on the West such conditions as have been long endured by the submerged continents?

Clearly the Western nations can no longer be indifferent to the causes of rebellion in Africa. Hardly more acceptable than indifference is the recourse to grudging concessions whenever and wherever suppressed tensions gather sufficient force to threaten the maintenance of an unpopular alien rule, as, for example, in Indonesia and Burma. Nor will it serve any useful purpose to attempt, as some powers are now attempting, to re-establish old and decaying colonial and feudalistic institutions for reasons of expediency or, as a matter of fact, to approach the problem in any sort of piecemeal fashion. As the door to colonial exploitation closes in Asia, Africa is rapidly assuming increasing importance—both economic and military. For this reason if no other, it is incumbent on the Western nations to work co-operatively not only with each other but with the African peoples toward a solution of their common problems.

True, a course for co-operative action in Africa has already been mapped. Economic missions and scientific investigations and conferences are being sponsored increasingly by European powers with American collaboration. President Truman's Point Four program and the United Nations Technical Assistance plan for aid to underdeveloped areas, the European Recovery Program, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)—these and several other agencies of the United Nations constitute practical channels through which international co-operation in Africa is being directed. But despite these laudable developments,

a frank appraisal must attest that practice, if not declared principles, falls short of creating an atmosphere for really enlightened and effective co-operation. For one thing, in by far the greater part of Africa, Point Four and United Nations Technical Assistance programs can be implemented only at the invitation or with the consent of the colonial powers. This subtle provision, properly described as the "undisputed prerogative of the metropolitan power," abrogates the basis upon which any legitimate co-operation could be founded. But it is not even necessary to question the motives or sincerity of the colonial powers, for it has yet to be demonstrated that effective machinery exists whereby the wishes of the people of Africa can be ascertained and democratically implemented.

The implications of this situation are serious and must concern anyone truly interested in peace or genuine international co-operation in Africa. It would seem therefore that an objective re-examination of present-day conditions in Africa is in order.

## II

To most people in the United States and Europe, Africa is a little-known continent, though its economic and strategic importance were dramatically re-emphasized during World War II and more recently in the all-out effort to aid Europe, or to forestall expansion in Africa of a type of development described as "agitation inspired by communist elements."<sup>1</sup> Apart from such items as those about the "White Queen" of Sereste Khama of Bechuana-land, very little news about the people of Africa appears in the American press, and still less about such developments as the strong nationalist sentiment sweeping over the continent. Much of the information available comes from the colonial powers. The continent has attracted many daring explorers but their reactions are epitomized in the titles of the stories of their adventures—*Darkest Africa*, *White Man's Burden*, or *White Man's Grave*. (It

<sup>1</sup> George C. McGhee, "United States Interests in Africa," in U. S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. 22, no. 572 (June 19, 1950) p. 1000.

is interesting to note the shift in the Western point of view as reflected in more recent titles: *The Brightest Africa, Tomorrow's Hope or Yesterday's Dream, Bastion for Western Democracy.*) For the most part, the mention of Africa suggests jungles, wild animals, savages, and pygmies. No one familiar with Africa will deny the existence of the pygmies or the wild animals or the other peculiarities of the African continent, but there is another side to the picture.

The extent and depth of Africa's reservoir of industrial raw materials, foodstuffs, and manpower has not yet been determined. But there is reason to believe that her resources have not even been tapped, much less depleted, by the enormous annual exports of raw and semiprocessed goods. The Belgian Congo, which leads the continent in concentration and diversity of raw materials, is believed to be the richest known source of uranium and cobalt in the world. The Congo, Gold Coast, Southwest Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and Angola are primary producers of industrial diamonds. The Gold Coast is a leading producer of manganese. Tungsten, coal, and tin are found in Nigeria and the Congo; Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia also produce coal. Deposits of a good grade of iron ore are located in Nigeria, French West Africa, Algeria, and Morocco. The continent also yields gold, bauxite, copper, vanadium, columbite, lead, zinc, mica, and other minerals. The British, through the Shell D'Arcy Exploration Company, are conducting an intensive oil survey, but little is actually known about the fuel-oil resources and experts in the field are loathe to make predictions. Water power is ample, but relatively untapped.

In the matter of foodstuff resources, it is sufficient to mention that Nigeria and the Gold Coast control as much as 63 percent of the total world production of cocoa beans, and that Africa as a whole is the world's greatest producer of palm oil and palm kernel. Other important products are peanuts, cotton, sisal, mahogany, coffee, tobacco, hides and skins, wools, and rubber.

With an estimated total population of about 198 million, Africa



can offer a vast labor force, as well as a huge potential market for European and American exports.

Excluding Liberia, Ethiopia, Union of South Africa, and Egypt, the rest of the continent, numbering some 147 million persons and containing the richest natural resources, is under varying forms of European colonial administration. In this vast territory, the nationals of European powers control all the major economic sources of wealth, such as banking, mining, lumbering, transportation, communications, shipping, export and import trade, and manufacturing industries. Needless to say, Africa has paid fabulous dividends to the European entrepreneurs. For example, Unilever, one of the world's greatest combines, increased its sales through the United Africa Company from 160 million dollars in 1937 to 280 million in 1948.<sup>2</sup> The Union Minière du Haut Katanga made fantastic profits of 38 million dollars in the same year.<sup>3</sup> Other nations not directly connected with colonial administration have also benefited either through dividends from direct investments or through trade and international exchange of goods and personnel.

Africans have also benefited from the development of railways, roads, and markets, but only incidentally. And it must be recognized that practical necessity rather than the alleged sentimental desire to Christianize and civilize the African natives has been the primary impetus to the reluctant establishment of health services, sanitation, and minimal education. Such innovations, needless to say, were introduced mainly to further the ultimate objective—economic exploitation of natural resources.

These observations are not, however, intended solely as indictments. They are stressed here because the problem of adjustment that is the legacy of this generation demands an understanding of colonial imperialism and the late nineteenth-century European nationalism out of which it grew. The classical writings of

<sup>2</sup> See Gilbert Burk, "Unilever Africa," in *Fortune* (February 1948) p. 80. This is one of a series of three articles on the combine which appeared in *Fortune* in December 1947 and January and February 1948.

<sup>3</sup> See *African World*, London (August 1949) p. 39.

Rudyard Kipling, the assiduous statesmanship of Leopold II of Belgium and of Joseph Chamberlain of Great Britain, and the invidious racism of Sir Cecil Rhodes are monumental expressions of this nationalism, and the concepts embodied in such records are still very much alive in some quarters today. Only consider, for example, these words of Cecil Rhodes: "If there be a God, I think that what He would like me to do is to paint as much of the map of Africa British red as possible, and to do what I can elsewhere to promote the unity and extend the influence of the English speaking race. . . ." "I contend that we are the first race in the world, and that the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race. . . ." <sup>4</sup>

Granted that the defects of the nineteenth-century patterns are now apparent and that they have been largely rejected *in principle*. There is still no assurance that the concept of enlightened international co-operation in Africa will automatically find ready acceptance and active implementation. To assume that it will is to underestimate the concert of European interests in Africa and their policies. Despite the fact that the greater part of Africa is under the rule of French, British, Spanish, Belgians, Portuguese, and Italians, with all the implied diversity of cultural, social, linguistic, political, and economic practices, there is still a common ground for European colonial policies: they derive their inspiration from the metropolitan power, not the area governed, and the source is almost always economic. But this singleness of purpose on the part of the governing powers in no way reduces the obstacles to international co-operation. Instead, the complexity of the problem is matched only by the urgency of finding an early solution.

### III

In actual fact, the concept of international co-operation in African affairs has been developing over many decades, though more slowly

<sup>4</sup> *The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes*, ed. by W. T. Stead (London 1902) pp. 98, 58.

than might have been expected. The necessity for such co-operation in Africa has been apparent, but was never so strongly advocated as when global conflict pointed up the need.

The first serious attempt was made in 1884. At that time it was obvious that the rivalry between conflicting European interests in Africa would ultimately lead to war, unless claims and rights were established and accorded international recognition. The Europe of the 1880's was, of course, experiencing unprecedented prosperity, made possible by the industrial revolution, and the new concepts of economic nationalism, *laissez faire*, protective tariffs, and competition. It was a Europe whose economic tempo and international outlook were dominated by Great Britain; the other powers—principally Germany, France, Spain, and Belgium—vied desperately with each other to emulate British productive superiority, to capture foreign markets, and to open up new sources of raw materials. It was in this setting that Bismarck summoned a meeting of European powers to consider the possibilities for co-operation in Africa. The outcome of this conference is well known. As is stated in the General Act of Berlin, the participating powers agreed that the commerce of all nations should enjoy complete freedom in Central Africa and that navigation of the Congo and the Niger should be unrestricted.<sup>5</sup> But the greatest, and certainly the farthest-reaching, result was not effective international co-operation, but the partition of Africa among rival European nations.

The next effort was the insertion of Article 22 in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919. This article formed the basis for the mandate system,<sup>6</sup> which was applicable only to those colo-

<sup>5</sup> Represented at the conference were the following powers: Great Britain, the United States (as observers only), France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Germany, Russia, Austria, Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The United States and Italy did not ratify the treaty at the time, but the United States became a signatory when the Convention of St. Germaine-en-laye revised the two general acts of Berlin and Brussels, and also reaffirmed the policy of commercial equality in African territories.

<sup>6</sup> Three types of mandates were created. "A" mandates were Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan (British); Syria, Lebanon (French). "B" mandates were Togoland, Cameroons,

nies and territories which as a consequence of World War I were no longer under the sovereignty of the states which had formerly governed them, and which were "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." In compliance with this provision the administering powers accepted the principle that the "well-being and development" of the inhabitants formed a "sacred trust of civilization."

The third stage is embodied in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, and, ironically, was inspired by the fury and immensity of the Nazi advance which forced the Allied leaders to enunciate war aims that would command the loyalty of men everywhere. The Atlantic Charter described these aims in the following words: "They [the signatories] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live . . . they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security." And in 1945 at San Francisco these principles were accepted by the United Nations.

The scope of the power vested in the UN in connection with Africa is defined in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter. The latter two refer to the trust territories which have an estimated total population of about 18.25 million.<sup>7</sup> The obligations imposed by these two chapters are specifically stated, with Chapter XII stipulating as a major objective the promotion of the trust territories' progressive development toward self-government or independence. Chapter XI pertains to the 130 million Africans

Tanganyika (British); French Togoland, French Cameroons; Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian). "C" mandates were South Africa (Union of South Africa); Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands (Japanese); Western Samoa (New Zealand); New Guinea (Australian). The "A" mandates are now sovereign nations.

<sup>7</sup> The trust territories include the Cameroons (British and French); Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian); Togoland (British and French); Tanganyika (British); Somaliland (Italian); Southwest Africa (Union of South Africa); Eritrea and Libya (British Military Government). (Libya has been promised her independence by 1952.) The status of other territories is not entirely clear; for example, Egypt is dissatisfied with the arrangements in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a condominium, and has protested to the UN. Tangier is under international administration.

who do not live in the trust territories. The obligations laid down in this chapter are, however, applicable to all non-self-governing territories and therefore include the trust territories. According to Chapter XI, "member nations of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interest of the inhabitants are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust [same wording as the League Covenant] the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants . . . to insure . . . their political, economic, social, and educational advancement . . . to develop self-government . . . to transmit regularly to the secretary general for information purposes . . . statistical and other information . . . relating to economic, social, and educational conditions. . . ." It is significant that while colonial powers accept the obligation to develop free political institutions and self-government, they do not accept the obligation to submit information on political development. This was not an oversight; it was a deliberate omission favored by the colonial powers.

With this slight historical background the difficulties encountered in developing international co-operation may be readily recognized. Today, the UN, together with its Specialized Agencies, is regarded as the sole instrument through which international co-operation in Africa can be achieved. But just how effective can the UN be? No fair critic of the Charter will deny that its fundamental overall objectives are laudable and should command the support of all peoples. At the same time, to those concerned with the affairs of colonial peoples now described as "non-self-governing" it is evident that the peacemakers at San Francisco in 1945 were no more successful than their counterparts at Versailles some twenty-six years earlier. It is true that some concessions have been won from colonial powers, namely, that the principle of self-government in the case of colonial territories, and self-government or independence in trust territories, should be the goal of administration, and that administering powers of colonial

territories accept the obligation to submit to the UN reports on economic, social, and educational matters for purely information purposes. But is it not true that the doctrine of *international accountability*, which colonial powers unanimously resisted at Versailles, has again been defeated, in spite of its desirability? Is it not also true that legally and technically the UN expects no more from the colonial powers than what these powers individually or collectively volunteer to do, irrespective of the acknowledged conflicts between European and African economic and political objectives? Furthermore, there is no acceptable definition of what constitutes a "non-self-governing territory," nor does the UN state who is competent to declare certain territories non-self-governing.

Cutting through the relevant, but still not fundamental, details and the controversies which have marked the attainment of certain worthy objectives, we submit that the question of effective international co-operation has not been solved. In plain language, with regard to African colonials the UN is no more a guardian of the "sacred trust of civilization" than a hungry English mastiff is the keeper of a piece of rare steak. Plans for achieving effective international co-operation in Africa through the offices of the UN, as it is at present constituted without direct representation of the African peoples concerned, are suspect and impractical. At the same time, it must be emphasized that this weakness of the UN does not imply that there is any inherent defect in the foreign relations philosophy of the majority of the member nations; it is therefore, remediable.

#### IV

Earlier in this analysis it was pointed out that a number of projects for economic development in Africa are now being sponsored by various colonial powers, some of them in collaboration with the United States. Though these fall short of solving the problem of true international co-operation, is there perhaps the possibility that they may at least point the way to a solution?



For any realistic appraisal of the chances, it is necessary to distinguish between those plans that are earmarked to aid metropolitan economies or European enterprises, and projects that will actually serve the expressed needs of the African masses. Again, it is useful to draw a line between projects sponsored exclusively by metropolitan powers and those financed primarily by outside sources such as the Marshall Plan and the United Nations Technical Assistance services.

Considering first the projects of metropolitan governments, particularly those of France, Belgium, and Great Britain, one notes that these are usually described as "ten-year plans for economic and welfare development." The major part of the capital and management comes from the metropolitan states. Though the projects are government monopolies and include short-term as well as long-term interests, they do not as a rule discriminate against private or foreign capital investment, so long as such investments do not impose conditions that may be described as "intervening in domestic affairs." The Economic Co-operation Administration of the United States, for example, has established a special division called the Overseas Development Fund, the purpose of which is "to speed the establishment of basic services, the surveying of available resources, and providing dollar aid in the form of equipment and technical skills" in the overseas territories of European governments.<sup>8</sup> France, for one, has been able to avail herself of this aid. In recent months she has obtained 2.2 million dollars for the exploitation of a diamond enterprise in Equatorial Africa, and another 2 million dollars for iron ore exploitation in West Africa. Britain is to receive about 13.9 million dollars, primarily for roads and agricultural projects designed to build up her dollar economy. Belgium, though she has refused an ECA offer to develop mines, would, however, consider loans for the development of roads, agriculture, or harbors.

According to the text of the ten-year plan for the Belgian Congo

<sup>8</sup> *Congressional Record*, May 25, 1950, p. 7829; see also Economic Co-operation Administration, *Budget Estimate*, July 1, 1950-June 30, 1951, pp. 11-35.

and the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, published in 1949 after two years of study, an estimated sum of about 1.1 billion dollars will be spent in the form of both public and private investment. In the category of public investment, development of transportation facilities (water, road, rail, and air), at an estimated cost of about 254 million dollars, heads the list. About 15 million dollars have already been spent on river port developments. Other public investment projects concern water supplies, hygiene and medical facilities, native education, electric power and agriculture. For private investments (financed predominantly by European enterprises and largely controlled by the gigantic Union Minière du Haut-Katanga) various mining industries and agricultural processing projects are envisioned.

France passed a law for the ten-year development of her overseas territories on April 30, 1946, in fulfillment of which the government agency, Fond D'Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social (FIDES), was created. The funds are derived partly from the national government and partly from local government units, and are supplemented by loans from the Caisse Centrale de la France D'Outre-Mer. Projects scheduled are for educational, agricultural, transportation, and mining developments. In French West and Equatorial Africa, for example, it is planned to spend about 342 million dollars.

The British ten-year plan has been in effect longer than either the Belgian or the French and is the most highly organized and the most diversified. The idea was conceived in 1929 during the depression, with the creation of the Colonial Development Fund "designed with the primary object of relieving unemployment in Great Britain."<sup>9</sup> A sum of about 3.2 million dollars was to be spent annually for eleven years in the sprawling colonial empire for agricultural and industrial enterprises "in order to promote commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom."<sup>10</sup> In 1940,

<sup>9</sup> Cmd. 7167, *The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947* (1947) p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Cmd. 6175, *Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare* (February 1940) p. 5.

with the great political uncertainties and the need for raw materials for a total war, it became evident that "trying to tie the development of a colony closely to the trading and industrial needs of the metropolitan country . . . is a too narrow and self-defeating policy."<sup>11</sup> The 1929 law was then elaborated to include "welfare" and was renamed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Its annual spending power climbed to about 20 million dollars. By 1945 the whole program had collapsed: great debts had accumulated, industries had been destroyed, empire relations had deteriorated. But practical considerations made it necessary to pass a new Act differing only in the amount of funds allocated. Provisions for capital of about 480 million dollars was made by the Overseas Resources Development Bill, which established the Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation. Through these two government monopoly schemes, Britain is now carrying out the work of economic and welfare development in Africa. In the colonial territories regional development boards have been organized and loans have been extended to local governments and private enterprises as well.<sup>12</sup>

The major projects of the Colonial Development Corporation, which is the larger of the two agencies, concern mainly the exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources. In Gambia, the Corporation undertook an egg-production and poultry-raising scheme at a cost of about 2 million dollars. This has proved to be unsuccessful though it reportedly yields 350,000 chickens and 20 million eggs a year. Among the projects of the Overseas Food Corporation is the much criticized East Africa groundnuts

<sup>11</sup> British Information Services, *British Colonial Development and Welfare Act*, iD892 (November 1948) p. 4.

<sup>12</sup> In British Nigeria, however, a member of the Legislative Council asked how many applications came from local peoples and how they were handled. In answer it was revealed that nineteen applications for aid had been received from two regional boards. Of these, only six were considered and only two received loans, which amounted to 360 dollars; two other applications were beyond the scope of the ordinance, two were unsuitable, and seven applicants failed to pursue the matter when asked for further details. See Nigeria, Western House of Assembly, *Debates*, October 11, 1949 (Lagos 1950) p. 12.

scheme, which the Corporation took over from the United Africa Company.

Without going into further detail, it is abundantly clear that though it would be inaccurate to declare these schemes solely exploitative, the philosophy inherent in the overall plans, as well as in the currently active projects, is preponderantly exploitative and conforms precisely to the regular pattern of colonial imperialism. Hence, with few exceptions, the ten-year plans have come to be opposed by Africans. The road projects, for example, are invariably from mines to ports. Agricultural projects are almost always designed to meet European needs regardless of whether they are in serious conflict with the local economy. Educational projects are sponsored, by and large, to augment the labor market for European enterprises; where sufficient pressure exists, education policies are usually adjusted to an apologetic compromise with metropolitan cultures. In none of the British territories where there are university colleges has it been considered wise to establish agricultural colleges, much less courses in the engineering sciences or commercial studies at university levels. Some overseas scholarships have been granted but the numbers are pathetically inadequate considering the vast amount of basic work that needs to be performed by carefully trained technicians, scientists, and engineers.<sup>13</sup> Aware of this, the Africans, against all odds, are sponsoring their own educational and economic projects,<sup>14</sup> but metropolitan policies have resulted in a series of subtle restrictions against which the woefully handicapped Africans cannot compete.

The second group of projects comprises those economic activities originating in the implementation of the Marshall Plan and operating under the OEEC. The policy of the organization is amply defined by its administrator:

<sup>13</sup> In South Africa, the Indian representative awarded scholarships to Africans but local governments were not able to grant the necessary visas.

<sup>14</sup> In Nigeria and the Gold Coast, for example, there are African-owned and operated private schools, banks, newspapers, and simple consumer industries for the production of handwoven cloth (a traditional industry of the people), soap, bread, and so on.

The dependent overseas territories of the E.R.P. countries, principally United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal offer large reservoirs of undeveloped resources. The development of the areas of sources of materials needed on the European continent and for export to the United States and other Western Hemisphere markets is an important aspect of the European Recovery Program. Development of these overseas areas calls for considerable technical assistance in the surveying of economical potentialities; in the development of known or newly discovered minerals or agricultural resources; in the improvement of transportation and communications from the producing countries, and the protection of the health, welfare and safety of the inhabitants. . . .<sup>15</sup>

It is significant that the emphasis is not on the rapid development of political responsibility (self-government or independence) or on economic strength for the masses of the people. In actual fact, the OEEC is complemented by the ECA and is itself a complement of the ten-year plans. The philosophy, however, is twofold: first, with OEEC agreement, colonial powers undertake "to make available to the U. S. for stock piling purposes certain raw materials available almost solely from the colonies"; second, OEEC "facilitates American investment in colonial territories" under terms agreeable to colonial powers. From the foregoing discussion it would appear that while the American people need not justify the extension of aid to their European allies, to whom every aid must be given, they might well make note of the fact that the indirect alliance of American capital with European colonial imperialism is largely responsible for the spreading charge of "American imperialism."

In contrast with the ten-year plans, the OEEC, and ECA is the bold vision of Point Four, which aims to aid "the efforts of people living in economically underdeveloped areas of the world to realize their full capacities and to develop the resources of the lands in which they live." But Point Four, unfortunately, in so far

<sup>15</sup> Economic Co-operation Administration, European Recovery Program, *A Report on Recovery Progress and United States Aid* (Washington, February 1949) p. 166.

as African colonial territories are concerned, is beset with the obstacles already discussed. And yet this observation should not obscure the potentialities of the program. First, Point Four is a new and imaginative effort on the part not of the colonial powers but of the United States. Second, it assumes the ability of the people of the underdeveloped areas to rise above their present lot. Third, it emphasizes the very things the masses of colonial people are seeking (and which colonial powers have appeared unable to supply)—that is, the technology of our time. Finally, Point Four is not restricted to bilateral agreements, for by inviting all other nations to join in this program, the United States recognizes that peace and prosperity can be achieved only through a new world order of enlightened international co-operation. It is therefore possible to hope that a way can be found—perhaps through education—whereby the conflict of interests can be resolved.<sup>16</sup>

Because of the moral obligations implied by the Point Four program and because the United States is so heavily committed—politically, militarily, and financially—to the European nations which control most of Africa, the American stake in Africa is real and direct. To complete the picture on international co-operation in Africa, some reference must be made to the United States' own policy in Africa. The underlying assumption is that one of the virtues of democratic leadership, which makes the exercise of

<sup>16</sup> All colonial powers agree on the inadequacy of educational facilities in the territories they administer. Britain and France, the two major controlling states in Africa, admit to a lack of educational facilities even in the metropolitan areas. At the same time, Africans are demonstrating increasingly their willingness and capacity to take advantage of educational opportunities, as is evidenced by the fact that they have not only started their own schools but are sending their people abroad to study. It would seem appropriate for the Point Four program to explore ways of augmenting educational facilities and there is little doubt that other nations would support such a policy. As a matter of fact, the adoption by the General Assembly (December 12, 1950) of the resolutions on education (A/1303/Add. 1, 20 September 1950) submitted by the UN Special Committee is an indication of willingness to support this view. There is also no reason why the United States should not apply the reasoning that motivates the Fulbright awards program to an arrangement that would aid African students. Several American universities have extended scholarship aid to African students and Point Four grants might well enable them to expand such aid.



democratic power and control tolerable, is its recognition of its moral obligations; another is its power to create an atmosphere for progressive development of the masses within its orbit. It seems, therefore, in the light of the preceding discussion, that what is really necessary is an analysis of the practical objectives of the United States in Africa, in relation to current events and to their bearing on colonial areas.

## V

Although the United States has large shares in the uranium projects of the Belgian Congo, the diamond and gold mines in South Africa, the rubber estates of Liberia, and iron ore projects in Liberia and French West Africa, American capital has not been so heavily invested in Africa as it has, for example, in Puerto Rico or the Philippines. Nevertheless, the United States has insisted on free trade and navigation in Africa, as demonstrated by her ratification of the Berlin Conference agreements of 1885 and subsequent international documents. Even from the military point of view, keeping the entire coastline of Africa free for all commercial purposes is more important than the freedom to use the west coast as a strategic base in case of war.<sup>17</sup> The big oil reserves of the Near East and the trade with Asia via the Mediterranean and South Africa constitute more realistic stakes. But all such objectives fade to insignificance beside such statements as that of Vernon McKay, State Department Specialist on Dependent Area Affairs: "Our apprehension about Dakar was much exaggerated. Far more important for our security will be a stable African settlement that would satisfy the powers involved."<sup>18</sup> Although Mr.

<sup>17</sup> "The United States wishes to preserve its rights of equal economic treatment in the territories of Africa and to participate itself, both commercially and financially, in the development of this great continent along with other nations of the world" (George C. McGhee, *op. cit.*, p. 1002).

<sup>18</sup> *Foreign Policy Reports* (January 1946) p. 270. The powers referred to here are presumably the British and French, both of whom are being increasingly harassed by African nationalists. For obvious reasons, neither power is willing to surrender control of its African territories unless forced to do so. The United States, however, has negotiated for air bases in Liberia.

McKay was not defining American policy for Africa as such, he did strike the keynote for the foundation of a future American policy toward the colonial areas.

It appears obvious that at the moment two major considerations underlie American decisions on African policy: military and economic. But because of the unique international status of so much of Africa, any American decisions are necessarily influenced by the relationship of the United States with whatever nation exercises effective power in the particular area concerned. Actually, except for Liberia, the Union of South Africa, Ethiopia, and Egypt, the United States has no direct diplomatic relations with Africa. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the attainment of American objectives and the implementation of American democratic principles must rest on the degree of co-operation between the United States and the foreign powers controlling Africa. One might expect that American guarantees of financial and military aid to the colonial powers would serve to advance American objectives and principles. This assumption, however, is correct only in part: in practice, the objectives overshadow the principles to such an extent that American policy in Africa, however well-intentioned, gives the impression of acquiescence in colonialism.

That such a situation has existed in the past may be deplored, but should not astonish. No nation, however praiseworthy its ideals, has ever been guided by completely altruistic motives in its foreign relations. The United States is no exception. (India, however, may prove that it can be done.) But the world of the twentieth century, with its two major conflicting ideologies, its phenomenal accomplishments in the fields of science and technology, and the revolt of the oppressed colonial peoples, who but a few years ago had no direct voice in the control of their own lives, much less any appreciable influence in international affairs, indicates that an adjustment in the mental attitudes of the West is not only inescapable but expedient. In the case of Africa, it is most desirable that the adjustment take the path of effective and

enlightened international co-operation and that the United States by virtue of her leadership should use her influence to create a favorable atmosphere for this purpose. In a community of nations, especially the West, where the fundamental principles of freedom have been compromised to permit intolerance and suppression, complacency is tragic. There has been a terrible perversion of justice in Africa, which the West, especially Europe, precariously situated as she is today and hopelessly dependent upon her overseas territories with their predominantly nonwhite population, can ill afford to countenance.

These remarks are in no way meant to suggest that the United States be substituted for the governments now in power in Africa. Nor is it contemplated that the United States should ignore the usual diplomatic courtesies for purposes of direct action. On the contrary, international co-operation in Africa is desirable only in an atmosphere of cordial relationships among members of the western European nations themselves and with Africans. Despite the deficiencies and outright inhumanities of the European administration in Africa, the world is indebted to the ordinary European citizen, especially the French and British. The historical development of the national institutions of these common peoples of Europe are monumental records of courage and progress, and their rich experience will serve to guide the efforts of Africans. With regard to the United States, the Africans have no very clear picture. Available information is meager and ranges thinly from tales of cowboys and gangsters to sagas of a land of freedom and opportunity.<sup>19</sup> This is due in part to the low standard of general education in Africa and partly to the attitude of Europeans in Africa, who are not infrequently suspicious of American motives. Only in the last decade have Africans (especially West Africans)

<sup>19</sup> Only recently has the United States opened up offices of information through the United States Information and Educational Exchange Centers. There are now about fourteen of these centers located throughout Africa. The Voice of America program also operates in some sections. It is reported by the information agency that of the fourteen key American officers in charge of the radio stations only two are Negroes, but that efforts are being made to secure more.

come in steadily increasing numbers to study in America.<sup>20</sup> And even this contact is suffering a severe setback as a result of the devaluation of 1949. Nevertheless, the influence of the American-educated African (and they are usually keenly interested in the American struggle for independence) is largely responsible for African opinion which, taken as a whole, may be regarded as favorable.

The task now before the West is to provide imaginative statesmanship which will give reality to the prevailing world opinion, as it has been summarized by the London *Economist*: "The aims supported by world opinion—speedy development and final self-government in Africa—do not in any way contradict the declared policies of the colonial powers."<sup>21</sup> It is, however, essential to keep the problem and its complexities constantly in mind. Dr. Rita Hinden, a member of the British Labor Advisory Committee of the Colonial Office, stated it most precisely when she wrote:

"... there should be no more difficulty in evolving a white black co-operation in Africa than there is in working out the relationship between Latin-America and the United States: in essence the problems are closely akin. But in practice the position is complicated in West Africa by our continued political control, which arouses so many emotional resentments. And in East Africa, the existence of settler communities confuses every issue. If settlement must be permanent—and must it?—then the British genius for adapting political institutions to changing circumstances will need to be stretched to the utmost to save a deteriorating situation."<sup>22</sup>

No one can predict the future trend of events in Africa. But, if the problem is re-examined impartially, not so much from the point of view of strategic military positions and materialistic advantages, but from the human angle and in the light of the minimum moral obligations imposed by democratic leadership, the problem becomes less complex. It is apparent by now that

<sup>20</sup> There are now more than 400 African students in the United States and Canada.

<sup>21</sup> *Economist*, December 3, 1949, p. 1219.

<sup>22</sup> "White Settlement and African Aspirations," in *African World*, London (December 1949) p. 15.

African nationalism and colonial powers do not quarrel over the "aims supported by world opinion." On the contrary, the quarrel is with "how and when" the opinion will be implemented. Colonial powers, for obvious practical reasons, stress caution, contending that democracy in Africa is hindered by the extremely high rate of illiteracy and lack of experience in self-government. But it is clear that no one except an explicit enemy of Western democracy can in sincerity support the claims put forth by the colonial powers of Africa. The African sentiment, on the other hand, is stated in the form of an appeal to the West: "If the communist adopted a policy that facilitates our struggle and hastens our freedom then assuredly we must know the buttered side of our bread. If, on the other hand, conservatives and reactionaries even of the foolhardy Churchillian type go the length of dropping into our deep-well of slavery in our aid, then surely we shall use them. . . ." This challenging appeal concludes by emphasizing that Africans are "far more concerned with the struggle for Nigerian freedom than with alignment with any power block of the world." The last statement is significant not only because it reflects the same attitude as that of the Asian people, Indians in particular, but because as the editorial continues, "too often have the ruling classes fooled the outside world into believing that Russian Communism has any special appeal to African leaders wickedly stigmatised as agitators."<sup>23</sup> Against this background it is safe to say that the past pattern is becoming increasingly difficult to support. Unenlightened American aid to colonial powers can only intensify the problems. Enlightened aid may solve them.

<sup>23</sup> Editorial entitled "Freedom: Our First Concern," in *West African Pilot*, Lagos, Nigeria, October 17, 1949, p. 2. This daily paper enjoys wide circulation in West Africa and England. The proprietor is Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe affectionately called "Zik" by millions of African peoples whose sentiments he symbolizes. He was educated in the United States and is a great admirer of the American people and form of government.

# MAKING MUSIC TOGETHER

## *A Study in Social Relationship*

BY ALFRED SCHÜTZ

### I

MUSIC is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme. Yet this meaningful context can be communicated. The process of communication between composer and listener normally requires an intermediary: an individual performer or a group of coperformers. Among all these participants there prevail social relations of a highly complicated structure.

To analyze certain elements of this structure is the purpose of this paper. The discussion is not aimed at problems commonly relegated to the realm of the so-called sociology of music, although it is believed that an investigation of the social relationships among the participants in the musical process is a prerequisite for any research in this field; nor is it concerned with a phenomenology of musical experience, although some elementary observations regarding the structure of music will have to be made. The chief interest of our analysis consists in the particular character of all social interactions connected with the musical process: they are doubtless meaningful to the actor as well as to the addressee, but this meaning structure is not capable of being expressed in conceptual terms; they are founded upon communication, but not *primarily* upon a semantic system used by the communicator as a scheme of expression and by his partner as a scheme of interpretation.<sup>1</sup> For this very reason it can be hoped that a study of the social relationships connected with the musical process may lead to some insights valid for many other forms of social intercourse,

<sup>1</sup> The system of musical notation, as will be shown, has quite another function and a merely secondary one.



perhaps even to illumination of a certain aspect of the structure of social interaction as such that has not so far attracted from social scientists the attention it deserves. This introductory statement requires some clarification.

When sociologists speak of social interaction they usually have in mind a set of interdependent actions of several human beings, mutually related by the meaning which the actor bestows upon his action and which he supposes to be understood by his partner. To use Max Weber's terminology, these actions have to be oriented in their course with reference to one another. In studying the process of communication as such, most sociologists have taken as a model either the interplay of significative gestures or language in the broadest sense of this term. G. H. Mead, for example, finds that two wrestlers communicate with each other by a "conversation of gestures" which enables either of the participants to anticipate the other's behavior and to orient his own behavior by means of such anticipation.<sup>2</sup> We may also say that two chess players who both know the functional significance of each chessman in general, as well as within the unique concrete constellation at any given moment of a particular game, communicate their thoughts to each other in terms of the "vocabulary" and "syntax" of the scheme of expression and interpretation common to both of them, which is determined by the body of the "rules of the game." In the case of ordinary speech or the use of written symbols, it is assumed that each partner interprets his own behavior as well as that of the other in conceptual terms which can be translated and conveyed to the other partner by way of a common semantic system.

In any of these cases the existence of a semantic system—be it the "conversation of significant gestures," the "rules of the game," or "language proper"—is simply presupposed as something given from the outset and the problem of "significance" remains unquestioned. The reason for this is quite clear: In the social world into which we are born, language (in the broadest sense) is

<sup>2</sup> G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago 1937) pp. 14, 63, 253 ff.

admittedly the paramount vehicle of communication; its conceptual structure and its power of typification make it the outstanding tool for the conveying of meaning. There is even a strong tendency in contemporary thought to identify meaning with its semantic expression and to consider language, speech, symbols, significant gestures, as the fundamental condition of social intercourse as such. Even Mead's highly original endeavor to explain the origin of language by an interplay of significant gestures—his famous example of the dogfight—starts from the supposition that a prelinguistic "conversation" of "attitudes" is possible. It is not necessary to accept Mead's basic position of "social behaviorism" in order to admit that, as has so often happened, he has seen a crucial problem more clearly than others. Nevertheless, the solution he offers only seemingly removes the difficulties connected with the basic issue, namely, whether the communicative process is really the foundation of all possible social relationships, or whether, on the contrary, all communication presupposes the existence of some kind of social interaction which, though it is an indispensable condition of all possible communication, does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it. It is currently rather fashionable to dismiss problems of this kind with a haughty reference to the question of the priority of the chicken or the egg. Such an attitude not only reflects an unfamiliarity with the philosophical issue discussed by the Schoolmen under the heading of priority, but also constitutes a self-made obstacle to a serious analysis of the various problems of foundation important especially for the social sciences.

As far as the question under scrutiny is concerned, the concrete researches of many sociologists and philosophers have aimed at certain forms of social intercourse which necessarily precede all communication. Wiese's "contact-situations," Scheler's perceptual theory of the alter ego, to a certain extent Cooley's concept of the face-to-face relationship, Malinowski's interpretation of speech as originating within the situation determined by social interaction,

Sartre's basic concept of "looking at the other and being looked at by the other" (*le regard*), all these are just a few examples of the endeavor to investigate what might be called the "mutual tuning-in relationship" upon which alone all communication is founded. It is precisely this mutual tuning-in relationship by which the "I" and the "Thou" are experienced by both participants as a "We" in vivid presence.

Instead of entering here into the complicated philosophical analysis of this problem,<sup>3</sup> it may be permissible to refer to a series of well-known phenomena in the social world in which this precommunicative social relationship comes to the foreground. Mead's example of wrestlers has already been mentioned. It is typical for a set of similar interrelated activities such as the relationship between pitcher and catcher, tennis players, fencers, and so on; we find the same features in marching together, dancing together, making love together, or making music together, and this last-named activity will serve as an example for analysis in the following pages. It is hoped that this analysis will in some measure contribute to clarification of the structure of the mutual tuning-in relationship, which originates in the possibility of living together simultaneously in specific dimensions of time. It is also hoped that the study of the particular communicative situation within the musical process will shed some light on the nonconceptual aspect involved in any kind of communication.

## II

Certain elements of the social structure of the musical process were analyzed in one of the later writings of the famous French sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs.<sup>4</sup> The paper in question deserves special attention because it was written as a kind of introduction to a major study on the nature of time, which was unfortunately

<sup>3</sup> Mead's *Philosophy of the Present* (Chicago 1932) is just one example of how investigations of this kind have to be carried out and where they lead.

<sup>4</sup> Maurice Halbwachs, "La mémoire collective chez les musiciens," in *Revue philosophique* (March-April 1939) pp. 136-65.

never completed owing to the author's tragic death in the concentration camp of Buchenwald in July 1944.<sup>5</sup>

Halbwachs' basic position is well known. He assumed that all kinds of memory are determined by a social framework and that individual memory cannot be conceived of without the assumption of a collective memory from which all individual recollection derives. This basic principle—which it is not our concern to criticize here—was applied to the problem of musical communication because the author felt that the very structure of music—its development within the flux of time, its detachment from anything that lasts, its realization by re-creation—offers an excellent opportunity for demonstrating that there is no other possibility of preserving a set of recollections with all their shades and details except by recourse to the collective memory. In other words, Halbwachs was primarily concerned with analyzing the social structure of music. Curiously enough, he divided the realm of music into two distinct parts: music as experienced by the educated musician and music as experienced by the layman. With regard to the former, Halbwachs came to the conclusion that it is first of all the possibility of translating music into visual symbols—that is, the system of musical notation—which makes transmission of music possible. To be sure, the signs of musical notation are not images of the sounds. They are, however, means of expressing in a conventional language all the commands which the musician must obey if he wants to reproduce a piece of music properly. The conventional character of the signs of musical notation and their combination consists in the fact that they have meaning merely by continuous reference to the group which invented and adopted them. This group, the “society” of educated musicians, lives in a world exclusively filled with sounds and is interested in nothing else but creating or listening to a combination of sounds. Even the invention of new combinations

<sup>5</sup> Four chapters from the manuscript were published posthumously under the title, “Mémoire et société,” in *L'Année sociologique*, 3rd Series, Vol. I (Paris 1949) pp. 11-197.

of sounds is possible only within the framework of the socially conditioned musical language (which, for Halbwachs, was identical with the system of musical notation). The creative act of the composer is merely a discovery in the same world of sounds that is accessible exclusively to the society of musicians. It is precisely because the composer accepts the conventions of this society and because he penetrates more deeply into them than others that he can make his discoveries. The musical language is not an instrument invented afterward in order to put down and to transmit to other musicians what one of them has spontaneously invented. On the contrary, it is this very language which creates music.

This is roughly Halbwachs' main argument for the social character of the musician's music. Yet the child or the musically uneducated person learns nursery rhymes, anthems, popular songs, dance or march melodies by rote without any knowledge of musical notation. How is this possible and how can this kind of memory for sound combinations be referred to the collective memory? Halbwachs' answer is that the layman's memory of musical events is also founded upon the collective memory but always attached to metamusical experiences.<sup>6</sup> The melody of a song is remembered because the words—a social product—are remembered. As for dances or marches or other pieces of music dissociated from words, it is the rhythm of marching, dancing, speaking, that serves as the carrier of the musical recollection. Yet rhythm does not exist in nature; it, too, is a result of our living in society. The insulated individual could not discover rhythm. No evidence is offered for this statement (which I believe to be wrong) except reference to the rhythmical character of work songs and of our speech. Both words and rhythms are of social origin and so, consequently, are the layman's musical experiences. But they refer to a world in which other than exclusively sonorous events exist and to a society not exclusively interested in musical texture. So much for Halbwachs.

<sup>6</sup> This term is not used by Halbwachs, but probably renders what he meant.

Interesting as Halbwachs' analysis is, it suffers from various shortcomings. In the first place, it seems to me that the distinction between a musician's music and music accessible to the layman is without any foundation in fact. But postponing the discussion of this question and restricting ourselves for the time being to the province of music allegedly accessible only to the educated musician, the following objections to Halbwachs' theory must be raised: (1) He identifies the musical thought with its communication. (2) He identifies musical communication with musical language which to him is the system of musical notation. (3) He identifies musical notation with the social background of the musical process.

In regard to the first objection, it is clear that from the point of view of the composer a musical thought may be conceived without any intention of communication. This thought may be a perfect piece of music, having its specific meaning structure; it may be remembered at will without being translated into actual sounds or into the visible form of notation. This is, of course, not a particularity of the musical process. It has been said that Raphael would have been one of the greatest painters even if he had been born without arms. In general, all kinds of mental activities performed in fantasy may be perfectly meaningful and capable of being mentally reproduced within the solitude of the individual consciousness. All our unexpressed thoughts, our day dreams as well as projects for future action never carried out, show these features. But any kind of communication between man and his fellow man and therefore the communication of musical thoughts presupposes an event or a series of events in the outer world which functions, on the one hand, as a scheme of expression of the communicator's thought and, on the other hand, as a scheme of interpretation of such thought by the addressee. Musical thoughts can be transmitted to others either by the mechanics of audible sound or by the symbols of musical notation.

It is hard to understand why Halbwachs regarded only the latter as the appropriate form of musical communication. Obvi-



ously he took as a model of his analysis the situation in which the composer has to communicate his musical idea to the performer by way of a system of visible signs before the performer can translate these ideas into sounds to be grasped by the listener. But this procedure has nothing to do with the particularities of musical communication as such; it is a more or less technical question. We may perfectly well understand an improvisation executed by one or several instrumentalists. Or we may, with Tovey, foresee a revolution in the process of musical communication by means of the microscopic study of phonographic records. "There is nothing to prevent the individual production of music directly in terms of the phonographic needle. That is to say, the composer, untrammelled by the technique of instruments, will prescribe all producible timbre in whatever pitches and rhythms he pleases, and will have no more direct cooperation with the craftsman who models the phonographic wave-lines, than the violinist may with Stradivarius."<sup>7</sup>

Musical notation is, therefore, just one among several vehicles of communicating musical thought. But musical notation is by no means identical with musical language. Its semantic system is of quite another kind than that of ideograms, letters, or mathematical or chemical symbols. The ideogram refers immediately to the represented concept and so does the mathematical or chemical symbol. The written word in our alphabetic languages refers to the sound of the spoken word and through it as an intermediary to the concept it conveys. As stated above, the meaning of a musical process cannot be related to a conceptual scheme, and the particular function of musical notation today as well as in its historical development reflects this situation. The musical sign is nothing but instruction to the performer to produce by means of his voice or his instrument a sound of a particular pitch and duration, giving in addition, at certain historical periods, suggestions as to tempo, dynamics, and expression, or directions as to the connection with other sounds (by such devices as ties, slurs,

<sup>7</sup> Donald Francis Tovey, "Music," in *British Encyclopaedia*, 14th ed.

and the like). All these elements of the tonal material can only be approximately prescribed and the way to obtain the indicated effect is left to the performer. "The composer's specific indications are themselves not always a part of his original creation but rather one musician's message to another about it, a hint about how to secure in performance a convincing transmission of the work's feeling content without destroying its emotional and intellectual community," says a well-known composer and critic.<sup>8</sup> And the conductor, Furtwängler, is certainly right in stating that the composer's text "cannot give any indication as to the really intended volume of a *forte*, the really intended speed of a *tempo*, since every *forte* and every *tempo* has to be modified in practice in accordance with the place of the performance and the setting and the strength of the performing group" and that "the expression marks have intentionally a merely symbolic value with respect to the whole work and are not intended to be valid for the single instrument wherefore an '*ff*' for the bassoon has quite another meaning than for the trombone."<sup>9</sup>

Thus, all musical notation remains of necessity vague and open to manifold interpretations and it is up to the reader or performer to decipher the hints in the score and to define the approximations. These limits vary widely in the course of the historical development of musical culture. The more closely we approach the present in the study of the history of music, the lower the level of the general musical culture of performers and of listeners, and the stronger the tendency of the composer to make his system of notation as exact and precise as possible, that is, to limit more and more the performer's freedom of interpretation. To be sure, all signs of musical notation are conventional; but, as has been shown, the system of musical notation is more or less accidental to the process of musical communication. A social theory of music therefore does not have to be founded on the conventional

<sup>8</sup> Virgil Thompson, *The Art of Judging Music* (New York 1948) p. 296.

<sup>9</sup> Wilhelm Furtwängler, "Interpretation—eine musikalische Schicksalsfrage," in *Das Atlantischbuch der Musik* (Zurich 1934) pp. 609 ff.

character of the visual signs but rather on the sum total of what we have just called musical culture against the background of which the reader's or performer's interpretation of these signs takes place.

## III

To make this web of social relationships called musical culture clearer, let us imagine a lonely performer of a piece of music sitting at his piano before the score of a sonata by a minor master of the nineteenth century which, we assume, is entirely unknown to him. Furthermore, we assume that our piano player is equally proficient as a technician and sight reader and that consequently no mechanical or other external obstacle will hinder the flux of his performance.

Yet, having hardly made these two assumptions, we hesitate. Are they indeed compatible with each other? Can we really maintain that the sonata in question is *entirely* unknown to our performer? He could not be an accomplished technician and sight reader without having attained a certain level of musical culture enabling him to read offhand a piece of music of the *type* of that before him. Consequently, although this particular sonata and perhaps all the other works of this particular composer might be unknown to him, he will nevertheless have a well-founded knowledge of the type of musical form called "sonata within the meaning of nineteenth century piano music," of the type of themes and harmonies used in such compositions of that period, of the expressional contents he may expect to find in them—in sum, of the typical "style" in which music of this kind is written and in which it has to be executed. Even before starting to play or to read the first chord our musician is referred to a more or less clearly organized, more or less coherent, more or less distinct set of his previous experiences, which constitute in their totality a kind of preknowledge of the piece of music at hand. To be sure, this preknowledge refers merely to the *type* to which this individual piece of music belongs and not to its particular and unique

individuality. But the player's general preknowledge of its typicality becomes the scheme of reference for his interpretation of its particularity. This scheme of reference determines, in a general way, the player's anticipations of what he may or may not find in the composition before him. Such anticipations are more or less empty; they may be fulfilled and justified by the musical events he will experience when he starts to play the sonata or they may "explode" and be annihilated.

In more general terms, the player approaching a so-called unknown piece of music does so from a historically—in one's own case, autobiographically—determined situation, determined by his stock of musical experiences at hand in so far as they are typically relevant to the anticipated novel experience before him.<sup>10</sup> This stock of experiences refers indirectly to all his past and present fellow men whose acts or thoughts have contributed to the building up of his knowledge. This includes what he has learned from his teachers, and his teachers from their teachers; what he has taken in from other players' execution; and what he has appropriated from the manifestations of the musical thought of the composer. Thus, the bulk of musical knowledge—as of knowledge in general—is socially derived. And within this socially derived knowledge there stands out the knowledge transmitted from those upon whom the prestige of authenticity and authority has been bestowed, that is, from the great masters among the composers and the acknowledged interpreters of their work. Musical knowledge transmitted by them is not only socially derived; it is

<sup>10</sup> All this is by no means limited to the situation under scrutiny. Indeed, our analysis has so far been merely an application of Husserl's masterful investigations into the structure of our experience. According to him the factual world is always experienced as a world of preconstituted types. To embark upon the importance of this discovery by Husserl, especially for the concept of type, so fundamental for all social sciences, is not within the scope of the present paper. This theory has been touched upon in Husserl's *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (London-New York 1931) § 47, p. 149, and has been fully developed in his *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Prague 1939) pp. 35 ff., 139-43, 394-403.

also socially approved,<sup>11</sup> being regarded as authentic and therefore more qualified to become a pattern for others than knowledge originating elsewhere.

## IV

In the situation we have chosen to investigate—the actual performance of a piece of music—the genesis of the stock of knowledge at hand with all its hidden social references is, so to speak, prehistoric. The web of socially derived and socially approved knowledge constitutes merely the setting for the main social relationship into which our piano player (and also any listener or mere reader of music) will enter: that with the composer of the sonata before him. It is the grasping of the composer's musical thought and its interpretation by re-creation which stand in the center of the player's field of consciousness or, to use a phenomenological term, which become "thematic" for his ongoing activity. This thematic kernel stands out against the horizon of preacquired knowledge, which knowledge functions as a scheme of reference and interpretation for the grasping of the composer's thought. It is now necessary to describe the structure of this social relationship between composer and beholder,<sup>12</sup> but before entering into its analysis it might be well to forestall a possible misunderstanding. It is by no means our thesis that a work of music (or of art in general) cannot be understood except by reference to its individual author or to the circumstances—biographical or other—in which he created this particular work. It is certainly not a prerequisite for the understanding of the musical content of the so-called Moonlight Sonata to take cognizance of the silly anecdotes which popular belief attaches to the creation of this work; it is not even indispensable to know that the sonata was composed by a man called Beethoven who lived then and there and went through

<sup>11</sup> With regard to the concepts of socially derived and socially approved knowledge, see my paper, "The Well-Informed Citizen," in *Social Research*, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 1946) pp. 463-78, especially 475 ff.

<sup>12</sup> The term "beholder" shall include the player, listener, and reader of music.

such and such personal experiences. Any work of art, once accomplished, exists as a meaningful entity independent of the personal life of its creator.<sup>13</sup> The social relationship between composer and beholder as it is understood here is established exclusively by the fact that a beholder of a piece of music participates in and to a certain extent re-creates the experiences of the—let us suppose, anonymous—fellow man who created this work not only as an expression of his musical thoughts but with communicative intent.

For our purposes a piece of music may be defined<sup>14</sup>—very roughly and tentatively, indeed—as a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time. It is the occurrence in inner time, Bergson's *durée*, which is the very form of existence of music. The flux of tones unrolling in inner time is an arrangement meaningful to both the composer and the beholder, because and in so far as it evokes in the stream of consciousness participating in it an interplay of recollections, retentions, protentions, and anticipations which interrelate the successive elements. To be sure, the sequence of tones occurs in the irreversible direction of inner time, in the direction, as it were, from the first bar to the last. But this irreversible flux is not irretrievable. The composer, by the specific means of his art,<sup>15</sup> has arranged it in such a way that

<sup>13</sup> This problem has been discussed for the realm of poetry by E. M. W. Tillyard and C. S. Lewis in their witty and profound book, *The Personal Heresy, a Controversy* (London-New York 1939).

<sup>14</sup> An excellent survey of philosophical theories of music can be found in Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (Cambridge 1942), Ch. 8, "On Significance in Music," and Ch. 9, "The Genesis of Artistic Import," although the author's own position seems unsatisfactory. It may be summed up in the following quotation: "Music has all the earmarks of a true symbolism, except one: the existence of an assigned connotation. . . . It is a limited idiom like an artificial language, *only even less successful; for music at its highest, though clearly a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol*. Articulation is its life but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression."

<sup>15</sup> Some of these specific means are essential to any kind of music, others belong merely to a particular musical culture. Rhythm, melody, tonal harmony, technique of diminution, and the so-called forms based on what Tovey calls the larger harmony, such as Sonata, Rondo, Variations, and so on, are certainly characteristic of the musical culture of the nineteenth century. It may be hoped that intensified



the consciousness of the beholder is led to refer what he actually hears to what he anticipates will follow and also to what he has just been hearing and what he has heard ever since this piece of music began. The hearer, therefore, listens to the ongoing flux of music, so to speak, not only in the direction from the first to the last bar but simultaneously in a reverse direction back to the first one.<sup>16</sup>

It is essential for our problem to gain a clearer understanding of the time dimension in which music occurs. It was stated above that the inner time, the *durée*, is the very form of existence of music. Of course, playing an instrument, listening to a record, reading a page of music—all these are events occurring in outer time, the time that can be measured by metronomes and clocks, that is, the time that the musician "counts" in order to assure the correct "tempo." But to make clear why we consider inner time the very medium within which the musical flow occurs, let us imagine that the slow and the fast movement of a symphony each fill a twelve-inch record. Our watches show that the playing of either record takes about three and a half minutes. This is a fact which might possibly interest the program maker of a broadcasting station. To the beholder it means nothing. To him it is not true that the time he lived through while listening to the slow movement was of "equal length" with that which he dedicated to the fast one. While listening he lives in a dimension of time incomparable with that which can be subdivided into homogeneous parts. The outer time is measurable; there are pieces of equal length; there are minutes and hours and the length of the groove to be traversed by the needle of the record player. There is no such yardstick for the dimension of inner time the listener lives in; there is no equality between its pieces, if pieces

research in the phenomenology of musical experience will shed some light upon the difficult problem which of these means of meaningful arrangement of tones is essential to music in general, regardless of what its particular historical setting may be.

<sup>16</sup> This insight has been formulated in an unsurpassable way by St. Augustine in Book XI, Ch. 38, of his *Confessions*.

there were at all.<sup>17</sup> It may come as a complete surprise to him that the main theme of the second movement of Beethoven's Pianoforte Sonata in d-minor, Op. 31, No. 2, takes as much time in the mere clock sense—namely, one minute—as the last movement of the same sonata up to the end of the exposition.<sup>18</sup>

The preceding remarks serve to clarify the particular social relationship between composer and beholder. Although separated by hundreds of years, the latter participates with quasi simultaneity in the former's stream of consciousness by performing with him step by step the ongoing articulation of his musical thought. The beholder, thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a genuine face-to-face relation<sup>19</sup> such as prevails between speaker and listener.

But is this reconstruction of a vivid present, this establishment of a quasi simultaneity, specific to the relationship between the stream of consciousness of the composer and that of the beholder? Can it not also be found in the relationship between the reader of a letter with its writer, the student of a scientific book with its author, the high school boy who learns the demonstration of the rule of the hypotenuse with Pythagoras? Certainly, in all these cases the single phases of the author's articulated thought are polythetically—that is, step by step—coperformed or reperformed by the recipient, and thus a quasi simultaneity of both streams of thought takes place. The reader of a scientific book, for instance, builds up word by word the meaning of a sentence, sentence by sentence that of a paragraph, paragraph by paragraph that of a

<sup>17</sup> We do not need the reference to the specific experience of listening to music in order to understand the incommensurability of inner and outer time. The hand of our watch may run equally over half the dial, whether we wait before the door of a surgeon operating on a person dear to us or whether we are having a good time in congenial company. All these are well-known facts.

<sup>18</sup> Donald Francis Tovey, *Beethoven* (London-New York 1945) p. 57.

<sup>19</sup> This term, here and in the following paragraphs, is not used in the sense that Charles Horton Cooley used it in *Social Organization* (New York 1937) Chs. 3-5; it signifies merely that the participants in such a relation share time and space while it lasts. An analysis of Cooley's concept can be found in my article, "The Home-comer," in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 50, no. 5 (March 1945) p. 37.

chapter. But once having coperformed these polythetic steps of constituting the conceptual meaning of this sentence (paragraph, chapter), the reader may grasp the outcome of this constitutive process, the resulting conceptual meaning, in a single glance—monothetically, as Husserl puts it<sup>20</sup>—that is, independently of the polythetic steps in which and by which this meaning has been constituted. In the same way I may grasp monothetically the meaning of the Pythagorean theorem  $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$ , without restarting to perform the single mental operations of deriving it step by step from certain assured premises, and I may do so even if I have forgotten how to demonstrate the theorem.

The meaning of a musical work,<sup>21</sup> however, is essentially of a polythetical structure. It cannot be grasped monothetically. It consists in the articulated step-by-step occurrence in inner time, in the very polythetic constitutional process itself. I may give a name to a specific piece of music, calling it "Moonlight Sonata" or "Ninth Symphony"; I may even say, "These were variations with a finale in the form of a passacaglia," or characterize, as certain program notes are prone to do, the particular mood or emotion this piece of music is supposed to have evoked in me. But the musical content itself, its very meaning, can be grasped merely by reimmersing oneself in the ongoing flux, by reproducing thus the articulated musical occurrence as it unfolds in polythetic steps in inner time, a process itself belonging to the dimension of inner time. And it will "take as much time" to reconstitute the work in recollection as to experience it for the first time. In both cases I have to re-establish the quasi simultaneity of my stream of consciousness with that of the composer described hereinbefore.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Husserl, *Ideas* (cited above) §§ 118, 119, pp. 334 ff.

<sup>21</sup> Also of other time-objects such as dance or poetry (see footnote 22).

<sup>22</sup> This thesis is simply a corollary to the other—that the meaning context of music is not related to a conceptual scheme. A poem, for instance, may *also* have a conceptual content, and this, of course, may be grasped monothetically. I can tell in one or two sentences the story of the ancient mariner, and in fact this is done in the author's gloss. But in so far as the poetical meaning of Coleridge's poem surpasses the conceptual meaning—that is, in so far as it *is* poetry—I can only bring it before my mind by reciting or reading it from beginning to end.

We have therefore the following situation: two series of events in inner time, one belonging to the stream of consciousness of the composer, the other to the stream of consciousness of the beholder, are lived through in simultaneity, which simultaneity is created by the ongoing flux of the musical process. It is the thesis of the present paper that this sharing of the other's flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, constitutes what we called in our introductory paragraphs the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the "We," which is at the foundation of all possible communication. The peculiarity of the musical process of communication consists in the essentially polythetic character of the communicated content, that is to say, in the fact that both the flux of the musical events and the activities by which they are communicated, belong to the dimension of inner time. This statement seems to hold good for any kind of music. There is, however, one kind of music—the polyphonic music of the western world—which has the magic power of realizing by its specific musical means the possibility of living simultaneously in two or more fluxes of events. In polyphonic writing each voice has its particular meaning; each represents a series of, so to speak, autarchic musical events; but this flux is designed to roll on in simultaneity with other series of musical events, not less autarchic in themselves, but coexisting with the former and combining with them by this very simultaneity into a new meaningful arrangement.<sup>23</sup>

So far we have investigated the social relationship between composer and beholder. What we have found to be the outstanding feature of musical communication—that is, the sharing of the ongoing flux of the musical content—holds good whether this process occurs merely in the beholder's recollection,<sup>24</sup> or through

<sup>23</sup> See, for instance, the Brahms song, "Wir wandelten wir zwei zusammen," in the introduction of which the walking together of the two lovers is expressed by the specific musical means of a canon, or the same device used in the Credo of Bach's B-minor Mass for expressing the mystery of the Trinity ("Et in unum").

<sup>24</sup> In this connection, one recalls Brahms's dictum: "If I want to listen to a fine performance of 'Don Giovanni,' I light a good cigar and stretch out on my sofa."

his reading the score, or with the help of audible sounds. To believe that the visible signs of musical notation are essential to this process is no more erroneous than to assert, as even Husserl does, that a symphony exists merely in its performance by an orchestra. To be sure, the participation in the process of musical communication by means other than audible sounds requires either a certain natural gift or special training on the part of the beholder. It is the eminent social function of the performer—the singer or player of an instrument—to be the intermediary between composer and listener. By his re-creation of the musical process the performer partakes in the stream of consciousness of the composer as well as of the listener. He thereby enables the latter to become immersed in the particular articulation of the flux of inner time which is the specific meaning of the piece of music in question. It is of no great importance whether performer and listener share together a vivid present in face-to-face relation or whether through the interposition of mechanical devices, such as records, only a quasi simultaneity between the stream of consciousness of the mediator and the listener has been established. The latter case always refers to the former. The difference between the two shows merely that the relationship between performer and audience is subject to all variations of intensity, intimacy, and anonymity. This can be easily seen by imagining the audience as consisting of one single person, a small group of persons in a private room, a crowd filling a big concert hall, or the entirely unknown listeners of a radio performance or a commercially distributed record. In all these circumstances performer and listener are “tuned-in” to one another, are living together through the same flux, are growing older together while the musical process lasts. This statement applies not only to the fifteen or twenty minutes of measurable outer time required for the performance of this particular piece of music, but primarily to the co-performance in simultaneity of the polythetic steps by which the musical content articulates itself in inner time. Since, however, all performance as an act of communication is based upon a series

of events in the outer world—in our case the flux of audible sounds—it can be said that the social relationship between performer and listener is founded upon the common experience of living simultaneously in several dimensions of time.

## v

The same situation, the pluridimensionality of time simultaneously lived through by man and fellow man, occurs in the relationship between two or more individuals making music together, which we are now prepared to investigate. If we accept Max Weber's famous definition, according to which a social relationship is "the conduct of a plurality of persons which according to their subjective meaning are mutually concerned with each other and oriented by virtue of this fact," then both the relationship prevailing between intermediary and listener and that prevailing between coperformers fall under this definition. But there is an important difference between them. The listener's coperforming of the polythetic steps in which the musical content unfolds is merely an internal activity (although as an "action involving the action of others and being oriented by them in its course" undoubtedly a social action within Weber's definition). The coperformers (let us say a soloist accompanied by a keyboard instrument) have to execute activities gearing into the outer world and thus occurring in spatialized outer time. Consequently, each coperformer's action is oriented not only by the composer's thought and his relationship to the audience but also reciprocally by the experiences in inner and outer time of his fellow performer. Technically, each of them finds in the music sheet before him only that portion of the musical content which the composer has assigned to his instrument for translation into sound. Each of them has, therefore, to take into account what the other has to execute in simultaneity. He has not only to interpret his own part, which as such remains necessarily fragmentary, but he has also to anticipate the other player's interpretation of his—the other's—part and, even more, the other's anticipations of his own execution. Either's freedom



of interpreting the composer's thought is restrained by the freedom granted to the other. Either has to foresee by listening to the other, by protentions and anticipations, any turn the other's interpretation may take and has to be prepared at any time to be leader or follower. Both share not only the inner *durée* in which the content of the music played actualizes itself; each, simultaneously, shares in vivid present the other's stream of consciousness in immediacy. This is possible because making music together occurs in a true face-to-face relationship—inasmuch as the participants are sharing not only a section of time but also a sector of space. The other's facial expressions, his gestures in handling his instrument, in short all the activities of performing, gear into the outer world and can be grasped by the partner in immediacy. Even if performed without communicative intent, these activities are interpreted by him as indications of what the other is going to do and therefore as suggestions or even commands for his own behavior. Any chamber musician knows how disturbing an arrangement that prevents the coperformers from seeing each other can be. Moreover, all the activities of performing occur in outer time, the time which can be measured by counting or the metronome or the beat of the conductor's baton. The coperformers may have recourse to these devices when for one reason or another the flux of inner time in which the musical content unfolds has been interrupted.

Such a close face-to-face relationship can be established in immediacy only among a small number of coperformers. Where a larger number of executants is required, one of them—a song leader, concert master, or continuo player—has to assume the leadership, that is, to establish with each of the performers the contact which they are unable to find with one another in immediacy. Or a nonexecutant, the conductor, has to assume this function. He does so by action in the outer world, and his evocative gestures into which he translates the musical events going on in inner time, replace for each performer the immediate grasping of the expressive activities of all his coperformers.

Our analysis of making music together has been restricted to what Halbwachs calls the musician's music. Yet there is in principle no difference between the performance of a modern orchestra or chorus and people sitting around a campfire and singing to the strumming of a guitar or a congregation singing hymns under the leadership of the organ. And there is no difference in principle between the performance of a string quartet and the improvisations at a jam session of accomplished jazz players. These examples simply give additional support to our thesis that the system of musical notation is merely a technical device and accidental to the social relationship prevailing among the performers. This social relationship is founded upon the partaking in common of different dimensions of time simultaneously lived through by the participants. On the one hand, there is the inner time in which the flux of the musical events unfolds, a dimension in which each performer re-creates in polythetic steps the musical thought of the (eventually anonymous) composer and by which he is also connected with the listener. On the other, making music together is an event in outer time, presupposing also a face-to-face relationship, that is, a community of space, and it is this dimension which unifies the fluxes of inner time and warrants their synchronization into a vivid present.

## VI

At the beginning of this paper, the hope was expressed that the analysis of the social relationship involved in making music together might contribute to a clarification of the tuning-in relationship and the process of communication as such. It appears that all possible communication presupposes a mutual tuning-in relationship between the communicator and the addressee of the communication. This relationship is established by the reciprocal sharing of the other's flux of experiences in inner time, by living through a vivid present together, by experiencing this togetherness as a "We." Only within this experience does the other's conduct become meaningful to the partner tuned in on him—that is,

the other's body and its movements can be and are interpreted as a field of expression of events within his inner life. Yet not everything that is interpreted by the partner as an expression of an event in the other's inner life is meant by the other to express—that is, to communicate to the partner—such an event. Facial expressions, gait, posture, ways of handling tools and instruments, without communicative intent, are examples of such a situation. The process of communication proper is bound to an occurrence in the outer world, which has the structure of a series of events polythetically built up in outer time. This series of events is intended by the communicator as a scheme of expression open to adequate interpretation by the addressee. Its very polythetic character warrants the simultaneity of the ongoing flux of the communicator's experiences in inner time with the occurrences in the outer world, as well as the simultaneity of these polythetic occurrences in the outer world with the addressee's interpreting experiences in inner time. Communicating with one another presupposes, therefore, the simultaneous partaking of the partners in various dimensions of outer and inner time—in short in growing older together. This seems to be valid for all kinds of communication, the *essentially* polythetic ones as well as those conveying meaning in conceptual terms—that is, those in which the result of the communicative process can be grasped monothetically.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the remarks in the preceding paragraph refer to communication within the face-to-face relationship. It can, however, be shown that all the other forms of possible communication can be explained as derived from this paramount situation. But this, as well as the elaboration of the theory of the tuning-in relationship, must be reserved for another occasion.

## SOVIET POLITICS AND POWER

WHEN a book presents the fruits of diligent and careful research at its very best, weighs all the available evidence in a balanced and conscientious manner, refuses to be dragged into programmatic generalizations where the evidence does not seem to warrant them, is full of instructive, and sometimes amusing, fully documented detail, and skillfully summarizes and theorizes its findings, one is inclined to regard it favorably. Dr. Moore's recent volume on Soviet politics<sup>1</sup> does all these things. But it is not a good book. It is a case of the trees versus the forest, the innumerable facts versus the basic structure, the foreground versus the background—in short, research versus scholarship. The equation of the two tends to be more and more generally accepted; mastery of research methods substitutes for fundamental knowledge. Not that research methods do not yield some useful results. In the case at hand one may single out especially the discussion of what Dr. Moore aptly terms the "vested interest in confusion" which every bureaucracy, and particularly the Soviet bureaucracy, is bound to develop. But, by and large, Dr. Moore's book is not really interesting; in five hundred pages on such a subject as Soviet Russia, it does not make a single point that is new, be it plausible or unacceptable. It is interesting merely as a test case, on the highest level of its type, of what can and what cannot be achieved by research without scholarship.

### I

Before illustrating the general criticism made above, it is necessary to point out a particular error with regard to a very important issue. Apparently, Dr. Moore is a student of sociology, anthropology, and psychology. He is not an expert on economics or on international relations. In the chapters devoted to these two subjects he draws heavily on earlier works—those of Yugow, Bykow, and Dobb, and the joint work of Bienstock, Schwarz, and Yugow for economics, and on Beloff and Dallin for international affairs. There is nothing objectionable in this, except that Moore takes over from these sources and the Russian statistics grave oversights and prejudices that have on several occasions been publicly exposed as such. The most important case in point concerns the collectivization of agriculture, which was forced on the recalcitrant peasants against the statistical evidence on com-

<sup>1</sup> Barrington Moore, Jr. *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1950. xviii & 503 pp. \$6.

parative productivities for political reasons, that is, to control them more easily and transform them into quasi proletarians. None of Dr. Moore's authorities has studied agricultural problems, and all without exception have been reared in Marxian economics, though most of them repudiate political Marxism. Hence they unquestioningly subscribe to the official Soviet explanation and justification of rural collectivization—that unified large units are more productive than many small units—despite the fact that even official Soviet sources grant that Soviet experience has proved the exact opposite.<sup>2</sup> The wrong doctrine and the ensuing pro-Soviet interpretation appear to be so strongly entrenched that newcomers to such studies no longer deem the critical voices worth heeding.

Dr. Moore obviously accepts the Soviet regime's point of view when he states that one of its objectives is "to put an end to the inherent disadvantages of small-scale peasant agriculture, which is unable to make use of modern machinery and scientific methods." He then goes on to say that "the regime finally decided upon a mixed system of socialized and individual property. . . . However, the collective farmers are permitted to retain. . . ." (p. 333). The fact that this was a compromise forced on the regime by the fury of the peasants' resistance resulting in a famine and the loss of hundreds of thousands if not millions of lives, especially in the Ukraine, appears in Moore's account as "strong pressure of the communist party" on the peasants to join the kolkhozes. The unproportional development of these individual homesteads on the kolkhozes in subsequent years is described by the author under the heading of "divisive tendencies" (pp. 342 ff.), again indicating that he accepts the Soviet version because his authorities have done so.

The chapters on international relations, while not actually erroneous, lack perspective. The nature of the League of Nations as an explicitly anti-Soviet alliance of the liberal democracies is nowhere mentioned, and even a fact as overwhelmingly important for the understanding of past and present events as the hostile activities within Soviet territory on the part of troops of fourteen member nations of the League, without any declaration of war, does not occur

<sup>2</sup> See A. Gayster, in Obolensky-Ossinsky, Ronin, Gayster, and Kraval, *Social Economic Planning in the USSR* (1931) p. 116. Gayster, however, credits the Soviet regime with having relieved the small peasants of pressure to an extent that enabled them to advance more rapidly than even the large ones. The alternative to large-scale collective farms naturally is no longer a multitude of small farms but the type of co-operative which is responsible for the flourishing of agriculture and democracy in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.

in this picture of Soviet policy. On the other hand, the author does not seem to understand that Lenin, through the separate peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, brought the Western allies to the brink of military disaster, consistent with his hatred for the West expressed at the two international socialist conferences in the Swiss mountains during the war. Likewise the pro-Nazi bias in the Soviet's initial neutrality in the second world war is definitely played down, and neither the excesses of communist propaganda in the Western countries nor even the official declaration of the Supreme Soviet to the effect that Britain and France had "criminally attacked Nazi Germany," are so much as mentioned.

## II

The particular objections raised in the preceding paragraphs are in line with our main criticism announced at the beginning of this note: lack of perspective for reasons of lack of fundamental knowledge. The two things of which the author is ignorant, and on which all his factual researches cannot enlighten him, are Marxian doctrine and the history of Russia. To write on the "dilemma of power" in Soviet politics without knowledge of the Marxian doctrine is like writing on Christian worship services without knowing the Bible. Obviously, a diligent researcher could construe something of the Christian religion from the liturgies, hymns, and the like; but not recognizing as such the innumerable allusions to Biblical passages, he would stumble from word to word and miss the relative weights. This is more than a mere analogy, because the Soviet system is a theocracy, though an atheist one, built around a sacred book. Dr. Moore step by step discovers problems which found their Marxist answers decades ago in Marxist scripture itself.

For example, Moore repeatedly makes the point that the "transfer of the means of production to the state is the only goal of Marxism of which one can say with considerable plausibility that it has been achieved." That this is an ambiguous sentence the author himself recognizes immediately, and adds that to many Marxists this transfer of means of production is really not a goal but only the means to the end of liberation from capitalist oppression. He does not realize that the latter goal has undoubtedly been achieved; what he means to say is that capitalist oppression has been exchanged for an oppression of a different kind, which no Marxist, however, would classify as oppression at all but merely as the transitional discipline which must be imposed with a view to the attainment of eternal bliss, a com-



pletely homogeneous, conflictless, universal society. In other words, in a tightly knit system of thought like the Marxist, there is only one supreme goal, and all other "goals" are means logically derived from that supreme end. Even this is a doubtful proposition; there is only one supreme means, Soviet power, which includes control of all means of production and is employed in production and society to reconstruct man in the direction of the supreme end. This again signifies that Dr. Moore's problem—the "dilemma of power"—does not exist; in Marxism, there is no tension between ideas and power because the unlimited power of those who alone understand the supreme goal, the Marxist intelligentsia, is the central idea, the materialized reason which finally emerges victorious from the dialectic of world history as seen by Marxism. Hence the preoccupation of Marx himself with the technique of revolution, the extensive military studies of Engels, the many volumes of Marxist discussion on the seizure and use of power, and the organization of the Bolshevik party along "bureaucratic"—that is, military—lines from the top down by Lenin himself as early as 1903, in conscious anticipation of the structure of the future Bolshevik state. All this is only logical in a doctrine which proclaims that "violence is the midwife of history."

This is not to deny the difficulties which many Marxists have in adjusting themselves to this logic of their doctrine. After all, it is a dialectical doctrine—that is, it leads through causally connected opposites, starting in its final stage from individual bourgeois democracy and resolving itself into collectivist homogeneity as the goal of proletarian democracy. While the logic of this transition is cogent from its premises, it nevertheless confounds and cannot fail to run up against many mental, moral, and sentimental inhibitions. The Russian Marxist intelligentsia itself, accustomed to the Bohème atmosphere of western European student quarters, was not sociologically predisposed to submit to collectivist mental discipline. This point, like many others in their doctrine, has never been understood by Marxists themselves, owing to their faulty sociology, which makes private property the sole criterion of social status and hence classifies the starving intelligentsia as proletarians pure and simple.<sup>3</sup> In any case,

<sup>3</sup> Social democratic scholars in the German-speaking countries, while they professed to be Marxists—far more than in France, let alone England—understood the real character of the Marxist theory only too well, as can be seen from the fact that the dictatorial climax of the doctrine was strictly suppressed in the popular propagandist literature and remained completely unknown, not only to the rank and file but also the highest functionaries.

Lenin, the moralist, looked upon moral and sentimental inhibitions as strictly immoral self-indulgence.

But with regard to the workers proper, Marx had as few illusions as Lenin. On the contrary, overriding importance in the Marxian system attaches to the theory that the proletarians by themselves are not able to develop more than "trade unionism," a junior partnership in capitalism, which cannot fail to crash with capitalism. It is true that the propertylessness of the workers should free them from the distorting and perverting influence of vested interests on man's mind and morality and make them capable of realizing that their class interest demands a homogeneous proletarian society. But this quality of the workers, the basis for the democratic or populist strain in Marx's and Lenin's thought, remains potential; it cannot be actualized for the time being. The untrained minds of proletarian workers are incapable of the high degree of abstraction required for a vision that carries beyond the pale of capitalist reality and experience; they must be taken under tutelage by the trained minds of their intelligentsia, organized as the "socialist party." The "correctly understood" class interest—correctly understood by the socialist party alone—is superior to the empirical class interest of the empirical workers. This is Karl Marx speaking—where is Dr. Moore's "dilemma"?

Dr. Moore attributes to Lenin the "mixture of incompatible authoritarian and democratic elements" (p. 333 and elsewhere). He is unaware that "democratic dictatorship" is a genuine Marxian idea since Marx never speaks of democracy as such as a goal but always of "workers' democracy," signifying thereby that nonworkers have no rights in this democracy. It is apparently unknown to Dr. Moore that the idea of forcing people to be free has come down from the doctrine of Jacobinism, much studied by Marxists, and can be found in the *Contrat Social*. He traces the position of the "conspiratorial elite" to Russian history exclusively (p. 60), instead of attributing a share to the theory of the correctly understood class interest; he traces the denunciation of trade unionism as the empirical goal of labor to Lenin (p. 61), instead of to Marx. The same is true in regard to the theory which is the center of the Marxist doctrine of the creative ability of the propertyless masses (p. 61). Moore summarizes his discussion of Leninism in the "double paradox" that "Lenin and his followers set out to achieve for humanity the goals of freedom and equality by way of an organization which denied these same principles" (p. 81); he does not seem to know that this is not Leninism but Marxism, and that what he calls paradox is dialectic in its Marxian

version, the causally necessary movement of history through opposites. He speculates on whether the theory or the pressure of environment had greater influence on the policies of the Bolsheviks (pp. 116, 199, and elsewhere), when actually it is their theory of power which has led them through the jungle of environmental pressures, often changing the direction from step to step but never for a moment losing sight of the ultimate objective. In sum, Dr. Moore constantly presents as original theories forced on Lenin and Stalin by their experiences what in reality are their quotations from Marx, which need not be identified in every instance because they are as familiar from decades of pre-revolutionary discussions among the conspirators and exiles as the words of the Gospels and Apostolic Epistles are to a Christian preacher and his audience.

## III

Marxism today gives Russia's power direction and dynamics; Russia gives Marxism power, the power of an enormous land mass inhabited by almost 200 million people. Dr. Moore very commendably proclaims that "the goals of society, and of groups within society are in a sense given—determined by tradition, by past historical circumstances" (p. 412). This passage seems to suggest an awareness of the place of history in "politics" and "the dilemma of power." Such an expectation, however, is again disappointed. The book offers hardly more than the routine facts concerning the relative sizes of industry and agriculture in Russia and a brief and far from adequate discussion of the role of the intelligentsia in Czarist Russia.<sup>4</sup> The result is that such fundamental problems of Russian structure and Soviet politics as cannot be approached on the basis of sociological research are strictly ignored.

The first such problem is that of the reasons for the victory of Marxism in, of all countries, backward Russia, contrary to Marx's and Engels' exclusive concentration on advanced countries. Just as Dr. Moore's ignorance of Marxist dogma makes him wonder about deviations from whatever he may regard as Marxist dogma that were forced on Lenin and Stalin by experience, so he now overlooks the astonishing achievement of Lenin's genius or demon in fitting the Marxist dogma into a structure of power which seemed to preclude its victory altogether. According to Lenin, it is not the advanced, but only the backward, as yet unorganized, countries in which socialism could break

<sup>4</sup> On this subject, see the magnificent discussion in E. Rosenstock-Huussy, *Out of Revolution* (New York 1938).

through the defenses of capitalism, in order then to revolutionize the advanced countries by a combined attack from without and within. This indeed is a new departure for which no guidance was to be found in Marx and Engels; this is the great divide between Marxism and Leninism, the new chapter which Marx could never have written.<sup>5</sup> Whatever else Marxism may be, it is certainly a conclusion from industrialization. What, then, are the "historical circumstances" which permitted it to conquer preindustrial Russia? Naturally, Dr. Moore finds no reference to this tremendous problem in Russian administrative and party documents because it precedes them all, and his addiction to "sources" prevents him from looking elsewhere in the literature.<sup>6</sup>

The second fundamental problem which the author ignores is that of the relationship of the Soviet government, once it was firmly established, to the Russian people. On this problem all that the author has to say is that "the power of the population to influence the policy of the communist party leadership is about equal to the power of a balky mule to influence its driver" (p. 233). If one is to take this totally inadequate and rather flippant remark seriously enough to discuss it at all, it is necessary to point out at once that the metaphor errs, for the mule does nothing but balk, while the Russian people hold strong positive convictions on what is right and wrong. These convictions are generally on the conservative side, but for this very reason are in some measure favorable to the regime. A conservative people is authoritarian-minded, and in Russia one thousand years of Byzantine Christianity have given conservatism the strongest religious sanction—it is still true that Moscow is the second Byzantium (and Rome the third). In other words, the dictatorial regime found in Russia a people predisposed to accept its authority and guidance, if not without certain reservations. A progressive and "enlightened"

<sup>5</sup> It need hardly be said that once Marxism had been transferred from industrial western Europe to preindustrial Russia, China was only a further step along this road.

<sup>6</sup> In this connection, it might be mentioned that Moore accepts the doctrine of monopoly capitalism emerging from competitive capitalism, drifting into economic crises, and seeking relief in imperial adventures and wars, as an original contribution of Lenin's book on imperialism. It is true that the Russian documents he consulted do not reveal that this doctrine originated with Rodbertus, whom Marx showered with invective, and was elaborated by Rosa Luxemburg, who heatedly fought Lenin for "proletarian democracy" in the party, and by Hilferding, the theorist of "social patriotism," not to mention the "bourgeois economist," Hobson. But even Lenin himself referred approvingly in his book to Hilferding and Hobson.

government in a backward conservative country is in a uniquely enviable position, the Soviet government no less than the "enlightened despotisms" of Europe two or three centuries earlier. This is one of the reasons for the success of Sovietism in Russia.

On the other hand, such conservatism as is found in the Russian people implies certain positive convictions of a specific character. One of them concerns the organic nature of the peasant economy supplemented and supported by the village community. Such a principle is perfectly compatible with both agrarian social revolution—emancipation from feudal bonds—and the economic progress achieved by the Soviet government. It is not compatible, however, with revolutionary, rational collectivization, and was furiously defended against collectivization in a manner not adequately characterized as mere balkiness—that is, retardation of progress—as has been noted above.

Dr. Moore mentions early in his book that he will concentrate on economic and administrative problems (though he also has two chapters on foreign policy). Such a limitation may have advantages, but it is unfortunate that the ambitious title of the book gives no hint of it. Politics and power in totalitarianism are bound to concentrate on spiritual life with a view to thought control. Hence Soviet politics and power can best be studied in the spectacular reversal of educational policy, from original antipatriotism to a full affirmation of Russian literature and history, and in the still more spectacular reversal of original atheist policy in favor of the recognition of family life and the final restoration of the Russian Orthodox Church to her ancient splendor.

Patriotic history and family and church life are obviously the main content of Russian popular conservatism, and for years they resisted the invading forces of totalitarian rationalism. The climax was reached with the introduction of the six-day week, which was designed not only to destroy the church by abolishing Sunday as a general day of rest, but also to extirpate the family by "staggering" the new day of rest so as to prevent several members of a family employed in different industries from ever having the same day free. This scheme backfired, despite the bribe of one free day out of every six instead of every seven, which the planners probably figured would be irresistible. Even after this defeat, official atheism still had a privileged status as late as in the Constitution of 1936, but was gradually withdrawn from 1938 on and disappeared during the war when the regime was entirely dependent for its own defense on the peasant boys in the Red Army. Similarly, the undermining of the family by informal registration of



marriage and one-sided notice of divorce by postcard continued right up to the war, though it had been offset for a number of years during the thirties by the emphasis on family stability as favorable for socialist order and numerous progeny.

Most important for an analysis of Soviet power is recognition of the amazing art with which it turned defeat into victory; for this is what it did. What happened on the family front was the surrender of a position which could not have been maintained in a socialist system. However much the idea of promiscuity may be cherished by intellectuals (see Max Weber's analysis of this question), the stern moralism and singleness of purpose of the Bolshevik revolutionaries and martyrs, particularly those of Lenin's inner circle, always frowned upon such laxity. More generally, it is clear that the rational discipline required for rational collective work would only be upset by the excitements, tensions, orgies, and tragedies of promiscuity, should this be the sole alternative to the Christian family.

The reversals of educational and church policies are somewhat different and even more striking. From Lenin's decisive discovery regarding the backward countries it follows that the power of Bolshevism in Russia's national and imperial strength and the international class war now travel on two tracks, that of Soviet expansion by diplomatic and military means, and that of revolution proper, but not without active aid extended to it by the Soviet power. Then, however, Soviet power owes the heaviest debt to the builders of Russian national and imperial power, and by recognizing this debt, it at the same time wins over to its own cause all the patriotic energies and loyalties which its original internationalism alienated. It not only averts a serious danger but also makes an immense positive profit.

The same thing is even more true of the restoration of the Russian Church. Heir to sixteen hundred years of resplendent but submissive Byzantine tradition, seasoned in a warm sacramentalism without this-worldly ambitions, and dependent from its very origin on protection by the imperial power against the papal claims of Rome, the docile Eastern Church is now being groomed for resumption of its ancient role as the champion of Eastern Christian piety against the political ambitions and corruptions of Western Christendom under the leadership of anti-imperial Rome. Nothing could fit more perfectly into the Soviet game than this extension to a field otherwise inaccessible to it.

The addition of this powerful weapon to the Soviet arsenal involves no ideological sacrifice or compromise. It is characteristic that the



Church itself never addresses Stalin, as it did the Czar in earlier days, as the father of the people, which would have a semireligious connotation, but as the great leader of the people, a purely political term. And to the student of dialectical materialism it is clear that religion, being nothing but the ideological reflection of private property must be fought tooth and nail so long as there is private property thus fortified by religion, but that it loses its "substructure" as soon as socialist institutions are firmly established, and can be tolerated provisionally as an innocuous pastime of backward people because it is sure to dissolve as the people discover that nothing corresponds to it in reality. Meanwhile it can serve a highly useful purpose in the international arena. This, however unexpected, is good dialectic, perfectly logical within the system, and at the same time good politics, a perfect proof of the absence of any "dilemma of power" in a system which can very well be defined as dialectics of power.

EDUARD HEIMANN

## BOOK REVIEWS

BERLE, ADOLF A., JR. *Natural Selection of Political Forces*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. 1950. 103 pp. \$1.50.

American political science, Charles Beard used to say, was bold and creative so long as it remained in the hands of laymen like Hamilton and Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Calhoun. Taken over by the professors, political science has become timid and sterile.

Adolf Berle is a professor by avocation, but by vocation he is a jurist and a statesman. He writes like one of the laymen admired by Charles Beard. Like the writers for *The Federalist*, he dares to put a great idea within the compass of a short essay. His theme is the nature of a political force and the conditions of its survival in history.

Every real political force has at its heart a nucleus of ideology. If the ideology has a purity and significance that can appeal to all men it can extend its power widely through force of conversion; witness early Christianity. But strictly political ideologies, like the liberties enshrined in Magna Carta, the equalitarianism of the American and French Revolutions, require what Adolf Berle calls an "apparatus" for effective functioning. The "apparatus" may consist of more or less related ideas tacked on the ideological nucleus; it may consist in personal ambitions, more or less ideal, interests more or less pure, organization, tactics. There is always the risk that the apparatus will mushroom out and choke the life out of the nucleus.

Much depends on the character of the nucleus: is it good or bad? Adolf Berle shies away from moral valuation. "Good" has high survival values, "bad" can't survive. But in human affairs you can pitch moral values out the window; they will slip back in through a lower door. The ideology of Magna Carta had survival value, because it appealed to the moral sense of the barons it covered. "All men are created equal" is an ideology that has a survival value because it appeals to the sense of right of moral men. So of *Liberté, égalité, fraternité*. Adolf Berle tries to escape the moral implications through the concept of universality. What appeals to all men is the most viable nucleus factor. But what is it that appeals to all men but moral quality? The Fascist ideology could not survive because in Italy it proclaimed the dominance of the elite, in Germany of the Nordic. It lacked universality, and therefore was doomed.

All this has a bearing on the problem of Soviet Russia. Is Stalinism a force having survival value?

The ideological nucleus of the Russian Revolution, as one finds it in

Kropotkin, was of great purity and universal appeal. Freedom for all; equality, fraternity, free co-operation; who can question either the viability or the morality of such an ideology? The Social Revolutionaries fortified the nucleus with an apparatus of organization and concrete proposals; Lenin equipped the nucleus with the apparatus of Marxian pseudo-economics, the tactics of infiltration and sabotage worked out by our own Industrial Workers of the World and the French Syndicalists.

The elder Masaryk once told me of a conversation he had had with Lenin, then an exile in Switzerland. Dethrone the Romanoffs, abolish the nobility, confiscate private property down to the peasant's land and the workman's tools; but no killing. That was Masaryk's prescription. Lenin objected that some killing is a natural concomitant of revolution.

"Then I told him," Masaryk said, "you can never tell where the killing will end."

For the ghost of Masaryk it ended with the "defenestration" of his own son, whether thrust out of the window by Comintern hands or by the tragic force of a noble idea corrupted to bitter poison.

How viable is the Stalinist political force? Adolf Berle does not believe in its survival value. The nucleus of humanity is smothered by the ghastly apparatus of genocide, slave labor, torture, conspiracy and spying, the tactics of the Big Lie. A world war may add itself to this frightful apparatus. But with or without a world war, Adolf Berle believes, the Stalinist enterprise is doomed. It is conceivable that when the apparatus now dominant perishes from its own corruption, the ideological nucleus may raise itself from the ground and put forth new leaves. All things are possible, in the future phase of history.

ALVIN JOHNSON

SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR M. *Paths to the Present*. New York: Macmillan. 1949. vii & 317 pp. \$3.

Thirteen essays in American history, dealing chiefly with national traits, national politics, and problems of war and peace, comprise this volume. In each case, the author has selected some problem of historical interest and has traced its varying manifestations in different periods. Thus, the essay on "The Martial Spirit" tells us something of the unity and dissension in wars which Americans have fought. "The Role of the Immigrant" discusses the contributions of immigrants to American civilization at various periods. Similarly, the essay on the United States as a nation of "joiners" deals with trends in associational

life. The task imposed by this method is a difficult one, and it can be handled only, as it has been in this case, by a writer with great historical knowledge. Few books of historical essays, and certainly few current books, are as rich in historical material as this one. Moreover, judgments are balanced and careful, and the writing is sober, with a certain richness.

A theme that recurs in several of the papers has perhaps its most explicit statement in the essay, "American and World History" (p. 169). Schlesinger points here to the interaction of three factors in our civilization: the original contribution of Europe, the impact of the New World, and the continuing influence of the Old. It is the third factor that Schlesinger feels has been underrated, and thus he accords it great emphasis. The same point is made in the essays on the immigrant and on the city, and it is not unrelated to the prevailing argument of the essay on "America's Stake in One World." This theme, it seems to me, is a serious and important one, and its presentation is well documented. The contribution that Schlesinger makes in calling it to our attention is a worthy one. Curiously enough, there are times when the author himself, in his effort to find and to interpret peculiarly American traits, seems to neglect it. Such statements as the one that the belief in progress "blossomed spontaneously on such a soil" (p. 17), or the generalization that "the settlers were the hardest working people on earth" (p. 8), or that Americans "have always indulged in prophecy" because "in a country still being finished the future is more important than the past" (p. 256) are unconvincing unless compared with the experiences of other nations so that the differences suggested by the author may be evident to all.

In general, what weakness there is in this book lies in the interpretation, in a lack of breadth and subtlety in analysis. To some extent these faults derive from the author's fundamental optimism. When the historical phenomena are open to several interpretations, Mr. Schlesinger seems to prefer to concentrate exclusively on the rosier view. The broad common development of different nations, for example, may lead to the suggestion that "if peoples will but stake their faith upon the things they have in common . . . youth will gain fresh courage in facing the future" (p. 185). But it may also lead to an analysis of the present world scene in which the most striking fact may be the sharing among different peoples of the dangerous fruits of ruthless technological experiment. The encroachment of city and country on one another may lead to a way of life which will "blend

the best features of both" (p. 233). It can also lead to the corruption of the countryside by television and other forms of cultural decay. The essay on the immigrant is thrilling, and the story is one that no sensitive person can read without being moved. But the conclusion with regard to the value of a democracy of diverse cultures (p. 76) can be justified only on the basis of an analysis of the value of "diversity" and the limits to that value in any teleological view of the world. Schlesinger has great faith in American democracy. So have I, but I believe that a larger measure of skepticism would lead to a broader and more fruitful interpretation of its character.

The second reason for my feeling that the interpretation is less full than the material itself is methodological and it comes chiefly from the essays that seem to me the least successful in the book. The analysis of the tides in national politics has already been brought into question by the 1948 elections. The socio-scientific discussion of those tides is less than convincing, and the definitions of liberalism and conservatism on which the discussion depends (p. 81) are themselves susceptible of broad interpretation, which renders the periodization doubtful. The use of polling methods in historical judgment ("A Yardstick for Presidents"), even among fifty-five distinguished historians, is open to serious objections. Historical criticism is not a matter of counting noses. Moreover, to include Franklin D. Roosevelt in such a survey, when judgment is not yet cold, is a doubtful procedure. A graver objection to the method, however, cannot even be seen in the essay itself. This country has had no Caesar or Napoleon. Had we had one, a much clearer understanding of what the historians meant by "greatness" would have been required. Or, had the success of Polk loomed still larger, the problem of whether the successful prosecution of an unjust war (his chief claim) constitutes greatness would have demanded more thorough analysis. I do not question that the results of this poll were themselves the result of reflection and judgment. But since polls give no reasons, the trend in polling must be to substitute consent for judgment. The application of new methods in the social sciences to historical writing may not be an unmixed good.

My third reason for being somewhat dissatisfied with Schlesinger's interpretations leads to much broader problems which can barely be touched on here. Where serious history writing is concerned with political problems in the strict sense, history becomes a preceptor of prudence, as Burke considered it. It is an aid to the statesman in

understanding the application of broad general principles to changing situations. In the original and very useful essay on "The Martial Spirit" this is done by showing the more and less statesmanlike ways of dealing with dissent in wartime. When this function is maintained, the interpretation makes sense, but when the discussion of social trends takes the place of prudent political counsel, there is a tendency to be doctrinaire. The most important history is still political history, and there are reasons associated with the use of history itself that make this so.

A tribute must be paid not only to the breadth but also to the originality of Mr. Schlesinger's work. The essay on prophecy is exceptional in that respect. The two essays on the presidency, while they cover more familiar ground, cover it well. And Schlesinger says many things that needed saying.

HOWARD B. WHITE

BERNARD, WILLIAM S., CAROLYN ZELENY, and HENRY MILLER, eds. *American Immigration Policy: A Reappraisal*. [Published under the sponsorship of the National Committee on Immigration Policy.] New York: Harper. 1950. x & 341 pp. \$4.

Chief among the virtues of this volume is its presentation of the six-point reform program prepared by the National Committee on Immigration Policy. The program asks for a modest increase in the number of immigrants, for the pooling of unused quotas, for the auxiliary use of occupational criteria in the selection of immigrants, for at least token quotas for the now-barred Asiatic peoples, for adjustment of our policies to our changed role in international affairs, and for the creation of a Congressional Immigration Committee to consider long-range plans for legislative reforms. The balance, moderation, and clarity of these recommendations bear all the marks of careful discussion in expert council.

In arguing its case, the report sharply attacks the restrictive immigration of the twenties and thirties, bringing to bear much pertinent information. Yet despite its consistently scholarly tone the argument occasionally abandons objective analysis for the techniques of a political pamphlet. Since their report will indeed form the basis for a political battle, the editors probably felt justified in leaving out some of the shadows in the picture; they can count on their opponents to paint them in. But it seems to this reviewer that the call for reform of our present legislation would have gained in force had the editors



adhered to the really scholarly line and had they dealt more adequately with the historical development of the immigration policies of this country.

In tracing the events that led to the enactment of our immigration laws, the editors mention virtually all the influences that came into play. But they believe that, in the main, "myths and rationalizations about the new immigrant have played a *fundamental role* [italics mine]" in the formation of our policy. The immigrant is depicted as a scapegoat, "as the symbol of the underlying transformations which we were undergoing as a nation. The resentment and insecurity . . . were vented on the immigrants." And further: ". . . the intensified nationalism accompanying the First World War and the hysterical fear of revolution . . . were *definitely decisive* [italics mine] in the determination of our attitudes towards immigration." The quota law itself is dismissed with the remark that its "principle . . . which . . . declares that certain immigrants are desirable and others undesirable . . . is clearly at odds with our democratic ideals." Thus, the editors clearly imply that the preponderant influences in the formation of our restrictive immigration policy emanated from misguided national prejudices against the Asiatic and the "new" immigration from southern and eastern Europe.

It seems more likely, however, that both these prejudices and our subsequent restrictive legislation were the consequences of real difficulties, which arose as an aftermath to the mass immigration that in many years passed the million mark. In 1920 there were 14 million foreign-born in the United States, many of below-average economic and cultural aspirations. Badly assimilated, and concentrated in the great industrial centers (36 percent of New York City's population, for instance, was foreign-born), these immigrants represented a serious threat not only to labor standards but even—as became apparent in World War I—to the country's basic national unity. In this context the distinction between the Asiatic and new immigration, on the one hand, and the old immigration, on the other, was very real and no "myth."

By failing to show the historical process in its true dimensions, the editors deprived themselves of their strongest argument: namely, that policies which may have been defensible in 1921 and 1931 have no foundation today; thirty years have radically altered the scene. The mass assimilation problem no longer exists, as was proved decisively by the country's unity in the last war. The magnitude of our recent immigration rate—0.1 or 0.2 percent of our population—excludes the

possibility that assimilation problems should ever again arise on a serious scale. The structure of our quota immigration has drastically shifted: as late as 1925, 55 percent of our immigrants were unskilled laborers and only 6 percent were professionals; in 1945, only 18 percent of all immigrants were unskilled laborers, while the share of professionals had risen to 26 percent. The decline of our birth rate, the continued depopulation of the farm areas, increasing nonquota immigration from South America, shortages in segments of our economy that were traditionally immigrant trades, and finally, our altered position in international affairs—all constitute strong arguments for a basic reconsideration of our immigration policies along the lines suggested by the National Committee.

But there are even more urgent reasons for reform. During these last years our immigration policy has taken a turn for the worse. It was a tragic accident that the American immigration restrictions should have been most drastic in the very decade when the need for mass emigration from Europe became more urgent than ever before. But it is not altogether an accident that Hitler's race concept has left its mark on our law books. It is a sad comment on our affairs that this concept has survived of all places in the statute books of the United States; the Displaced Persons Law and the ensuing instructions from the State Department to its consular officers accept the essence of the Nuremberg laws without modification in their definition of special quotas for "immigrants of German ethnic origin." And, to add a minor but significant illustration, as recently as 1950, immigrants received their United States visas with the designation "Hebrew" in their passports, although this procedure was abolished by the Department of Justice in 1943. And the latest development—the McCarren bill now before the Senate—makes the legislation of the twenties appear liberal by comparison. This bill, whose sinister designs have not yet received much public attention, attempts to strangle future immigration through the following clever mechanism. Superimposed on the present national origin quota, a new quota system is to be erected: 50 percent of each national quota is to go to parents of adult United States citizens; 20 percent to spouses or children of alien residents; 30 percent to persons whose services are "urgently needed by the U. S." The net effect of these provisions would be a further drastic reduction of all quotas, since unused portions of these preference categories are nontransferable beyond 10 percent. Moreover, half of this 10 percent of the unused preference categories is reserved for brothers and sisters of citizens;

only the balance will be open to nonpreference immigration. With these enormous nontransferable preference quotas for relatives, and especially for "parents of adult citizens" (who will soon die either abroad or here), the McCarran bill, if enacted, will within a few years reduce immigration to a negligible level. The pattern of the national quota system has already had the result that, on an average, only about 40 percent of the total quotas has been used. McCarran's quota system would rapidly reduce this figure to about 10 percent. And even for these remnants of immigration, the bill proposes no relaxation of racial discrimination but rather a widening of administrative powers over these future citizens.

It is against this formidable opponent, obviously anticipated by Mr. Bernard and his associates, that the document they have prepared must be weighed. Whatever shortcomings their argument may have, its wise program for reform of our immigration policies deserves our support. It is between these views and those expressed in the McCarran bill that the American people will have to choose. There should be little dispute about legislation that permits Americans to be joined by their families. The basic decisions on our immigration policies will have to be made in terms of the world's needs for refuge and migration and the extent to which we decide to make those needs our concern.

HANS ZEISEL

*New School for Social Research*

PRIBRAM, KARL. *Conflicting Patterns of Thought*. Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1949. viii & 176 pp. \$3.25.

The main objectives of Pribram's study are to analyze four major conflicting patterns of thought—the universalistic, the nominalistic, the organismic, and the dialectical—and to indicate the interrelationship between these patterns and specific social, political, and economic phenomena. In the author's opinion, international understanding is impeded more by differences in patterns of thought than by the multiplicity of languages. Thus, every serious attempt to foster international understanding presupposes familiarity with the four basic patterns. It is a primary task of social research to examine whether the patterns as such or certain of their constitutive elements may be reconciled with each other. In addition to conflicts in the realm of logic there are the social repercussions which in the author's words are conflicts "among individuals whose reasoning has been dominated

or influenced by divergent assumptions regarding the cognitive capacity of the human mind" (p. 1).

No attempt can be made here to describe in detail Pribram's characterization of the four patterns. It should be emphasized, however, that in general Pribram's universalistic pattern corresponds to the scholastic school of realism and should not be confounded with the universalistic approach of certain twentieth-century sociologists, such as Othmar Spann.

Of particular interest among the interpretations of specific economic, social, and political phenomena in the light of the four major patterns of thought are the chapters entitled "The Definition of Social Responsibilities," "The Concept of Liberty," "Patterns of Economic Planning," and "Patterns of International Trade."

In the first, collective responsibility and nominalistic reasoning are posed as incompatible, since for nominalistic reasoning the will of individuals is the only source of social relationships and social institutions. Self-responsibility or self-reliance implies the obligation to think and act on the basis of assumptions and possibilities. In a social environment governed by nominalistic reasoning the individual is bound only by positive laws and by contracts freely entered into. The counterpart to self-responsibility in the sphere of politics and morals is self-responsibility in the economic field. At the same time, recognition of certain minimum levels of social security, education, and general well-being as safeguards of the effective exercise of economic self-responsibility is regarded by Pribram as being in line with nominalistic reasoning.

With regard to the second point, Pribram notes that man's struggle for "liberty" has been closely related to the conflict among patterns of thought. Nominalistic reasoning distinguishes different aspects of liberty, each of them related to a specific sphere of human action: freedom of thought and expression, freedom of creed and association, legal and political liberty, economic freedom. In all democratic countries in which the principles of nominalism were generally accepted, the right of the individual to choose among available alternatives was established as a guiding principle of social action in almost all spheres of life.

Methods of devising and implementing economic plans also have varied in accordance with the dominant patterns of thought. Nominalistic reasoning led to the dissolution of the medieval economic system which had been patterned on universalistic reasoning. Thus

economic planning in terms of a rigid hierarchy of concepts was superseded by planning in pursuit of individual interests, which required freedom in choosing the means to attain certain economic ends which in themselves were not fixed. By contrast, organismic planning and Bolshevik planning should be interpreted in reference to the organismic and the dialectical patterns of thought.

In the field of international trade the principles governing the multilateral trade pattern were developed in reference to nominalistic patterns of thought. A hypothetical conception of the economic system was devised to facilitate application of the principles of mechanics to the aggregate of all exchange transactions. The international trading community which the mercantilists regarded as the integration of widely different political entities came to be regarded as a composite of innumerable individual transactions motivated by profit-seeking and interrelated by a common monetary standard of value. Pribram considers the nineteenth-century system of international trade and finance among the greatest achievements of the application of nominalistic reasoning to the regulation of social relationships. He states that the three prevailing patterns of world trade—the bilateral, the multilateral, and the monopolistic—correspond to the organismic, the nominalistic, and dialectic patterns of thought, whereas medieval and sixteenth-century concepts of trade were still widely determined by the universalistic pattern.

Pribram's approach to these and specific related questions which concern the social scientist and economist is undeniably stimulating. But some of his interpretations of theories, facts, and events are not entirely free from a certain arbitrariness. For example, a considerable number of historians of political philosophy have emphasized that William of Occam and his reforming ideas greatly influenced Marsiglio of Padua, author of *Defensor Pacis* (1324). The *Defensor Pacis*, in turn, has rightly been recognized as the first systematic exposition of the doctrine of sovereignty. Traditionally, a student of political philosophy and of the history of ideas would therefore infer that there is a certain intellectual affinity between nominalism and sovereignty. Pribram, however, in discussing certain problems of sovereignty states: "A fundamental problem faced by the League [of Nations] was how to reconcile, for purposes of practical and lasting international co-operation, the doctrine of national sovereignty with the methods of nominalistic reasoning" (p. 152). Also, Pribram refers to "the nominalistic maxim '*nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege*'"

(p. 67), but on the following page cites the Nuremberg trials as an application of the principles of nominalistic reasoning. These two examples may suffice to indicate some of the difficulties of applying consistently the four major patterns of thought to specific problems and situations.

It may also be doubted whether it is fruitful to classify individual philosophers as belonging exclusively to the nominalistic, universalistic, dialectic, or organismic school. ("School" is here used by the reviewer as synonym for "pattern of thought.") In Plato's dialogues one can find most lucid expositions of nominalism (*Protagoras*), of universalism (*Parmenides*), or organic reasoning (*Republic*), and of dialectic reasoning in virtually all of his writings. It may, of course, be perfectly justifiable to state that John Stuart Mill formulated "the final nominalistic arguments in favor of general freedom of thought" (p. 75), but to praise or condemn certain philosophers on the ground that they did not *fully* endorse nominalistic methods of thought (p. 21) appears to be a debatable approach to the history of ideas.

It is perhaps the fundamental premise of Pribram's book that "differences in patterns of thought have exerted a basic influence on the organization of political, economic, and social life in various nations at various times and have been responsible for far-reaching divergencies in political and social institutions" (p. 1). It appears, however, that philosophers of certain countries have made significant contributions to nominalistic, realistic, organic, and dialectic reasoning *without* having exerted a basic influence on the political, economic, and social life of the nation. There may, after all, be an element of truth in the saying, *Nemo propheta in patria*. The fact that Locke, Hume, and Mill were Englishmen does not in itself prove that their doctrines, in so far as they may be considered nominalistic, have been responsible for certain features deemed characteristic of Anglo-Saxon democracy. Even if one recognizes that there may be a significant interaction between patterns of thought and social reality, one may doubt whether these patterns of thought are, to use a juridical term, "self-executing." For, such patterns may be conceived by political theorists without being transformed into socially and economically effective action, especially if political leaders or the public at large do not think or act in conformity with these patterns. The constructive criticism of basic ontological and ethical problems by Kant, Fichte, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schopenhauer, Vaihinger, and Husserl cannot be denied, but lack of response to certain of these philosophical



doctrines on the part of the German leaders and the German people may be attributed to other factors than to patterns of thought as such.

In short, nominalistic, universalistic, organic, and dialectic reasoning *may influence* social and economic action and behavior, but whether and to what extent these types of reasoning *are responsible* for political and economic thought and action should in every case be most carefully scrutinized.

Up to the final chapter of the book Pribram treats the four major patterns of thought as if they were self-contained and mutually exclusive. There he sets forth three conceivable relationships between the "conflicting" patterns, namely: (1) Peaceful coexistence of the patterns is conceivable. In particular, "It is a great and vital problem to allocate separate spheres of influence to various patterns of thought through democratic procedures and thus to secure their peaceful co-existence" (p. 169). (2) Combinations of one pattern with another pattern or with several patterns occur. For example, "Nominalistic reasoning has shown a remarkable capacity to enter into combinations of various kinds with other patterns of thought" (*ibid.*). (3) There is a secular conflict between these patterns. It is this conflict that constitutes the major theme of the book.

Pribram's approach invites the basic methodological question whether the conflict between the four patterns is due to "fundamental logical differences" (p. 168) inherent in these patterns or whether these conflicts should rather be considered conflicts between political ideologies purposely devised to separate the adherents of one pattern from those of another. In other words: Is the social significance of these patterns to be ascribed to their logical content or to their social or antisocial applications? Who decides whether the ultimate social and economic objective should be peaceful coexistence of or conflict between the patterns?

Ideologies have frequently been linked with the principle of "double truth"; that is to say, there are basic differences between what is true for the adherent of one school of thought and what is true for followers of another. From this viewpoint, each individual statement takes on a different meaning when considered in the context of one or the other ideological pattern.

To designate what Pribram calls "patterns of thought" as ideologies may, moreover, be justified on the ground that the exposition of the four major patterns is greatly oversimplified; this is especially true of the dialectical pattern. In general, the reviewer feels that the social

significance of the various patterns is not directly derived from the differences inherent in the processes of reasoning, but from the different social effects of these methods of reasoning. Furthermore, the emphasis on "secular conflicts" between the patterns of thought may furnish another argument that Pribram focuses attention on ideologies rather than on conflicts among religious tenets, although, no doubt, the struggle between nominalism and realism in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was not considered a purely secular conflict. In the Middle Ages realism versus nominalism was undoubtedly a theological rather than a secular conflict. At least, secular forces relied on nominalistic reasoning in their opposition to what they considered unwarranted logical and political claims of the Papacy.

However that may be, there can hardly be any doubt that the major ideological conflicts of the last one hundred and eighty years have centered on conflicts between the universalistic, organic, and dialectical schools of thought. What is doubtful is whether these three schools of thought have lived up to their claim of constituting coherent and systematic political *Weltanschauungen* or whether individuals in their presumably intellectually honest search for coherent and systematic political *Weltanschauungen* may not have been misled by sham symbols set up by demagogues. It has often been overlooked by students of political theory and practice that logical significance and coherence of a certain school of thought are not necessarily equivalent to its political effectiveness. As for nominalism, it is one of the undeniable merits of Pribram's book that it stresses the unique position of nominalism in this ideological conflict and indicates the nominalistic pattern of thought as a significant element in Western democratic thinking. As the author rightly states: ". . . no generally valid system of moral values can be established by means of nominalistic methods" (p. 168). Moreover, nominalism must appear less purposeful, at least in regard to community action, than the universalistic, organic, and dialectic schools of thought, especially if one accepts as criteria of nominalism "randomness of ends" and "hypothetical thinking." In the author's words: "Consistent application of the principle that all views—even those of the most far-sighted men—are purely hypothetical has led inexorably to the conclusion that everybody can claim the right to participate on a footing of equality with all others in the discussion of political, moral, social, and economic issues and to have a voice in deciding these issues in accordance with generally accepted formal rules" (p. 58). It is noteworthy that the formal rules

do not and cannot in themselves determine the substantive results of their observance.

Pribram's emphasis on the nominalistic tradition in the United States and England should contribute to a clearer understanding of the apparent paradox that the Anglo-Saxon countries, which in the course of history have proved so bold in political action, appear at times hesitant in the assertion of their basic political beliefs and thoughts. Also Pribram's attempt to interpret pragmatism with special reference to nominalism and its opposite realism (see especially pp. 66, 70, 87) may help to elucidate a frequently neglected aspect of the American history of ideas. Parenthetically, it may be added that the discussion of philosophical, legal, and economic problems in terms of "realism" and "nominalism" is not without precedent in the United States. It should be recalled that in 1844 Emerson published an essay, "Nominalist and Realist," which is indicative of his interest in the conflict between nominalistic and realistic reasoning. Also, C. S. Peirce in his theory of reality considered carefully the nominalistic as well as the realistic approach. Currently, there appears to be a revived interest in the basic issues in the conflict between nominalism and realism as evidenced by the recent study of the medieval controversy by Meyrinck H. Carré, *Realists and Nominalists* (London 1946). Also Huntington Cairns in *Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel* (Baltimore 1949) regards the nominalistic-realist issue as a central theme of the philosophy of law and of applied jurisprudence.

There is much loose talk today on "ideas as weapons," on "ideological conflict," and the like. Actually, intellectual inertia and the abstract and complex character of the major conflicting ideologies serve as deterrents to an open-minded and intelligent appraisal of the logical and political significance of the nominalistic, universal, organic, and dialectical schools of thought. It should therefore not be surprising that even the most widespread use of the mass media of communication cannot contribute to international understanding unless the participants in mass media programs and the public at large endeavor to understand the premises from which the socially, politically, and economically effective ideas are derived as well as the substance of what is being communicated.

On the whole, Pribram's appeal to retrace and rediscover the nominalistic tradition in philosophy, economics, and politics should contribute to a clearer understanding of significant intellectual currents of the past and present. His study covers a wide field and is thoroughly

stimulating even where it invites objections. It is to be highly commended as a serious effort to bridge the often all too wide gap between political and economic theory and practice.

HANS AUFRICHT

Washington, D. C.

HOGBEN, LANCELOT. *From Cave Painting to Comic Strip. A Kaleidoscope of Human Communication*. New York: Chanticleer Press. 1949. 287 pp. \$5.

TSANOFF, RADOSLAV A. *The Ways of Genius*. New York: Harper. 1949. xv & 310 pp. \$4.

If Mr. Tsanoff may be said to have undertaken to show *en philosophe* what genius is and does, and the why and how of its being and doing, Mr. Hogben may be said to have concentrated, as a social scientist passionate about peace and freedom among the children of Adam, on that manifestation of man's genius which he regards as the singularity of his human nature—his arts of communication. Reading the two books together, I gain the impression that Mr. Hogben's discourse could more readily have a place for Mr. Tsanoff's, than Mr. Tsanoff's for Mr. Hogben's. Mr. Tsanoff, I gather, has concerned himself to state a philosophic faith, without studying to prove or demonstrate it. His book comes to me as the communication of an "insight" disregarding alternatives, glossing over controversial points, depending on a kind of Whiteheadian "self-evidence" made attractive by a quiet urbanity of tone and expression, an extensive allusiveness and a modest certitude. Genius, Mr. Tsanoff avers, is "original creative ability and it is creative and original because it is the integrative self-possession of intelligence." This is his summing up of his discourses about the relations of "mental ability and creative power," about the relation of insanity to genius, about primitive genius, about genius in painting, sculpture, and music, genius in poetry and drama and in translating poetry, genius in science and technology, genius in criticism and religion. This is their upshot—"the philosophic purport of our inquiry in this book. In the sublime achievements of genius reality reveals itself as a creative process, unique in each productive mind, inexhaustible and infinitely perfectible," and as involving "a scale of ideal prospects of actuality which operate as standards and bases of evaluation," which are also needful "in explaining physical processes. . . ." The conviction that in its creativity the mind somehow reaches the summit of reality has marked poet and sage and saint. Hinting of "expanding universe," "creative evolution," "genius is

creative in aspirations and achievement, and it contemplates the vision of Creative Reality."

Whatever this vision means, I regret to report that not Mr. Tsanoff's instances and occasions, not his charming manner nor his richly allusive—especially literary—matter, communicate this vision to me. His book does not enable me to see genius-at-work, whether in the singularity of some human person or the universality of existence exemplified in this singularity. It does enable me to apprehend something of Mr. Tsanoff's reacting-with-words-to-modes-of-specification-of-the-ambiguous-word, "Genius." I could with sufficient reason interpret this as Mr. Tsanoff's enjoyment of "genius" and I could appraise his enjoyment as an exemplification of his maxim for critics that "to enjoy is to create anew." But is this what Mr. Tsanoff intended to communicate? And, if not, can his communication be called successful?

The impact of Mr. Hogben's book makes an interesting contrast. Its subtitle is *A History of Human Communication*. It contains 230 illustrations. Each signalizes a step in this history, and all together give an overall view of the sequence and a suggestion of the next step. With their rubrics, they fascinate. Although designed to exemplify and illustrate the ideas of the text, their effect on me has been to take my attention away from the text and to make return to it an effort. And the text has an interest all its own, by no means small. Perhaps this experience is one more confirmation of Mr. Hogben's idea that man is the sole picturemaker among animals, that pictures are his first and last means of communication; that all his enduring signs and symbols begin as pictures of pictures of pictures; that pictures thus are the primal vehicles of numbers and letters and words, the first beginnings of the religions, the arts, the sciences in the economy of human cultures. In Mr. Tsanoff's language, it is the dynamics of genius at the source that Mr. Hogben is writing of and picturizing. The pictures bring it home independently of the text; the text would tell the tale even if there were no pictures. Perhaps, then, they ought not to have been interleaved as they have.

Their span stretches from the cave paintings of Altamira to the color-prints of the daily press. They tie communication in with basic instinctual need—first the need for food and shelter and safety, as these are postulated by cave images and by the totemic animals which primitive imagination projected upon the constellations that mark the places of the earth's seasonal turns, and instituted as "signs" of the Zodiac; again, the need for measuring time which is served by such structures as the pyramids of Egypt, the Downton in Devon, the Sun



Tower in Peru. Later came the tradesman's need to count, with its service by means first of the abacus and then by the invention and notation of numerals including zero; the tremendous development of the mathematician's art followed. Correlatively came the formation of alphabets from pictures and all the devices of writing and printing from the stylus to the teletype, while the painter's art developed to its present forms, and the comic strip arose to feed as a "mass-medium," under the new conditions of "mass communication," the hunger for seeing and making pictures. Today that device is reinforced by the movie and television. The hunger they serve is a hunger for entertainment, and the purveyors of entertainment serve it with a most vulgar, wasteful, and abortive use of the media of mass communication and accent the use with fantastic inflationary adjectives. Alas, poor mass-man! Watch out, civilization!

For in the past, Mr. Hogben believes, societies have failed because communication failed to keep up with development. Communication fails wherever it is a monopoly of an elite or wherever it is inadequate to the "day-to-day cross fertilization of theory and practice." It is failing today because, also in democratic societies, under the present conditions of research "the temper of science becomes daily more authoritarian" and a "new authoritarianism of the campus and of the laboratory" is joining that of the churches. To stop this we must undertake "an all-round and intensive speed-up of the educational process from the cradle to the grave." And this calls for media of communication common to all mankind. Mr. Hogben argues for an international language auxiliary to the national ones, and a sort of "pictorial esperanto" which can present, for the eye to see and the mind to understand instantaneously, abstract relational configurations whose verbal or mathematical explication might require the mandarinlike equipment of the occupational elite. Mr. Hogben holds that the late Otto Neurath's invention of the isotype is just such a medium as is required. As Neurath's book, *Modern Man in the Making*, demonstrates, its communication can be grasped by anyone anywhere, and it has an aesthetic economy and grace of articulation which no comic strip does or can attain. It can be as readily used in films and other audiovisual media as in print. If UNESCO's labors for global peace are not to become Sisyphean fiascos, the organization ought to aim at universal literacy, at a universal system of weights, measures, and scripts, and a universal auxiliary language, all postulated on the widest use of the new instruments and media of communication, while the United Nations ought to reward with higher status the progress of



backward countries in literacy and education—that is, in power to receive and make communications.

Assent or dissent to this conception of the rise, the role, and the impact of the media of communication as one may, its general character cannot fail to impress. It may be the very quintessence of a unifying utopianism, but the “realistic” syntheses men have bet their lives on in the past have proved to be no less efforts that get nowhere. Here, as in most human enterprises, the going's the thing, not the goal.

H. M. KALLEN

WIENER, NORBERT. *Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*. New York: John Wiley. 1948. vii & 194 pp. \$3.

Dr. Wiener's book deals with several new developments in physics as applied to technological problems, and with physiological phenomena which he tries to clarify by the study of those facts in physics. The new developments are: the construction of ultrarapid electric computing machines; the planning of prediction devices such as are needed in the control of antiaircraft fire; the systematic investigation of feed-back systems in which deviation of action from a prescribed result causes reduction of the deviation; and the study of certain problems in communication engineering which are related to the second law of thermodynamics. In physiology, Dr. Wiener regards the goal-directed activities of animals and man as examples of feed-back; he suggests that the action of organic catalysts in metabolism and reproduction be considered in relation to fundamental questions in communication engineering; and he includes the irritability of living tissue in the same domain. He also compares the all-or-none character of neuronal discharge with the way in which switching devices operate in computing machines; he describes an attempt to interpret certain Gestalt problems in terms of specially arranged fibers in the visual cortex; and he is inclined to believe that the perseveration of some activities in computing machines is analogous to short-time human memory. In fact, it seems to him that the new concepts may suffice for a physiological theory of conditioning, of learning in general, and of thinking.

In machines, feed-back may become impossible, or it may be excessive. Dr. Wiener finds that two disturbances of human action, ataxia and purpose tremor, can be explained as abnormalities of this kind. But his excursions into human pathology go much farther. Since he believes that so-called functional mental disorders are mainly diseases

of memory, and that memory has now become a subject matter of physics or engineering, he concludes that such forms of insanity can also be understood on this ground. There are, it seems to him, patients who have not the sufficient number of neurons to carry out normal processes of thought, too many neurons being occupied with ever-expanding processes which correspond to persistent worries, and so forth.

Among the concepts of the new technology, that of feed-back appears to the author particularly important. It is for this reason that the present book has been called *Cybernetics*. For, in feed-back, an action is automatically *steered* until a certain result has been reached, and the new name means, more or less, "the science of steered action."

The concept of feed-back is undoubtedly so important that the social no less than the natural scientist ought to be familiar with its denotation. Feed-back occurs in systems in which deviations of a given state from a standard always cause processes by which the deviations are reduced or abolished. Many events in nature may be described in such terms. Naturally, however, steering in a system appears to us particularly impressive when a part of this system changes its own situation, from deviations to standard, not directly, but rather via the operations of another part. Take the thermostat by which the heating of a house is regulated. The thermostat is sensitive to changes of temperature in its environment; on the other hand, the instrument is connected with the furnace, and through this connection it can provide conditions for either increased or reduced combustion. But such changes are "fed back" into the environment of the thermostat by the fact that the house becomes warmer in the former case, and that its temperature is lowered in the latter. Thus, if the thermostat is set for a particular temperature, circular action in the system as a whole will always lower the temperature when it is higher than the prescribed level, and will increase it when the air in the house is colder. The governor of a steam engine, which regulates the velocity of this engine, operates in a similar fashion. Again, the steering engines of a ship are connected with the wheel in such a way that differences between the position of the wheel and the position of the rudder always cause a decrease of the differences.

Such examples, which I take from Dr. Wiener's book, clearly show that feed-back in this sense (the so-called *negative* feed-back) is not an entirely new discovery. But the author is surely right when he insists that a more systematic study of steering in circularly arranged systems may lead to quite unexpected consequences not only in engi-

neering but also in the theory of organic processes. In fact, the general principle probably applies to situations which are far more interesting than those considered in the present book. A long time ago, Gestalt psychologists pointed to the fact that under the influence of given visual situations motor activities of the eyes tend to change those situations in the direction of greatest simplicity and clearness. This is a case of feed-back in a circular chain since movements of the eyes change the distribution of processes in the visual cortex, whereupon this area sends correspondingly changed patterns of innervation to the muscles of the eyes, further movements occur, and so forth. Since the eyes would not spontaneously deviate from a position in which muscle tensions are balanced, the distribution of visual processes in the brain is obviously the factor by which the direction of feed-back is here determined, and the final result must be a particular distribution of these processes, most probably one which represents a minimum (or maximum) of energy. The visual characteristics of the actual result agree with this expectation. The difference between feed-back operations in this situation and the examples considered by Dr. Wiener consists in the fact that in the former case no condition is arbitrarily imposed on the system as the "right" one. Whatever the visual situation may be, it is always an optimal distribution from a *dynamic* point of view which the feed-back establishes. Many instances of feed-back in the organism may be of this type rather than of the kind discussed by Dr. Wiener.

It must be remarked, however, that the author is opposed to a consideration of neurophysiological problems in terms of energy balances and the like, because his neurological thinking follows the tradition according to which even cortical function is restricted to the traveling of nerve impulses along separate fibers and to the excitation of further neurons at synapses. Actually, psychological evidence against this view of brain function is now quite strong. It seems that available observations can be physiologically understood only if it is assumed that, to a large extent, brain processes have the character of fields which spread in the tissue as a continuum. Moreover, the results of recent physiological investigations point in the same direction. If eventually a change of neurological thinking in this direction should prove to be necessary, many hypotheses formulated in *Cybernetics* would have to be discarded. For instance, the interpretation of certain Gestalt phenomena in terms of special machine arrangements in the cortex would have to be replaced by a much simpler explanation in terms of field dynamics. But it ought to be emphasized that such a

transition from the traditional to a field theory of brain processes would by no means deprive the concept of feed-back of its great significance in neurology. On the contrary, its importance would probably be enhanced. The same reasoning applies to the way in which the author approaches problems of thinking and of human pathology. Here again, his assumptions about the nature of neural events may have to be replaced by others which he fails to consider; but feed-back and related concepts would probably remain as essential in the framework of the new assumptions as they appear to Dr. Wiener from his point of view.

As to the now popular comparison between human thought and the operations of calculating machines, the greatest reserve seems to be indicated. Dr. Wiener's book does not actually describe how these machines function. But from what he says one does not get the impression that the processes occurring in the machines are functionally comparable to those which occur in human thinking. In the relation of human beings to the computing machines, thinking in the proper sense of the term appears to remain the task of the former. Excellent engineers and mathematicians build into such instruments mechanically forced ways of operation which may serve as factually reliable substitutes for certain quantitative activities of the human mind such as addition and multiplication. It is not astonishing that, so far as speed is concerned, the substituted operations of the machines are far superior to anything that human brains can achieve. At the same time, these operations appear to be generically different from those of a human being who is occupied with a mathematical problem. This statement holds for the quantitative phase of mathematical work, but it is still more obviously true of those operations which precede all quantitative work, and also of those which decide at each moment precisely what quantitative steps must next be taken. Such decisions are forced upon the machines from the outside by devices in which a series of successively applied mechanical constraints prescribes the right sequence of operations. The mathematician knows why in a given instance one particular combination of quantitative performances is required. The machines do not know, because among their functions there is none that can be compared with insight into the meaning of a problem.

Dr. Wiener's book has been highly recommended not only to electrical engineers, radio engineers and physicists, but also to physiologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers. Unfortunately, about one third of the book will prove

to be utterly useless to readers in the latter group. These pages contain mathematical deliberations which even otherwise well-trained mathematicians will not always be able to follow; for the deliberations are of the kind which specialists in a particular area of mathematics are likely to produce when they discuss their views among themselves with a blackboard at hand. The speed of reasoning is much too fast for psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, and even philosophers. Steps in the deductions which such persons could not possibly find alone are often omitted, and since several passages are printed as though they were quickly copied from the experts' blackboard, including uncorrected errors, nonmathematicians will learn virtually nothing from these chapters.

They will, however, learn a great deal from the Introduction, which gives a short history of the new technical problems and concepts. They may also be interested in Dr. Wiener's views about Newtonian and Bergsonian time, in his comparison of computing machines with nervous systems, and in his interpretation of mental disturbances.

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Moreover, such readers will find some penetrating remarks in the last chapter, which deals with information, language, and society. With regard to the possibility that typically sociological problems may also be handled as questions of communication engineering, the author assumes an extremely cautious attitude. Certain processes in social life may have something in common with the way in which feed-back operates in physical systems, but Dr. Wiener feels that we have no accurate observations in this field which could serve to transform mere speculation on this ground into actual knowledge of those processes. It is just possible that some readers will feel a similar hesitation when the mathematician or the engineer begins to deal quite freely with problems of psychology. There is probably more actual knowledge in modern psychology than there is in the sociology of our time. But although such knowledge is generally available, only fractions of it are mentioned when new technologists explain psychology.

WOLFGANG KÖHLER

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